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IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1559 
[The Decision of 1789] amounted to a legislative construc­
tion of the constitution, and it has ever since been acqui­
esced in and acted upon, as of decisive authority in the 
case. 
. . . [T]he construction given to the Constitution in 
1789 has continued to rest on this loose, incidental declara­
tory opinion of Congress, and the sense and practice of 
government since that time. It may now be considered as 
firmly and definitively settled, and there IS good sense and 
practical utility in the construction. 
James Kent' 
The public . . .  acquiesced in [the Decision of 1789], and 
it constitutes, perhaps the most extraordinary case in the 
history of the government of a power, conferred by impli­
cation on the executive by the assent of a bare majority of 
Congress, which has not been questioned on many other 
occasions. Even the most jealous advocates of state rights 
seem to have slumbered over this vast reach of authority ,  
and have left it untouched. 
Joseph Story2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The last fifteen years have seen an intense debate over the 
scope of the President ' s  power to execute the laws.  Presidential 
removal power, power to gather information from subordinate 
executive official s ,  and power to bind subordinate executive offi­
cials have all been the subject of controversy. This modem debate 
began with claims of executive authority advanced by President 
Reagan, whose administration continually questioned the constitu­
tionality of independent agencies and of independent counsels ap-
I. I JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 3 1 0  ( 1 st ed.,  0. Halsted ed . ,  
1826) (emphasis added) .  
2. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
Section 1 543 (4Lh ed., Thomas M. Cooley ed., 1 873). 
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pointed under the Ethics i n  Government Act of 1 978 ("EIGA"). 
President Bush continued and intensified these claims, and (after a 
slow start) President Clinton has begun to see some merit in them 
as well.  In retrospect, one could conclude w ith some irony that the 
passage of the EIGA in 1978 has done much to trigger this debate 
by encouraging recent Presidents to reassert vigorously their consti­
tutional prerogatives. 
As these reassertions of presidential authority began to receive 
the attention of the S upreme Court and of the legal academy, two 
principle camps grew up. The first camp consists of so-called uni­
tary executive theorists l ike ourselves who support a broad presi­
dential power of removal and control over law execution. The 
second consists of a group of anti-unitary executive theorists who 
have argued for a more l imited presidential role. 
To date the argument between these two camps has proceeded 
mainly along three axes. First, there has been spirited debate over 
whether unitarians l ike ourselves are right in arguing that the texe 
and structure4 of the Constitution as originally  understood5 created 
3. For textual arguments supporting the unitary executive, see Steven G. Calabresi, 
The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L.  REV. 1 377, 1378-86, 1 389- 1 40 0  
(1994) [hereinafter Calabresi ,  Power Grants]; Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B .  
Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 559-99 ( 1 994); 
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, 
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1153 ,  1165-68 (1992); Frank B .  Cross, Executive 
Orders 12.29 1  and 12,498: A Test Case in Presidential Control of Executive Agencies, 4 
1. L .  & POL. 483 ,  499-504 ( 1988) [hereinafter Cross ,  Executive Orders 12,291 and 
12,498]; Davi d  P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers after B owsher, 1986 SUP. CT . REV. 
1 9 ,  31-36; Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. O lson: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the 
Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 314- 1 7  ( 1 989); Geoffrey P .  Mi l ler, Indepen­
dent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REv . 4 1 ,  5 8-63; Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power 
of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. I, 14-15 (1993); Kevin  H. Rhodes, A Structure 
Without Foundation: A Reply to Professor Froomkin, 88 Nw. U.  L. REv. 1 406, 1408-14 
( 1 994); 1. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 198 9  DUKE L.J. 1 1 62, 
1183-89; Charles N .  Steele & Jeffrey H .  Bowman, The Constitutionality of Independent 
Regulatory Agencies Under the Necessary and Proper Clause: The Case of the Federal 
Election Commission, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 363 (1987); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of 
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 573, 597-99, 643-50 (1984). 
4. For structural arguments supporting the unitary executive, see Calabresi, Power 
Grants, supra note 3, at 1386-89; Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, supra note 
3 ,  at 504-08; Liberman, supra note 3, at 342-58; Thomas W. Merri l l ,  The Constitutional 
Separa.ion of Powers, 1 99 1  SUP. CT. REV. 225,  2 28-29, 235-45 [hereinafter Merri l l ,  Sepa­
ration of Powers]; Mil ler, Independent Agencies, supra note 3, at 63-67; Rhodes,  supra 
note 3, at 1414- 1 8; Strauss, supra note 3 ,  at 640-69; Susan M. Davies ,  Comment, Con­
gressional Encroachment on Executive Branch Communications, 57 U. CHI . L. REV. 1 297, 
13 1 4-20 ( l 990). 
5. For originalist arguments supporting the unitary executive, see Steven G. Calabresi, 
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a strongly unitary executive branch. Anti-unitarians have heatedly 
disagreed w ith the unitarian account and have offered their own 
non-unitarian accounts of the text,6 structure,7 and original histo­
ry. 8  Argument has been joined over this issue most recently by 
Professors Lawrence Lessig, Cass S unstein, and Martin Flahert/ 
on the anti-unitarian side and by Professor Calabresi and S aikrishna 
Prakash on the pro-unitarian side . 10 
Second, there has been some debate between unitarians and 
anti-unitarians over the significance and relevance of changed c ir­
cumstances. Professors Lessig and S unstein have argued that be­
cause of changed circumstances a mostly unitary executive is com­
pelled today where one w as not compelled before, and Professor 
Calabresi has argued that changed circumstances make the unitary 
Some Normative A rguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 37-47 ( 1 995) 
[hereinafter Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments] ;  Frank B.  Cross, The Surviving Signifi­
cance of the Unitary Executive, 27 Hous. L. REV. 599, 60 1 -18 ( 1990); Miller, Indepen­
dent Agencies, supra note 3, at 67-71; Monaghan, Protective Power, supra note 3, at 15-
20; P. Strauss, supra note 3, at 599-60 1 ,  603-04; Davies, supra note 4, at 1299- 1 306; 
Saikrishna Banga1ore Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the 
President's Administrative Powers, 1 02 YALE L.J. 99 1 ,  10 1 2-15 ( 1 993). 
6. See Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: Form, Sub­
stance, and Administrative Independence, 75 KY. L.J. 699, 7 1 2-14 ( 1 987) [hereinafter 
Entin, Removal Power]; A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 
88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 346, 1350-66 (1994) [hereinafter Froomkin, Imperial Presidency]; 
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. I, 47-55 ,  6 1 -70 ( 1 994); Morton Rosenberg, Congress 's Prerogative over Agencies 
and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration' s  Theory 
of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 649-51 ( 1 989) [hereinafter Rosen­
berg, Congress's Prerogative]; Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control of Agency Rule­
making: An Analysis of Constitutional Issues that May Be Raised by Executive Order 
12,291 ,  23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 1 99, 1 203- 1 0  ( 1 98 1 )  [hereinafter Rosenberg, Presidential Con­
trol] ;  Cass R. Sunstein, Article II Revisionism, 92 MlCH. L. REV. 1 3 1  ( 1 993); A. Michael 
Froomkin, Note, In Defense of Administrative Agency A utonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787, 799-
801  ( 1 987) [hereinafter Froomkin, Note]; Joseph P. Verdon, Note, The Vesting Clauses, 
the Nixon Test, and the Pharaoh's Dreams, 78 VA. L. REv. 1 25 3 ,  1277-82 ( 1 992). 
7. See A. Michael Froomkin, Imperial Presidency, supra note 6, at 1366-76; Lessig & 
Sunstein supra note 6, at 85- 1  06; Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About 
Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430 ( 1987); Froomkin, 
Note, supra note 6, at 8 0 1 -04. 
8. See Theodore Y. B lumoff, 1//usions of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Politics and 
the Tenure Powers in the Court, 73 IOWA L. REv. 1 079, 1086-93 ( 1 988); Gerhard Cas­
per, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2 1 1 ,  2 1 2-24 ( 1 989) [hereinafter Casper, Early Practices]; Abner S .  Greene, 
Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 23 ,  
1 40-53 ( 1 994); Froomkin, Note, supra note 6 ,  at 804-08. 
9. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 6; Martin S. Flaherty, The 
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 ( 1 996). 
I 0. See Ca1abresi & Prakash, supra note 3. 
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executive more necessary now than ever before.11 Professors Ab­
ner Greene and Ma..rtin Flaherty, however, disagree. They see 
changed circumstances as largely pointing in an anti-unitarian di­
rection.12 
Third, and lastly, there has been some related debate over 
whether normatively a strongly unitary executive is a good thing. 
Professor Calabresi and others have argued that it is.u Professors 
Peter Shane and Michael Fitts, 14 among many others, 15 have ar­
gued that it is not. 
Recently, the opponents of the unitary executive have opened 
up a fourth front in this struggle by placing increasing emphasis on 
early American practices with respect to removal power and pow­
ers of presidential supervision.16 Most notably, in their seminal 
article  The President and the Administration, Professors Lawrence 
Lessig and Cass Sunstein conducted an extensive survey of our 
early practices with respect to pres idential control over law execu­
tion and concluded that the idea that the Framers meant to create a 
I I. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 93- 1 06; Calabresi, Some Normative A rgu­
ments, supra note 5, at 23 (noting that changed circumstances strengthen the normative 
case for the unitary executive as a device to control factions). 
1 2. See Greene, supra note 8, at 1 53-76; Flaherty, supra note 9, at 1 8 1 0-38. 
13 . See Calabresi, Some Normative A rguments, supra note 5, at 48- 1 02; Harold J .  
Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegacions of Administrative 
Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 62, 70-80 (1990) [herein­
after Krent, Fragmenting] ;  Harold J .  Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizens Suits and 
Citizen Sunstein, 9 1  MICH. L. REv. 1 793 ,  1 79 8- 1 8 1 0  ( 1 993); Miller, Independent Agencies, 
supra note 3, at 56-57; Geoffrey P. Miller, The Unitary Executive in a Unified Theory of 
Constitutional Law: The Problem of Interpretation, I S  CARDOZO L. REv. 20 1 ,  2 1 3- 1 8  
( 1 993); P .  Strauss, supra note 3, at 622-25; S idak, supra note 3, at 1 202-06. 
1 4. See Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: 
The Case of Presidencial of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 1 6 1  ( 1 995); Michael A. Fitts, 
The Paradox of Power in the Modem State: Why a Unitary, Centralized Presidency May 
Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 1 44 U. PENN.  L. REV. 827 ( 1 996). 
I 5. See Blumoff, supra note 8, at I I  5 1 -55 ;  Neal Devins, Political Will and the Uni­
tary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency lndependem.7, I 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 
273, 275-76 ( 1 993); Greene, supra note 8, at 1 77-79; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 
93- 1 02; Peter P. Swire, Note, Incorporation of Independent Agencies imo the Executive 
Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1 766, 1 768-75 ( 1 985).  
1 6. See Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Altomey General in Our Constitu­
tional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1 989 DuKE L.J. 56 1 ;  Blumoff, 
supra note 8, at I 093- 1 1 01; Casper, Early Practices, supra note 8 ,  at 227 -42; Gerhard 
Casper, Executive-Congressional Separation of Power During the Presidency of Thomas 
Jefferson, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 ( 1 995) [hereinafter Casper, Thomas Jefferson] ;  Kent 
Greenfield, Original Penumbras: Constitutional lnterprelation in the First Year of Con­
gress, 26 CONN.  L. REV. 79, 1 42-43 ( 1 993); Froomkin, Note, supra note 6, at 805-08. 
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strongly unitary executive is an ahistorical myth.17 Professor Cala­
bresi and Sai Prakash responded in The President's Power to Exe­
cute the Laws, concluding that the text and pre-ratification history 
of the Constitution strongly support the unitariness of the executive 
branch and that nothing in the early post-ratification period raised 
serious questions about that support.18 Professor Martin Flaherty in 
tum responded with an insightful article disputing Professor 
Calabresi and Sai Prakash's interpretation of the constitutional text 
and the pre-ratification history regarding the unitary executive.19 
Along the way, Professor Flaherty also chose flatly to assert that 
"more than 200 years of practice under the Constitution suggest 
that the inherent fluidity and the system of checks and balances 
render a strict separation [of powers] impossible."20 Unhappily, 
little has been written on the history of the unitary executive that 
would support or disprove Professor Flaherty's assertion. Prior 
articles have either analyzed a small number of historical events in 
isolation or have merely sketched the history of the unitary execu­
tive debate in a truncated or superficial way. 21 
17. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 12-78. 
18. See Ca1abresi & Prakash, supra note 3. 
19. See Flaherty, supra note 9, at 1755-1810. 
20. See id. at 1816 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting FORREST McDONALD, THE 
AMERJCAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HJSTORY 180 n.35 (1994) [hereinafter MCDON­
ALD, AMERICAN PRESJDENCY]). Flaherty also cited EDWARD S. CORW1N, THE PRESIDENT: 
OFFICE AND POWERS 76-84 (1940) [hereinafter CORWJN, THE PRESIDENT (1940 ed.)]; 
Bloch, supra note 16, at 618-51; and, curiously enough, Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, 
at 14-22, as also supporting this proposition. See Flaherty, supra note 9, at 1816. 
Professor Flaherty is hardly alone in jumping to this conclusion. See Miller, Indepen­
dent Agencies, supra note 3, at 83-84 ("[T]he executive branch has not consistently op­
posed independent agencies on constitutional grounds."); Paul Verkuil, The Status of Inde­
pendent Agencies after Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779, 779 [hereinafter Verkuil, 
Independent Agencies after Bowsher] ("[N]o administration prior to the present one direct­
ly attacked the concept of agency independence from the constitutional perspective."). 
21. See Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, supra note 3, at 484-98; Entin, 
Removal Power, supra note 6, at 714-24; Bruce Ledewitz, The Uncertain Power of the 
President to Execute the Laws, 46 TENN. L. REV. 757, 776-96 (1979); Angel M. Moreno, 
Presidemial Coordination of the Independent Regulatory Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 
461, 481-88 (1994); Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative, supra note 6, at 649-61; Charles 
Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive 
Officers, 63 B.U. L. REv. 59, 70-76 (1983); Froomkin, Note, supra note 6, at 805-08. 
The most complete historical treatments of the unitary executive are offered by Louis 
Fisher, Congress and the Removal Power, 10 CONG. & PRESIDENCY 63 ( 1983) [hereinafter 
Fisher, Removal Power], and Charles Warren, Presidential Declarations of Independence, 
10 B.U. L. REV. 1 ( 1930). Fisher's work only addresses one facet of the unitary execu­
tive: the removal power. Warren's article, while extremely helpful, omits certain key his­
torical episodes and, based on its date of publication, necessarily does not proceed beyond 
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In this Article, we want to begin the process of revisiting the 
unitary executive debate from the fourth vantage point of the prac­
tice and tradition over the whole of the last 208 years. Our project 
here, and in a series of three additional forthcoming Articles,  is to 
consider the unitary executive debate from a Burkean, common law 
constitutionalist's perspective. V./e want to examine the claim that 
we believe is implicit in much anti-unitarian scholarship that the 
custom, tradition, and practice of the last 208 years amounts to a 
presidential acquiescence in the existence of a congressional power 
to (at times) Emit the President ' s  removal power and curtail his 
other constitutionally granted mechanisms of control over law exe­
cution. We disagree that Presidents have acquiesced in the constitu­
tionality of such l imits , and we seek in this series of Articles to 
prove that they have not done so. 
We start with the premise expressed and defended in Professor 
Calabresi 's prior writings that the Framers set up a strongly u nitary 
executive and that this is normatively appealing. Building on that 
premise, we argue here that there is no contrary longstanding cus­
tom, tradition, or practice that should cause a Burkean common 
law constitutionalist to conclude that tradition and custom foreclos­
es the adoption of what we believe is the normatively appealing 
original design. Indeed, we would go further and argue that over 
the past 208 years a powerful tradition has grown up whereby 
Presidents have consistently defended the prerogatives the text of 
the Constitution originally gave them and that public choice theory 
suggests they should have. 
This leads to a crucial methodological point that underlies our 
analysis: our decision here to focus on prior presidential practices, 
traditions, and customs. Because we are not Burkean common law 
constitutionalists ourselves, we do not deem it necessary for our 
purposes to prove that there is a 208-year-old three-branch consen­
sus about these matters .  Clearly, there is not. We claim only that 
there is no consistent three branch anti-unitarian custom, tradition, 
or practice that Presidents have acquiesced in that trumps the 
constitutional text and the original design. 
We believe this  Article, and the three that wi l l  follow it, thor­
oughly establish this more l imited point about the customs, practic­
es, and traditions of the American people with respect to pres iden­
tial power over the last 208 years. Congress and the S upreme 
the Coolidge Administration. 
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Court have vacillated over whether to recognize presidential claims 
of power over removals and Jaw execution. Sometimes they have 
acknowledged the power and sometimes they have denied it. The 
tradition within the executive branch, however, has been over­
whelmingly and consistently unitarian. For 208 years , Presidents 
have vigorously guarded the powers the Framers gave them, so 
much so that today no reasonable Burkean could conclude that a 
congressional easement has been established across the Executive 
Power Vesting Clause of Article II by the passage of time. 
Our position in this respect is very much l ike the one the 
Supreme Court took in INS v. Chadha22 when it  struck down the 
legislative veto on originalist constitutional grounds even though 
Congress had been ii1cluding such vetoes in federal statutes since 
before the New Deal. The Supreme Court in Chadha said this 
congressional practice was not relevant to the constitutional ques­
tion, in part because most Presidents had refused to acquiesce in it 
and had protested it even when signing such statutes into law. 
As we hope this A,rticle will begin to show, we think there is  
if anything an even more vigorous presidential practice of asserting 
power over removals and control over law execution. After briefly 
surveying the practice a.'1d recent public statements of almost every 
President, we conclude our four article series by arguing that, as in 
Chadha, the problem of the scope of presidential power over law 
execution is not one that can be resolved with reference to the 
fabric of statutes that Congress has at times passed. We thus reject 
approaches like the one ta.l(en by Justice B randeis in his dissent in 
Myers v. United States that seek to determine the scope of presi­
dential power by looking at biased congressional views on the 
subject expressed in a spider's web of statutory enactments.  
Our historical survey will seek to trace the development over 
time of all three of the mechanisms essential to any theory of the 
unitary executive. These include: the President's power of removal; 
the President' s  power to d irect subordinate executive official s '  
exercises of discretionary executive power; and the President's 
power to nullify or veto subordinate executive official s '  exercises 
of discretionary executive power.23 Each of the four Articles wil l  
22. 462 U.S. 9 19 (1983). 
23. See Calabresi & Prakash. supra note 3 ,  at 595-99; Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 
3, at 1166; see also Gary Lawson. The Ri�e and Rise of 1he Administrative Slate, 107 
HARV. L REV. 1231, 1242-45 (199,t); Liberman. supra note 3, at 353-54. 
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focus particular attention o n  one o f  the four great crises that con­
stitute the key moments in the development of the unitary execu­
tive. This Article will examine the development of the unitary 
executive over the course of the first fifty years of our constitu­
tional h istory focussing especially on the events surrounding Presi­
dent Andrew Jackson's removal of Treasury Secretary Will iam J. 
Duane. The second Article in the series will  focus on the period 
between 1 837 and the end of Reconstruction with a special focus 
on the attempted impeachment of President Andrew Johnson and 
the rise and fal l  of the Tenure of Office Act. The third Article will 
focus on the unitary executive during the third half-century of 
America.'1 constitutional history with special attention given to 
Frankl in D. Roosevelt's assertions of power during the debates on 
executive reorganization in 1 937-1938 .  And, the final Article will  
discuss the modern post-New Deal h istory with a focus on the 
crisis that we believe has been triggered by the EIGA.24 We re­
gret the need to break our book length argument up into four 
pieces but believe it is essential that we do so if we are to do 
justice to each historical epoch. 
A c lose examination of the history over the last 208 years has 
persuaded us that this country 's historical practice regarding issues 
of presidential control over removal and law execution either sup­
ports the unitary executive position or at best is inconclusive. Our 
survey of the history shows that Presidents have consistently as-
So defining the scope of our work calls for several caveats. With limited exceptions, 
we limit our discussion to the execution of the law directly under the Executive Power 
Clause. We do not address the President's control over areas such as the military, spend­
ing, and foreign relations. These require the careful balancing of numerous and often 
opposing textual provisions of the Constitution. We also do not discuss another area that, 
while having strong implications for the President's ability to execute L'le laws, is also 
governed by a specific constitutional provision (i.e., appointments). 
24. Most scholars to date have mentioned the first three crises as being of critical 
importance. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 78, 84 n.334. The fact that other 
scholars have paid attention to these episodes appears to confirm the propriety of focusing 
on these events. See Entin, supra note 6, at 720-22 (Jackson and Johnson); Ledewitz, 
supra note 21, at 794 n.154 (Jackson); Miller, Independent Agencies, supra note 3, at 67, 
85 (Johnson and Roosevelt); Monaghan, supra note 3, at 19-20 (Jackson); Moreno, supra 
note 21, at 485 (Roosevelt); Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogati\•es, supra note 6, at 657 & 
n.169 (Roosevelt); !tzha.k Zamir, Administrative Control of Administrative Action, 57 CAL. 
L. REV. 866. 875, 877 ( 1969) (Jackson); Steven Breker-Cooper, The Appointmenis Clause 
and the Removal Power: Theory and Seance, 60 TENN. L. REv. 841, 898-900 (1993) 
(Johnson). 
We believe the modern crises ever the EJGA warrants inclusion on an equal footing 
with the first three. 
1460 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 1451 
serted their authority to execute the laws through each of the three 
mechanisms described above since the earliest days of the Repub­
lic. Thus,  far from supporting the conclusions of Professor 
Flaherty, the historical practice over the last 208 years tends to 
confirm the textual, structural , originalist, and normative arguments 
in favor of a presidential power to control the execution of the 
laws .25 
II. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE DEBATE: SOME BRIEF 
COMMENTS ON ITS SIGNIFICANCE, ON HISTORICAL 
METHOD, AND ON METHODOLOGY 
Before beginning our discussion of the B urkean argument from 
practice, custom, and tradition, it is appropriate that we briefly  say 
a bit more about the methodology and vision of constitutional law 
that underlies our analysis and about the legal significance of our 
project. We will first discuss the importance of the unitary execu­
tive debate and of the claims we are developing about precedent 
within the executive branch about the scope of the executive pow­
er. Next, we will comment briefly on some matters of historical 
method. Finally, we will conclude with a discussion of the relation­
ship between the claims developed in this Article and the Presi­
dent ' s  role as a constitutional interpreter. With these items complet­
ed, we will then turn in Part III to our historical exegesis .  
A. The Importance of the Unitary Executive Debate 
It is easy today to dismiss the removal debate as being of 
inconsequentiai importance. Clearly, many factors affect presidential 
power over executive branch subordinates-the removal power is 
only one among these many factors . Presidential popularity ,  support 
in Congress, and skill in picking initial appointees all affect the 
degree to which a President i s  able to command the loyalty of his 
subordinates. Moreover, the removal power has not been exercised 
25. Professor Flaherty' s  misassessment of the unitary executive's history is particularly 
conspicuous given the sharpness of the criticisms he directed at the historical analysis of 
the Founding era contained in the previous work of Professor Calabresi and Sai Prakash. 
Professor Flaherty criticizes Calabresi and Prakash for supposedly failing to consi der all 
relevant sources, for focusing on a few historical examples in isolation, and particularly 
for failing to consider a broad enough range of history to lead to sound conclus i ons. See 
Flaherty, supra note 9, at 1750, 1774-77, 1788-1801. It appears that the same cr i ticisms 
would apply with greater justice to the 13 page discussion of changed circumstances in 
Part IV of Professor Flaherty ' s  own Article. See id. at 1816-28. 
1997]  THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 1 46 1  
often m recent years. At times, it even appears that presidential 
appointees in independent agencies are more committed to the 
administration's policy program than are the President's own Cabi­
net Secretaries. 
While it is certainly true that presidential power over the exec­
utive branch is a complex phenomenon, it would be a great mis­
take to underestimate the importance of the removal power. Like 
the veto power or the war power, the removal power does not 
need to be exercised often to be effective. All that is needed is an 
early firing or two, and a conviction that a particular President is 
willing to fire again, and the removal power will have accom­
plished its chilling effect on insubordinate employees. The removal 
power, like the power to issue binding orders to executive branch 
subordinates, is a potentially powerful tool of executive branch 
unitariness. 
It is probably the case that the removal power is most valuable 
when the President's party also controls a majority in the Senate. 
Without such a majority, presidential removal power becomes polit­
ically costly because Presidents who fire subordinates will have to 
endure hostile senatorial scrutiny of their replacements. Concerns of 
this kind may well explain why President Clinton has recently 
retained Janet Reno as the Attorney General, even though press 
reports suggest he wanted to replace her. Thus, those of us who 
have learned to live with opposite party control of the White 
House and of the Senate may well underestimate the importance of 
the removal power. It is a potent weapon at all times, and un­
doubtedly an even more potent weapon when the executive and 
legislative branches of government are not divided as they have 
been in recent times. 
In developing our argument that Presidents have always appre­
ciated the vital importance of the removal power, we intend to set 
the stage for several legal claims that Presidents may want to make 
in resisting congressional efforts to curtail either that power or the 
parallel presidential power to issue binding orders to executive 
branch subordinates. 
First, as mentioned above, we want to argue that, as in 
Chadha, presidential non-acquiescence to congressional claims of 
power means that the Supreme Court in future litigation should 
decide removal cases with reference to the text of the Constitution 
as originally understood. We believe this clearly means the Su­
preme Court should recognize that the Constitution creates what we 
have described as a strongly unitary executive. 
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Second, we believe that President Clinton and all future incum­
bent Presidents should recognize that there exists a strong internal 
executive branch precedent, established over 208 years, whereby 
Presidents have always resisted serious incursions on the principle 
of the unitary executive. Pursuant to this, we believe President 
Clinton and his successors should v iew themselves as being com­
pelled to veto any statute presented to them that v iolates the princi­
ples of strong executive branch unitariness. Obv iously, the EIGA is 
such a statute, and, not coincidentally, we note that it is soon 
coming up for reauthorization . Moreover, we believe Presidents 
should enforce unconstitutional statutes like the EIGA w ith the 
greatest circumspection. 
Finally, we believe Pres ident Clinton and his successors should 
continue to challenge unconstitutional statutes l ike the EIGA in 
federal court notwithstanding judicial decisions l ike Morrison v. 
Olson and Humphrey's Executor, which are inconsistent with the 
unitary executive. In doing this, they will  be keeping faith with 
their many predecessors who never let temporary defeats over 
matters like the adoption of the unconstitutional Tenure of Office 
Act deflect them from the long term project of protecting the v ital 
powers of the presidential office.  
The removal debate, then, is of vital s ignificance. We have 
begun this four Article series because we believe that, and because 
we believe that President Clinton and his successors c an act upon 
our historical findings in the three ways just d iscussed. 
B. Historical Method 
A second introductory concern relates to matters of h istorical 
method. While we do not w ish to enter into an extended discussion 
on this already much debated topic, we do believe it i s  necessary 
that we say something about the method we have followed in this 
Article and that we intend to follow in the three sequels to come. 
We do not claim to be historians, and we do not claim here to 
have produced original, ground-breaking historical research.  Al­
though we have canvassed many original sources, we have relied 
heavily on the famous and principle secondary works that discuss 
each of the presidencies or historical epochs that are the subject of 
this Article. Our debts are especially great in this particul ar Article 
to Leonard White, James Hart, Glenn Phelps, Forrest McDonald, 
and Robert Remini, among many others. Their groundbreaking and 
original work has been v ital to the success of our project. 
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The original contribution we seek t o  make i s  to pull together in 
one place the entire set of presidential claims about the unitary 
executive debate that have been made over the whole of the last 
208 years. No one to our knowledge has done this as thoroughly 
as we are trying to do it, and it is not clear to us that anyone has 
even tried since Chief Justice Taft wrote his long and well re­
searched opinion in Myers v.  United States. We believe it is vitally 
important for constitutional l awyers to have this information gath­
ered together in one place in a form that has been updated since 
the Myers opinion was written . We thus approach this historical 
research project as constitutional l awyers and not as legal histori­
ans.  We are interested in history in this project, but only in the 
way that lawyers are interested in history. For these purposes it is 
entirely appropriate that we rely  on the sources we have chosen 
and that we skip somewhat quickly over vast periods of time. In 
doing this, we are no more guilty of doing "history lite" than legal 
historians are guilty of doing "law lite ." We consume history here 
for a particular purpose, and it is a much narrower purpose than 
the one that often drives historians .  
C. Methodology: The Relevance of Departmental 
or Coordinate Review 
Lastly, and most importantly, we think it is important that our 
readers understand that we undertake this massive project very 
much influenced by , and in the spirit of, the recent debate that has 
raged about the role all three branches of the federal government 
must and do play in the interpretation and enforcement of the 
Constitution.26 Ever since former Attorney General Meese ' s  fa­
mous Tulane speech, 27 m any academics and judges have been 
more conscious than ever of the role Presidents and congresses can 
claim for themselves as constitutional interpreters alongside the 
federal courts. This role was ably defended by Judge Frank 
Easterbrook in an article in this l aw review entitled Presidential 
Review,28 and it has been defended recently as well by Professor 
26. For a helpful description and list of examples of coordinate construction, see LOUIS 
FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 231-46 
(1988). 
27. General Meese 's  speech is reprinted, along with other useful commentaries, in THE 
FEDERALIST SOCIETY, WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CONSTITUTION? THE DEBATE OVER INTER­
PRETIVE AUTHORITY (1992). 
28. Frank H .  Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905 ( 1990). 
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Michael Stokes Paulsen29 and by Professor Gary Lawson writing 
with Christopher D. Moore.30 
Despite the ancient vintage of this theory of departmental or 
coordinate construction of the Constitution,3 1 the suggestion that 
the Supreme Court may not have the last word on matters of con­
stitutional interpretation seems at first to be quite j arring to modern 
lawyers whose introduction to constitutional law began w ith Mar­
bury 's  ringing declaration that " [i ] t  is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law i s . "32 The 
declaration carries the implication that since the Constitution was 
the supreme law of the land, the judiciary must have the authority 
to interpret the Constitution . However, a close reading of Marbury 
reveals that Chief Justice Marshal l ' s  opinion in that famous case 
never claimed that interpretation of the law was the exclusive prov­
ince of the courts. On the contrary, Marshall reasoned that courts 
may construe the Constitution because " [t]hose who apply the rule 
to particular cases,  must of necessity expound and interpret that 
rule."33 Thus, scholars have universal ly acknowledged that al­
though Marbury firmly established the judic iary ' s  right to interpret 
29. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say 
What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 2 1 7  ( 1 994) [hereinafter Paulsen, Most Dangerous Branch] .  
30. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constirurional 
!nterprelation, 8 1  IOWA L. REV . 1 267 ( 1 996).  
3 1 .  In The Federalisr No. 49, James Madison declared, "The several departments being 
perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither of them, i t  is 
evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between 
their respective powers." THE FEDERALIST No. 49 , at 339 (James Madison) (J . Cooke ed.,  
1 96 1  ) .  Presidential power to i nterpret the law was later asserted by Presidents Thomas 
Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Frankl in  Roosevelt. See GERALD GUN­
THER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 1 -28 ( l i th ed. 1 985) ;  Gary Apfel ,  Whose Conslitution Is II 
Anyway ? The Aurhority of the Judiciary's Interpretation of the Constitution, 46 RUTGERS 
L. REV . 77 1 ,  777-82 ( 1 994) ; Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Di­
lemma of Autonomous Execwive Branch Interpretation, 1 5  CARDOZO L. REV. 8 1 ,  85-97 
( 1 993) [hereinafter Paulsen, Merryman Power]. 
For a comprehensive collection of instances of presidential constitutional construction 
by numerous Presidents from Frankl i n  Pierce to George Bush, see Christopher N. May, 
Presidential Defiance of " Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 2 1  
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 904-86 ( 1 994) . For an interesting discussion of examples of 
constitutional construction by Congress, see DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBI LJTY ( 1 966). For useful compilations of executive, 
legislative, judicial ,  and scholarly materials on the subject, see THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, 
supra note 27; LOUIS FISI-IER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 1 6-26 ( 1 992); WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL. ,  AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETA­
TION 1 95-247 ( I  st ed. 1 986) 
32. Marbury v .  Madison, 5 U . S .  (1 Cranch) 1 37 ,  1 77 ( 1 803) .  
33 .  !d. a l  1 77 .  
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the law, it fel l  far short of making those interpretations binding on 
the other branches.34 Other commentators have also noted that 
notions of judicial supremacy are inconsistent with the coordinacy 
of the three branches of the federal govemment.35 Therefore, after 
brief reflection, it comes as l ittle surprise that, as Professor Thomas 
Merril l  has noted, judicial supremacy has been rejected by a velita­
ble all-star list of constitutional scholars36 and that the l ist of 
commentators endorsing some form of coordinate construction has 
grown more impressive with each passing year.37 
34. See JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1 04-
07 ( 1 984); FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL D IALOGUES, supra note 26, at 242-43; LAURENCE H .  
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-2, a t  2 5  (2d e d .  1 988); Paul Brest, Congress 
as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. 
REv. 57, 63 ( 1 974) [hereinafter Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker ] ;  Paul 
Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. 
REv. 585,  587-88 ( 1 975) [hereinafter Brest, Conscientious Legislator] ; Thomas W. Merrill, 
Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 1 5  CARDOZO L .  
REV. 4 3 ,  5 1  ( I  993) [hereinafter Merri l l ,  Judicial Opinions]; Paulsen, Most Dangerous 
Branch, supra note 29, at 241 -45; Wil l iam W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury 
v .  Madison, 1 969 DUKE L.J. I,  37.  
35.  See Paulsen, Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 29, at 228-40. 
36. See Merri l l ,  Judicial Opinions, supra note 34, at 49 n .26 (citing ALEXANDER M .  
B ICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS B RANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR O F  POLI­
TICS 263-64 ( 1 962); EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 68-69 ( 1 939); PHILIP B .  
KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 1 1 6 ( 1 970); Gerald 
Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and Expedi­
ency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. I, 25 n. l 55 ( 1 964); Henry P. Monaghan, 
Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1 363, 1 363 n.2 ( 1 973);  
Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L.  REV. 1 00 1 , 1 008 
( 1 965)). 
37. For commentary generally supporting coordinate construction, see AGRESTO, supra 
note 34, at 1 04-07; FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 3 1 ,  at 1 -6, 8, 1 0- 1 6; Stephen Carter, 
The Courts Are Not the Constitution, WALL ST. 1 . , Feb. 7, 1 989, at A24; Neal Devins, 
The Constitution Between Friends, 67 TEx. L.  REV. 2 1 3  ( 1 988) (reviewing FISHER, CON­
STITUTIONAL DIALOGUES, supra note 26); John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and 
Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 37 1 ( 1 988); Rex 
E. Lee, The Provinces of Constitutional Interpretation, 6 1  TUL. L. REv . 1 009 ( 1 987); 
Edwin Meese Ill, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L.  REv. 979 ( 1 987); Walter F. 
Murphy, Who Shall Interpret ? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 
REV. POL. 40 1 ( 1 986) ; Robert Nagel, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches 
in Interpreting the ConstiTution, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 380 ( 1 988). For defenses of judicial 
supremacy in constitutional interpretation, see Christopher L. Eisgruber, The MosT Compe­
tent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L .J .  347 ( 1 994); Burt Neu­
bome, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in InterpreTing the Constitution, 
73 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 377 ( 1 988);  M ichel Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial 
Authority and the Rule of Law: Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation and the Sepa­
ration of Powers, IS CARDOZO L. REv. 1 37, 1 55-57 ( 1 993) .  
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We do not intend here to delve into all of the many complex 
and nuanced issues that are raised by applying the principals of 
coordinate construction to all exercises of presidential Article II 
powers.38 For purposes of this  series of Articles, it is sufficient for 
For commentary supporting the executive branch 's authority to interpret the Constitu­
tion, see RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 308 ( 1 974); 
TRIBE, supra note 34, at 34-37; William P. Barr, A ttorney General's Remarks, Benjamin 
N. Cardozo School of Law, November 15, 1 992 , 1 5  CARDOZO L.  REv. 3 1 ,  3 9  ( 1 99 3 ) ;  
Easterbrook ,  supra note 2 8 ;  Douglas W.  Kmiec, OLC' s Opinion Writing Function: The 
Legal Adhesive for a Unitary Executive, 1 5  CARDOZO L. REv. 337,  348-5 1 ( 1 993) ;  John 
0. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the A ttorney General: A Nornwtive, 
Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 1 5  CARDOZO L. REV. 375 ( 1 993) [hereinafter 
McGinnis, Opinion Function]; John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor 
General's Of ice in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REv. 799, 805-
06 ( 1 992) (reviewing CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW ( 1 99 1 ));  Merril l ,  Separation of 
Powers, supra note 34, at 240; Merril l ,  Judicial Opinions, supra note 36, at 49; Paulsen, 
Merryman Power, supra note 3 1 ;  Paulsen, Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 29; Mi­
chael B. Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 7 3 5 ,  
766-8 3 ;  J.  Gregory S idak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A R eply to 
Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 437, 452-60 ( 1 990). For critiques of the Presi­
dent's power to interpret the Constitution, see Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. Presi­
dent, 64 N .C . L. REv. 3 8 1  ( 1 986); May, supra note 3 1 ,  at 889-93; Arthur S. M iller, The 
President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REv. 3 89,  397-98 (! 987); 
Arthur S.  Miller & Jeffrey H .  Bowman, Presidential Attacks on the Constitutionality of 
Federal Statutes, 40 O HI O  ST. L.J. 5 1  ( 1 979); Burt Neubome, The Binding Quality of 
Supreme Coun Precedent, 6 1  TUL. L .  REV. 99 1 ( 1 987). 
For commentary supporting the Congress' s  authority to interpret the Constitution, see 
Archibald Cox, The Ro!e of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. C!N. L. 
REV. 1 99, 205- 1 1  ( 1 97 1 ) ; Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Con­
gress, 63 N.C. L. REv. 707 ( 1 985) [hereinafter Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation]; Eu­
gene W. Hickok, Jr., The Framers' Understanding of Constitutional Deliberation in Con· 
gress, 21 GA. L. REv. 2 1 7  ( 1 986); Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Com­
mon Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1 ,  3 ( 1 975);  Mark V. Tushnet, The Constitution Outside the 
Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry, 26 VAL . U. L. REV. 437 ( 1 992); Vik D. Amar, Note, The 
Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE L.J. 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 6, 1 1 23 ( 1 988); Mark E. Hen m ann, 
Note, Looking Down from the Hill: Factors Determining the Success of Congressional 
Efforts to Reverse Supreme Court Interpretations of the Constitution, 33 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 543 ( 1 992). Notably, even those who question whether Congress is institutionally 
suited to evaluate the constitutionality of statutes agree that the government would be 
better served if it tried to do so. See Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decision­
maker, supra note 34, at 98- 1 05 ;  Brest, Conscientious Legislator, supra note 3 4, at 587;  
Abner J .  Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution? ,  61 N.C. 
L. REv. 5 87 ( 1 983);  Abner J. Mikva & Joseph R. Lundy, The 91 st Congress and the 
Constitution, 3 8  U. CHI. L. REV. 449, 449 ( 1 97 1 ) ; Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforce­
ment of Equal Protection, 72 MINN . L.  REv. 3 1 1 ( 1 987). For commentary challenging 
Congress ' s  capacity to interpret the Constitution, see Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 
1 978 Term-Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. I,  9- 1 0  ( 1 979); Gerald L. 
Neuman, Variations for Mixed Voices, 1 37 U. PA. L. REV. 1 85 1  ( 1 989) (reviewing FISH­
ER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES, supra note 26). 
3 8 .  Some forms of coordinate construction have remained quite controversial. Vigorous 
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us to note that coordinate construction is  especially called for when 
separation of powers matters are involved. The Supreme Court ' s  
inconsistent resolution of separation of  powers cases has led some 
commentators to ask whether the judiciary is even capable as an 
institution of resolving these issues .39 Moreover, the Supreme 
Court is sometimes an interested party in separation of powers 
disputes; permitting it to be the final arbiter of separation of pow­
ers questions would contravene the jurisprudential rule against 
permitting parties from being judges in their own causes.40 Other 
commentators worry that giving one branch a monopoly on consti­
tutional interpretation will stifle valuable interbranch dialogues.4 1  
debate currently rages over whether or not the President i s  obligated to enforce federal 
court judgments. Professor Paulsen says he is not, while Professor Lawson and Christo­
pher Moore disagree. Cf Paulsen, supra note 29, with Lawson & Moore, supra note 30. 
Moreover, to pick a different context, many commentators have questioned the Supreme 
Court' s  deference to congressional interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment first an­
nounced in Katzenbach v. Morgan ,  384 U.S .  641 ( 1 966). See Stephen L. Carter, The 
Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 8 1 9  ( 1 986); Will iam Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and 
Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 ( 1 975);  Ross, supra note 37. Bur see Robert A. 
Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1 969 S uP. CT. REv. 8 1 ,  1 1 2- 1 8  
(defending the Morgan power). The Supreme Court i s  apparently reconsidering the issue 
as wel l .  See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1 352, 1 357-58 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 
1 1 7 S. Ct. 293 ( 1 996) . 
39. See Louis Fisher, Separation of Powers: Interpretation Outside the Courts, 1 8  
PEPP. L .  REv. 57. 57-62 ( 1 990); see also Cox, supra note 37,  at 204-05 ; Mikva & 
Lundy, supra note 37, at 497-98 .  
40. Compare Merril l ,  Judicial Opinions, supra note 34. at 53 with David A. Strauss, 
Presidential Interpretation of the ConstitUiion, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1 1 3 ,  1 3 1 -34 ( 1 993).  
For example, i t  i s  somewhat troubling that Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majori­
ty opinion in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.  654 ( 1 988).  Up to that point he had been a 
strong supporter of presidential power, see FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 3 1 ,  at 1 47 ,  and 
just two years earlier had supported an early draft of Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 7 1 4  
( 1 986), strongly endorsing the President ' s  right to remove all officers wielding executive 
power, Bernard Schwartz, A n  Administrative Law "Might Have Been"--Chief Justice Bur­
ger's Bowsher v .  Synar Draft, 42 ADMIN. L.  REV. 22 1 ,  226-27, 232 ( 1 990). And yet, 
Rehnquist authored a sweeping opinion upholding the removal restrictions in  the Ethics in 
Government Act as a constitutionally permissible infringement upon the executive branch. 
A disturbing explanation of his position is  that as Chief Justice, Rehnquist possessed the 
power under the Act to select the members of the special division of the D.C. Circuit 
that would control all independent counsel investigations and prosecutions. Thus, L'le Chief 
Justice arguably had a strong interest in upholding the constitutionality of the Act. Al­
though we in no way mean to suggest that thi s  motivation actuall y  underlay the Chief 
Justice 's authorship of Morrison, i t  does serve to illustrate that the Supreme Court ' s  pro­
nouncements about its own power relative to the other two br::mches may be subject to 
greater skepticism than i ts opinions i n  any other area of constitutional law. 
4 1 .  See AGRESTO, supra note 34, at 1 0, 93,  1 52; PAUL BATOR E T  AL., THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 363 (2d ed. 1 973); B!CKEL, supra note 36, at 240; 
MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 25-26 ( 1 982); 
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Therefore, whatever one ' s  conclusion in other areas of constitution­
al law, we think the case for coordinate constitutional rev iew is 
especially powerful in the separation of powers area. We think that 
in this area the concurrence of all three branches of the federal 
government is necessary on the proper allocation of a particular 
power before that matter may properly be regarded as settled.42 
To further elaborate, we think that the case for departmental or 
coordinate review is arguably at its strongest when that power is 
being asserted defensively to protect presidential powers from en­
croachment by Congress and the courts.43 Professor William Van 
Alstyne once noted that the narrowest and least controversial un­
derstanding of the power of judicial review announced in Marbury 
was its assertion as a defensive power when Congress sought un­
constitutionally to alter the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. 44 
S imilarly, here, a 208-year old presidential tradition of defensive 
presidential review to protect presidential power against congressio­
nal encroachments seems especially defensible. This is  p articularly 
the case since substantial historical evidence suggests that the 
Framers gave the President major constitutional powers (like the 
veto power) in part to enable and encourage him to defend the 
prerogatives of his office and with them the constitutionally man­
dated separation of powers. 
Accordingly,  if one accepts any role  for the policy making 
branches in constitutional interpretation, and all but the most die­
hard judicial supremacists do,45 then this seems l Lce an especially 
Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker, supra note 34, at I 03; Cox, supra note 
37, at 260; Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the 
Limits of Judicial Review, 5 1  01-00 ST. L.J. 1 75 ,  2 1 8-23 ( 1 990) [hereinafter Entin, Sepa­
ration of Powers]; Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 37, at 7 44; Merri l l ,  
Judicial Opinions, supra note 34 ,  at 45 . 
42. See FlSHER,  CONSTJTUTJONAL DlALOGUES, supra note 26, at 243-44; Fisher, Consti­
tutional Interpretation, supra note 37, at 7 1 6- 1 7, 74{); Michael J .  Glennon, The Use of 
Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B .U.  L REv. 1 09 ,  1 39-4 1 ( I  984).  
43. We realize, of course, that many wil l  deny that Presidents are defending turf here, 
since our conclusion in that regard presumes that the Framers meant to create a strongly 
unitary executive. We do presume that for reasons that have been amply explained in 
prior writings, and we ask here whether any contrary practice has grown up that would 
trump the original understanding. The absence of such a contrary practice suggests, if 
anything, that we are right about the original history and that Professors Lessig, Sunstein, 
and Flaherty are wrong. It would be very difficult  indeed to argue that for 208 years 
from George Washington to George Bush presidents have always uniformly asserted a 
view of presidential power that was both rejected by L'le Framers and that was at odds 
with the constitutional textl 
44. See Van Alstyne, supra note 34, at 34.  
45.  The most famous dicta expressing the judicial supremacy position was announced 
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easy context in which to recognize that a consi stent presidential 
interpretation of the law execution power as including at least a 
power of removal is deserving of deference.  Especially s ince Con­
gress and the Supreme Court have reached inconsistent resolutions 
on this issue, it would seem that deference to the President ' s  con­
sistent and v igorous interpretation of the scope of the removal 
power is appropriate. 
Not every presidential claim of executive power deserves to be 
given weight by all who believe in the legitimacy of three-branch 
construction of the constitution. Some presidential assertions of 
power are extraordinary and are associated with u nusual Presidents 
or unusual national crises that seemed to require an extraordinary 
response. We deal here with a claim of presidential power that is 
as old as the Republic and that has been asserted to one degree or 
another by v irtually every occupant of the presidential office. That 
kind of a defensive claim about the scope of presidential power 
does deserve the attention of those who believe in three-branch 
constitutional review . Accordingly,  the theory that underlies such 
review further buttresses the relevance of the h istorical discussion 
that follows. 
Embracing the use of coordinate construction in at least some 
separation of powers disputes still leaves one critical consideration 
unaddressed . As Professor Garj Lawson has pointed out, all theo­
ries of constitutional interpretation must, in addition to defining the 
legal standard that is being applied, also specify the amount of 
evi dence needed to establish when that standard is met.46 The Su­
preme Court provided one possible evidentiary standard in United 
States v. Midwest Oil Co. when it suggested that a "long-continued 
practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress,  would raise a 
presumption that the [executive actions] had been made in pursu­
ance of its consent or of a recognized administrative power of the 
Executive."47 As Justice Frankfurter subsequently elaborated, "a 
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned,  engaged 
in  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.  1 ,  1 8  ( 1 958 ) ,  which proclaimed that "the federal judiciary 
is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution." Subsequent cases referred to 
the "responsibi l ity of this Court" as the "ult imate i nterpreter of the Constitution." See 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S .  1 86 ,  2 1 1 ( 1 962); Powell v. McCorrnack, 395 U.S .  486, 549 
( 1 969); United States v .  Nixon, 4 1 8 U.S. 683, 704 ( 1 974).  
46. See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L.  REV. 859, 859 ( 1 992). 
47. United States v .  Midwest Oil Co. ,  236 U.S. 459, 474 ( l 9 1 5) .  
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in by the Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitu­
tion, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure 
of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ' executive power' 
vested in the President by § 1 of Art. Il ."4<l 
If such is the standard for evaluating congressional acquies­
cence to executive assertions of power, it logically follows that a 
converse standard should apply in evaluating presidential acquies­
cence to congressional assertions of power. Presidents should not 
be deemed to have acquiesced to a congressionally-imposed l imita­
tion on their power unless "a systematic,  unbroken, [congressional] 
practice" of limiting the President ' s  power existed that had been 
"long pursued to the knowledge of the [Presidents] and never be­
fore questioned."  And since the burden of proof logically must l ie  
upon the party asserting the existence of such a practice , the failure 
to prove the existence of such a continued , open, and unquestion­
ing acquiescence on the part of the President would nece ssarily 
imply that the propriety of such a congressionally-enacted l imi ta­
tion on the President ' s  power would have to be regarded as an 
unresolved question still subject to interpretation by all three 
branches. It is in this context that the S upreme Court ' s  statements 
in Chadha referred to above are most relevant. In Chadha, the 
Court declined to regard the legislative veto as an established prac­
tice because eleven of thirteen Presidents from Woodrow Wilson to 
Ronald Reagan had objected to it, and the Court instead decided 
the constitutional issue on purely textual , structural , and normative 
grounds. 
The Frankfurter "gloss on the text" standard helps resolve 
several practical questions .  First, Frankfurter ' s  test requires the 
existence of a "systematic , unbroken . . .  practice . "  This suggests 
that an occasional presidential failure to object to a particular in­
fringement on the President ' s  authority should not be sufficient to 
constitute acquiescence for all time and on behalf of all future 
Presidents in a particular constitutional construction. Transient 
political pressures or time constraints should not be allowed to 
48. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v .  Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S.  579,  
6 1 0- 1 1 ( 1 952) (Frankfurter, J . ,  concurring); see also Stuart v .  Laird, 5 U.S .  ( 1  Cranch) 
299, 309 ( 1 803) ("' [P]ractice and acquiescence under i t  for a period of several years, 
commencing with the organization of the judicial system . has indeed fixed the con­
struction.") ;  Myers v. United S tates, 272 U.S. 52, 1 63 ( 1 926); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 
453 U.S. 654, 668-69, 686 ( !  98 1 )  (noting "the h istory of [congressional] acqu iescence in 
executive claims settlement," the Court held that "Congress may be considered to have 
consented to the President ' s  action in suspending claims"). 
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determine major constitutional issues49 and Presidents should not 
be forced into wasting valuable time and political capital scru t i n i z­
ing every piece of legislation for even the most m inor incursions 
on Article II prerogatives . Moreover, Frankfurter' s requirement that 
the practice be " long pursued" ensures that the important quest ions 
surrounding the proper allocation of the federal powers among the 
three branches is not determined by the weaknesses or idiosyncra­
sies of a handful of Presidents.5° Final ly,  Frankfurter' s  requ irement 
that the branch in question have ful l  knowledge of the infringement 
m question guarantees that mere inattention w i l l  not be construed 
as active acquiescence . 
Applying these principles, we wil l  now examine m this four 
Article series statements made by each President from George 
Washington through George B u sh to determine whether our 
nation ' s  Chief Executives can fairly be said to have acquiesced in 
an anti-unitarian vision of the executive branch. 5 1  We begin in 
this first installment with Presidents Washington, Adams, Jefferson, 
49.  For example, the exigencies of World War 11 led Franklin Roosevelt to  s ign the 
Lend-Lease Act even though he believed that the legislative veto provision it contained 
was unconstitutional. See Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV.  L. 
REV. 1 353 ( 1 953) .  Such short-term political considerations are surely a weak basis for 
defining the scope of a major constitutional issue such as the separation of powers. See 
JOHN R. BOLTON, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: UNSEPARATING THE POWERS 1 0- 1 3  ( 1 977);  
Glennon, supra note 42, at 1 4 1 -42; Kmiec, supra note 37, at 348. But see Rappaport, 
supra note 37, at 77 1 -76 (arguing that the President has a constitutional obligation to veto 
unconstitutional laws). 
50. In fact, some scholars have argued that h istorical acquiescence by earlier Presidents 
cannot be dispositive no matter how long standing. See Kmiec, supra note 37, at 357 
("Later presidents cannot be estopped from returning to the original understanding [of the 
Constitution].") .  
5 1 .  Given this aim, this Article will primarily focus on statements made by the Presi­
dents. Positions taken by Congress and the judiciary will be discussed only in passing, as 
will the eventual resolution of particular disputes. The key to the analysis i s  whether the 
positions taken by the Presidents asserted the unitariness of the executive branch, not 
whether those assertions were opposed or were successful. 
Because of space constraints, this Article will limit its discussion for the most part 
to statements made by the Presidents themselves, including veto messages, signing state­
ments, legislative proposals, and statements regarding previously enacted legislation. This is 
not to say that an analysis of other executive materials would not be appropriate. See 
Glennon, supra note 42, at 140. We omit extended discussion of statements offered by 
lower-level executive officials (such as those embodied in the arguments offered by the 
Attorneys General and the Solicitors General before the Supreme Court, the opinions of 
the Attorneys General, testimony before Congress, among others) simply because undertak­
ing a comprehensive survey of those documents would constitute another monumental 
undertaking. To the extent that our research has exposed us to the views offered by sub­
ordinate executive officials, we have found that those views largely corroborated our con­
clusions. 
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Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Jackson. The conclu­
sion of our four Article series is that, contrary to the misconcep­
ti ons of many anti -unitarians,  no systematic ,  unbroken, long-stand­
ing practice exists of presidential acquiescence to congressional ly­
imposed limitations on the President ' s  sole power to execute the 
laws and remove subordinate official s .  On the contrary , the histori­
cal record shows that Presidents almost always  object or fight 
when Congress trespasses on their constitutional power to execute 
the laws free from legislative control .  The few exceptions that do 
exist are neither significant enough nor sustained enough to consti­
tute Frankfurterian acquiescence. Thus ,  it i s  clear that, Professor 
Flaherty ' s  assertions notwithstanding, no reasonable B urkean com­
mon law constitutionalist could conclude that history and practice 
resolves the unitary executive debate in Congress ' s  favor. That 
debate must be resolved in the President ' s  favor on textual , struc­
tural,  originalist, and normative grounds. 
III.  THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE DURING THE EARLY YEARS 
OF THE REPUBLIC, 1 787- 1 837 
The first half-century of  the Republic was  a critical t ime in the 
development of our constitutional system. Although the Framers 
chose to create an independent, co-equal , and strongly unitary 
executive branch of government, many of the issues s urrounding 
the distribution of powers among the three branches of the federal 
government were not directly addressed in the Constitution.52 
Many in Congress recognized, however, from the very beginning 
that the Constitution gave to the President the sole power to re­
move executive official s,  and this recognition was refl ected in the 
famous so-called Decision of 1 789.53 Thereafter, every single Pres-
52. For the purposes of this  P..nicle,  i t  is suffic ient t o  note that the Framers specifical­
ly  considered and rejected proposals to divide the executive power among multiple Presi­
dents, I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1 787, 65-66, 88-89, 96-97 (Max 
Farrand ed . ,  I 966), or between the President and a counci l  of revision or a council of 
state, 1 id. at 97-98, i 38-4D; 2 id. at 73-80, 298, 541 -42; I THE DEBATES IN THE SEV­
ERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1 59 ,  1 64, 
2 1 4, 243, 257, 292 (J. Ell iott ed., 1 866) (photo. reprint 1 94 1  ). Thus i t  is general ly  con­
ceded that " [ n ] o  one denies that in  some sense the framers created a unitary executive; 
the question is  in what sense ."  Lessig & Sunstein. supra note 6, at 8. For a more com­
plete analysis of the Framers ' support for the unitary executive, see Calabresi & Prakash, 
supra note 3 ,  at 603-35 .  
53 .  S ince the Decision o f  1 789 represents a legislative construction of t h e  Constitution, 
i t  fal ls  outside the scope of th is Article.  Fortunately,  several definitive treatments of the 
Decision of 1 789 exist.  See JAMES HART, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY IN ACTION: 1 789, 
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ident who served between 1 789 to  1 837 consistently objected to  all  
congressional attempts to limit the President ' s  power to control the 
execution of the laws.  In fact, the executive branch was so suc­
cessful in resisting these challenges that by 1 837, both the friends 
and enemies of presidential power over law execution agreed that 
the matter had been conclusively settled in the President' s  favor by 
practice . 
This settled practice of constitutionally vested presidential pow­
er over removals fol lowed importantly from the Framers ' decision 
to make the executive branch as independent of the legislature, and 
as nearly co-equal to it, as was practicable .  This  decision was 
manifested not only in the Framers ' choice of the Electoral College 
as the mechanism by which Presidents would, at least initially be 
selected, but also by their dec ision to give the President the inde­
pendence that can only come with a fixed term in office.54 Ideas 
about how to select the President varied at the Philadelphia Con­
vention, but there was broad support for presidential independence 
buttressed by a long fixed term in office.55 In fact, during the 
1 55-248 ( 1 948); CHARLES C .  THACH , JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1 775- 1 789, 
1 4 1 -65 ( 1 923). Of paiticular note is both Chief Justice Taft ' s  reliance on the Decision of 
1789 as establishing u'le President 's  power to remove and Justices McReynolds's, Bran­
deis 's ,  and Holmes's criticism of that reliance in Myers v. Unired Srares, 272 U.S.  52 
( 1 926). Professor Calabresi and Sai Prakash have offered their own analysis. See Calabresi 
& Prakash, supra note 3, at 642-45 . For other contemporary treatments, see Casper, Early 
Pracrices, supra note 8 ,  at 233-43; David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The 
First Congress and rhe Structure of Government, 1 789- 1 79 1 ,  2 U. CHI. L. SG!. ROUND­
TABLE 1 6 1 ,  1 95 -203 ( 1 995) [hereinafter Currie, First Congress and Structure] ;  Greenfield, 
supra note 1 6, at 82-1 1 1 . 
Briefly stated, the initial draft of the bi l l  to establ ish the Department of Foreign 
Affairs provided that the Secretar; of Foreign Affairs was "to be removable from office 
by the President of the United States." Concerned that this language suggested that the 
power to remove the Secretary was conferred by congressional rather than constitutional 
grant, Representative Egbert Benson offered an amendment to this language to remove this 
implication. This amended language was subsequently incorporated into the statutes creat­
ing the War Department (without much controversy) as well as the Treasury Department 
(by the narrowest of margins: the casting vote of Vice President Adams). Congress 's 
action has been thereafter regarded as recognizing the constitutional basis of the Presi­
dent's removal power. 
54. Executive officials in parliamentary regimes lack such protections because they can 
be unseated by a vote of no confidence in the legislature. For this reason, Arend Lijphart 
identifies the fixed term of office as a key and sometimes advantageous feature of presi­
dential regimes. See Arend Lijphart, "Introduction," PARLIAMENTARY VERSUS PRESIDENTIAL 
GOVERN MENT 1 ,  1 1 - 1 2  (Aiend Lijphart ed., 1 992).  
55.  Gouverneur Morris, for example, was indifferent how the executive was chosen so 
long as he had the independence that comes with a long term in office. S imilarly, Dr. 
McClurg favored tenure during good behavior for the President thinking "the independence 
of the Executive to be equally essential with that of the Judiciary Department." 3 PHILIP 
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period at Philadelphia when the Framers were contemplating legis­
lative selection of the President, they also were contemplating 
reinforcing his independence with a fixed term longer than four 
years. Thus, when Theodore Lowi implies, wrongly in our view , 
that the Framers expected that the Electoral College would ordi­
narily fail to produce a winner aild that Presidents would thus be 
selected in the House of Representatives, he overlooks the fact that 
those selected would still be independent due to their fixed term in 
office.56 He also overlooks the unintended consequences of the 
Incompatibility Clause, which in practice has greatly reinforced the 
separation of powers to the great benefit of the presidency .57 
Presidential power and independence of the legislature were 
thus critical elements of the Founders'  p lan, and they were reflect­
ed from the Decision of 1 789 on L'1 the practice of our first seven 
Presidents, all of whom asserted a power to control law execution 
and to remove officials as part of their understanding of the execu­
tive' s  constitutionally gra.11ted prerogatives. 'Ne tum now to an 
elaboration of their view s .  
A .  George Washington 
George vVash ington' s strong support for the unitary executive 
had very deep roots and grew out of events that occurred long 
before he became the first President of the United States .  In partic­
ular, Washington ' s  views were greatly shaped by his experiences 
during the Revolutionary War when several committees o f  the 
Continental Congress served as the army ' s  plural executive head.58 
These ineffective multiple committees led Washington to p lead 
throughout the war for the creation of a single executive structure 
that would have the power and the duty to "act with dispatch and 
energy."59 "\Vashington complained repeatedly about "the inconve-
B .  KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION 495 ( 1 987).  
56.  See THEODORE J .  LOWJ , THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE 
UNPUL�lLLED 33-35 ( 1 985). Lowi argues quite wrongly that the Framers' system was 
going to make the presidency "an essentially parl iamentary office." !d. at 3 4. 
57. See Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of 
Powers or Separation of Personne/ 7 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1 045 ( 1 994). 
58. See GLENN A. PHELPS, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND AMERJCAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
1 42-43 ( 1 993) ;  see also id. at 56 (noting that during 1 779- 1 780, Washington supported 
efforts to create a "strong executive branch, preferably with individual executives capable 
of accepting and exerc is ing political responsibi l ity") .  
59. Letter from George Washington to Joseph Jones (May 1 4, 1 780), in  1 8  THE WRJT­
INGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 356, 356-57 (John C.  Fitzpatrick ed., 1 939),  quoted in 
PHELPS, supra note 58, at 59. 
1 997] THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 1 475 
nience of depending upon a number of men and different channels" 
for supplies.60 As Glenn Phelps notes, once Robert Morris was 
appointed Commissary General in  1 78 1 ,  his "success in supplying 
the army in those crucial months [before Washington ' s  v ictory at 
Yorktown] only reinforced Washington ' s  bias in favor of strong ,  
independent executive leadership."6 1  
Washington was also greatly frustrated during the War for 
Independence by the astonishing lack of a unified command struc­
ture. The Northern Army , for example, was commanded by Philip 
Schuyler, a New Yorker whose strong political support from that 
state allowed him, in Phelps ' s  words, to "behave[]  more l ike an 
equal than a subordinate,"  forcing Washington to plead with 
Schuyler to provide support for his  efforts.62 Moreover, the Conti­
nental Congress also appointed Washington ' field generals ,  thus 
effectively giving those generals some degree of independence. A s  
a result some o f  Washington ' s  nominal subordinates spent their 
time catering to the interests of their congressional p atrons with the 
result that they failed to follow Washington ' s  orders prompt! y, if  
ever.63 All of these experiences led Washington to support strong­
ly the creation of a "strong, independent, and energetic executive" 
at the Philadelphia Convention .64 
Once the unitary presidency had been established, Washington 
was determined as the first President to give it structure and l ife 
both through his actions and through his public and private utter­
ances. Washington noted during the opening months of his Admin­
istration that in his view, other executive officials existed only 
because it was " impossib[le] [for] one man . . .  to perform all the 
great business of the State," and thus the proper role for these 
officials was merely "to assist the supreme Magistrate in discharg-
60. PHELPS, supra note 58, at 1 43 (quoting I THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: 
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR SERIES 84). As Washington later noted, "wherever, and when­
ever one person is found adequate to the d i scharge of a duty by close application thereto 
i t  is worse executed by two persons, and scarcely done at al l if three or more are e m ­
ployed therein."  Letter from George Washington t o  t h e  Secretary o f  War (September 24, 
1 792), in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 1 59, 1 60, quot­
ed in LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 9 1  
( 1 948) (hereinafter WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS) .  
6 1 .  PHELPS, supra note 5 8 ,  at 1 43 ;  see also id. at 59. 
62. !d. at 1 44. 
63. !d. Washington ' s  command of his forces was further undermi ned by the fact that 
the militia officers that were part of his forces were primari ly responsible to their state ' s  
governors, not t o  h i m .  See id. a t  1 44-45 . 
64. See id. at 1 03-04. 
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ing the duties of his trust ."65 As noted by Leonard White, the 
preeminent administrative law historian of this period, "The Presi­
dent looked upon the Secretaries . . .  as assistants, not as rivals or 
as substitutes. "66 
Washington ' s  determination to take control of the entire admin­
istration was demonstrated immediately after his swearing in when 
he asserted control over the executive structures that were left over 
from the government set up under the Articles of Confederation . 
Thus ,  even before the new Cabinet Departments were created, and 
even before Secretaries had been appointed to direct them,  Wash­
ington was already personally taking control of all executive struc­
tures and entities within the government . A mere five days after 
Washington ' s  inauguration the President asked Acting S ecretary of 
War Henry Knox to examine and provide a summary report on 
papers regarding a treaty with the Cherokee Indians that he was 
forwarding to Knox .67 And, a little over one month l ater, Wash­
ington asked the Board of Treasury, the Acting Postmaster General , 
and the Acting Secretaries of War and Foreign Affairs to prepare a 
written report that would provide him with "an acquaintance with 
the real situation of the several great Departments" and a "ful l ,  
precise, and distinct general idea of the affairs of the United 
States" connected with their particular departments.68 As James 
Hart has noted, these letters were notabl e  for "the c lear conception 
he had of the presidential function of over-al l administrative man­
agement. "69 
After the great Cabinet Departments had been created, and after 
the initial Cabinet Secretaries had been appointed, vVashington 
continued to exercise close supervision over the affairs of the exec­
utive branch. Again and again, he involved himself with the day-
65. Letter from George Washington to Elenor Francois Elie. Comte de Moustier (May 
25, 1 7 89), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 333, 3 34, 
quoted in WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 27,  and Calabresi  & Prakash, 
supra note 3, at 637 .  
66 .  WH ITE , THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at  27.  
67.  See Letter from George Washington to the Acting Secretary of War ( May 9, 
1 7 89), in 30 THE WR!T!NGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 3 1 3 , 3 1 3 , cited 
in HART, supra note 53 ,  at 1 34. 
68. Letter from George Washington to the Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs (June 
8, 1 789), in 30 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59 ,  at 343,  344; id. at 
344 n.30 (editor noting that simi lar letters were sent to the Acting Secretary of War, the 
Board of the Treasury, and the Acting Postmaster General) ;  see also HART, supra note 
53 ,  at 1 35;  Calabresi & Prakash,  supra note 3. at 637 & n.425, 65 1 n .503 . 
69. HART, supra note 53 ,  at 1 35 .  
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to-day affairs of the v arious Cabinet Departments. Leonard White 
notes that "contacts between the President and his department 
heads were close and unremitting" and they included "hundreds of 
written communications and records of oral consultation."70 He 
describes Washington ' s  contacts as including: the "approval of 
plans or actions which had been submitted to him in writing, "  the 
conveying of "directions concerning administrative  operations,"  the 
making of requests to his department heads (including Treasury 
Secretary Alexander Hamilton) for "opinions on the constitutional­
ity of acts of Congress," and the m aking of requests for his Secre­
taries "opinions on policy questions, foreign and domestic alike."7 1  
Washington also reviewed all  correspondence prepared by cabinet 
officials .72 "By this means," Jefferson noted, Washington was "al­
ways in accurate possession of all  facts and proceedings in every 
part of the Union, and to whatsoever department they related; he 
formed a central point for the different branches; [and] preserved a 
unity of object and action among them."73 
In fact ,  Washington was ever watchful for exercises of execu­
tive power outside his direct supervision. When a private c itizen 
named Rosencrantz participated in certain treaty negotiations,  
Washington sharp! y inquired: 
Who is Mr. Rosencrantz? And under what authority has he 
attended the councils of the Indians at B uffalo Creek? 
S ubordinate interferences must be absolutely interdicted, or 
counteraction of the measure of Govemm[en]t ,  perplexity 
and confusion will  inevitably ensue. No person should 
presume to speak to the Indians on business of a public 
nature except those who derive their Authority and receive 
their instructions from the Vv'ar Office for that purpose.74 
70. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 32.  
7 1 .  /d. at 32-33;  see also id. at  1 06-07; Calabresi & Prakash,  supra note 3 ,  at 638 & 
nn.427-428. 
72. On June 4, 1 789, Washi ngton began to read and make abstracts of correspondence 
between Jefferson, who was then serving as M i n i ster to France, and Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs John Jay, in  the process "beginning a practice which Washington continued, more 
or less throughout his presidency." 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHJNGTON, supra 
note 59, at 343 n .29 (editoria l  note) ,  quo!ed in HART, supra note 5 3 ,  at 1 35 ;  see also 
Christopher C. DeMuth & Dougl as H. Ginsburg, While House Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 99 HARV . L. REV. 1 07 5 ,  1 07 5  ( 1 986);  Cross, Executive Orders 12 ,291 and 
12 ,498, supra note 3, at 485 . 
73 .  MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 226 (quoting Memorandum 
from Jefferson to the Heads of Departments (Nov.  6 1 80 I )) .  
7 4 .  Letter from George Washington t o  the Secretary of War ( A u g .  1 5 , 1 792), in  3 2  
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Washington deployed many tools in his never-ending quest to 
administer the Executive Branch of the Government in an orderly 
fashion. One of the tools plainly and wil l ingly employed was the 
removal power. Washington exercised his removal power v igorous­
ly  in at least seventeen civil cases, as well as removing s ix mil i ­
tary officers .75 Leonard White notes that it is difficult to deter­
mine the number of removals ,  especially since there are no records 
with respect to inferior officers , but it is clear that Washington 
removed "three foreign ministers, Monroe, Carmichael ,  and Thomas 
Pinckney (at his request)" as well as "two consuls ,  eight col lectors, 
and four surveyors of internal revenue."76 In addition, Secretary of 
State Edmund Randolph ' s  resignation under charges of misconduct 
"was in effect a removal ."77 
Thus, Washington c learly conducted his administration in a 
manner that realized the unitary v ision of the executive branch. As 
White so aptly observes: 
All major decisions in matters of administration and many 
minor ones were made by the President. No department 
head, not even Hamilton, settled any matter of importance 
without consulting the President and securing his  approval . 
All of them referred to the President numerous matters of 
detail as well as large and many small issues of administra­
tive policy . . . .  Washington accepted ful l  responsibil ity as 
a matter of course, and throughout the e ight years of his 
service there is no indication of a tendency to consider 
department heads other than dependent agencies of the 
Chief Executive.78 
Other historians concur with White ' s  assessment. Rexford Tugwel l  
notes Washington firmly rendered the department heads "his  subor­
dinates and separated them from the Congress."79 Tugwel l  further 
THE WRlTINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 1 1 5 ,  1 1 6- 1 7 , quoted in 
PHELPS, supra note 5 8 ,  at 1 46,  and WHITE, supra note 60, at 3 3 .  
7 5 .  See WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 285.  
76.  /d. 
77. !d. at 288;  see also id. at 1 70-72; PAUL P. VAN RIPER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES CIVIL S ERVICE 1 9  ( 1 958)  (c i ting CARL R.  FIS H ,  THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE 
PATRONAGE 1 3  ( 1 905)) .  
7 8 .  WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60,  at 27 (emphasis added). 
79. REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE PRESIDENCY 43 ( l 960), quoted 
in Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 1 2 ,498, supra note 3, at 485 n.8 ( 1 98 8 ) .  
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notes that Washington ' s  principle of administration was · ' that the 
Executive Branch of the government was one whole to be managed 
by the President alone,"80 and that presidential control over law 
execution was to "remain the rule  until . . .  Andrew Johnson ' s  
Presidency, when the Congress would assert its superiority by 
seizing the removal power it had allowed Washington to exerc ise 
without protest."8 1 Finally ,  Glenn Phelps concludes that 
"Washington ' s  presidency reflected [a] concern for administrative 
central ization. There would be no divided responsibil ity or ambigu­
ity as to who was the chief executive."x2 
This is not to say that Washington did not p lace a great deal 
of trust in his advisers. As James Hart observes, "As an adminis­
trator Washington made the final decis ions, but only after exercis­
ing his best judgment in the l ight of the views of advisors."83 
Whenever possible, Washington paid due respect to the preroga­
tives of his subordinates and avoided interfering with the details  of 
how each department head managed his responsibil ities.84 For ex­
ample, when a representative of the French government asked to 
meet with Washington directly ,  Washington demurred, countering 
that as a matter of policy governments function best when such 
contacts were channeled through the appropriate department 
head.85 Thus, as Glenn Phelps points out: 
[Washington ' s  trust in his advisers was] perfect! y consistent 
with his own long-held notions of administrative central ism. 
No matter how much discretion he chose to delegate to his 
subordinates Washington always held the reins of responsi­
bil ity very tightly .  Although he remained aloof from the 
detail s  of government operations he insisted that his depart­
ment heads inform him of every aspect of their daily activ­
ities ,  especially with regard to how their actions might 
affect his own authority.86 
80. TUGWELL, supra note 79, at 1 34-3 5 .  
8 1 .  !d. at 43 . 
82.  PHELPS, supra note 58 ,  at 1 45 ,  quoted in Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 
638. 
83.  HART, supra note 53 ,  at 1 34; see also WHITE. THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, 
at 27 n .4  ("Washington . . .  took ful l  advantage of [the department heads ' ]  counsel and 
was deferential to their views.") .  
84. See WH ITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 30-3 1 .  
85 .  See Letter from George Washington to Eleanor Francois El ie,  Comte de Moustier, 
supra note 59. at 334, cited in WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 3 1 .  
86. PHELPS, supra note 58 ,  at 1 46; see also Cal abresi & Prakash, supra note 3 ,  at 
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Notwithstanding Washington ' s  clear assertion of control over 
the entire executive branch, some scholars have persisted in point­
ing to certain congressional actions that they suggest constitute 
dev iations from the unitary executive. First these scholars c laim 
that in establishing the Treasury Department and the Post Office, 
Congress failed to designate them as "executive" departments . 87 
With regard to the Treasury Department, these scholars also point 
out that the statute fai led to include a provision explicitly providing 
that the Treasury Secretary "shall conduct the business of the . . . 
department in such manner as the President of the United S tates 
shall from time to time order or instruct,"88 required that the Trea­
sury Secretary submit reports directly to Congress ,89 and required 
that appropriations warrants be signed by the Secretary and coun­
tersigned by the Comptroller.90 Together, these factors cause some 
to believe that the Treasury Department and the Post Office as 
originally constituted were inconsistent with a unitary executive 
branch .9 1  
Whether Congress regarded the differences in the statutes creat­
ing the Departments of Foreign Affairs, War, and the Treasury as 
being significant is far from clear.92 However, it is crystal clear 
638.  
87. Compare An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 1 2, sec.  I ,  I S tat.  65,  
65 ( 1 789), and An Act for the Temporary Establishment of the Post-Office, c h .  1 6, sec.  
1 ,  I Stat. 70, 70 ( 1 7 89) with An Act for Establ ishing an Executive Department, to be 
demoninated the Department of Foreign Affairs, ch.  4, sec. I ,  I Stat. 28, 2 8-29 ( 1 789) 
and An Act to Establish an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of 
War, ch. 7 ,  sec. 1, I Stat. 49, 49-50 ( 1 7 89) .  
88 .  Cf sec.  I ,  1 S tat. at  29; sec.  1 ,  1 Stat. at 50.  
89. Sec.  2 ,  1 Stat. at  66. 
90. Sec. 4, I Stat. at 66. 
9 1 .  This thesis was first laid out over 50 years ago, and has periodical ly resurfaced 
ever since . See Casper, Early Practices, supra note 8 ,  at 240-42; Ledewitz,  supra note 2 1 ,  
at 792-93; Lessig & S unstein,  supra note 6 ,  at 27-30, 7 1 -72; Peter Shane, Independent 
Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH .  L. REV. 
596, 6 1 5- 1 6  ( 1 989); Tiefer, supra note 2 1 ,  at 70-76 . 
92. The significance of Congress ' s  failure to refer to Treasury as an '·executive" de­
partment is belied by the fact that nine days after creating that department, Congress 
passed the Salary Act, which establ ished for "the Executive Officers of Government," 
i nc luding both the Secretary and the Comptroller of the Treasury. Act of Sept. I I , 1 789,  
c h .  1 3 , sec. I ,  I Stat. 67,  67; see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3 at 648. 
It  is  also far from c lear that the absence of a specific provision authorizing presiden­
tial d i rection of the Treasury Secretary supports any negatively- impl ied l i m i ts on presiden­
tial  control. Such si lence i s  more properly viewed as ambiguous, Calabresi & Prakash, 
supra note 3, particularly in  l ight of the fact that Washington did not hes i tate to issue 
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that Washington must have regarded the differences in statutory 
l anguage as inconsequential because he asserted fiJ1n control over 
the Treasury Department throughout his Presidency.  As noted earl i­
er, Washington included the Board of Treasury along with the 
other extant carry-over departments when requesting information 
shortly after assuming office. Washington also advised Hamilton 
extensively on the structure of the Treasury Department, suggesting 
which positions should be established and how much the compen­
sation for those positions should be.93 
Washington effectively placed the Treasury Department under 
his firm control when he nominated Alexander Hamilton to be the 
first Secretary of the Treasury. Hamilton was one of the strongest 
defenders of executive power, energy, and unity during the found­
ing era.94 Equally importantly, Hamilton was personally very loyal 
to Washington having served as his aide during the Revolutionary 
War.95 So deep was Washington ' s  faith in Hamilton ' s  loyal ty that 
Washington was later to insist during the Adams Administration 
that he would only agree to serve as Commander-in-Chief of a 
reactivated army if Hamilton was his second in command. After a 
lengthy stalemate with Adams, who resented Hamilton as a rival , 
the second president gave in and agreed to let Washington have his 
most loyal and preferred aide in the number two military spot. In 
sum, as a practical matter, Washington ' s  selection of Hamilton as 
the first head of the Treasury Department rendered nugatory any 
independence the Treasury Department might have had. As Leonard 
White notes, Hamilton ' s  "loyal acceptance of Washington ' s  prima­
cy and his theoretical view of the status of a department head 
precluded any attempt on his part" to assert policies independent of 
Washington.96 Thus, although Hamilton undoubtedly did have a 
"orders" to Hamilton that Hami l ton unhesita tingly followed. See id. at 65 1 .  
Finally, the fact that the Comptrol ler had to countersign warrants for money did not 
necessarily imply independence from the Treasury Secretary and certainl y  did not necessar­
i ly  imply independence from the President. See id. at 654 n .5 2 l .  
93.  Letter from George Washington to the Secretary o f  the Treasury ( Mar. 1 5 , 1 79 1  ) ,  
in 3 1  THE WRJTINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59,  at 233,  2 3 4-49; see also 
W H ITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 3 3 ;  Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 
65 1 n.503. 
94. See WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 89-92. 
95.  See RICHARD B ROOKH ISER, FOUNDING FATHER: REDISCOVERING GEORGE WASHING­
TON 1 65-66 ( 1 996). 
96. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 29; see also id. at 27. Other histori­
ans concur. See, e.g, FORREST M C DONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 65 
( 1 974) [hereinafter MCDONALD, PRESIDENCY OF WASHINGTON] (" In admi n i strative matters 
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direct influence on early fiscal legislation,97 as Glenn Phelps 
notes,  " If [Washington] chose not to rein in Hamilton . . .  it was 
because Hamil ton ' s  plans for the federal government conformed 
perfectly well with his own,"98 and not because the Treasury S ec­
retary was in any way independent of the President. 
It is also far from c lear that Congress ' s  failure to denominate 
the Post Office as an "executive" department is  in any way signifi­
cant. As David Currie notes, the initial organic statute of the Post 
Office was a hurriedly-created temporary measure.99 Moreover, 
that statute explicitly made the Postmaster "subject to the direction 
of the President ." 100 And more importantly for the purposes of 
this Article, regardless of what Congress thought, Washington 
never doubted that he possessed the authority to control the Post 
Office. Within the opening months of his administration, after 
inspecting the report he had requested from the Post Office,  Wash­
ington further requested that the Acting Postmaster General send 
him "in detail, the receipts and expenditures of the Post Office" for 
1 7 8 4  and 1 7 8 8  so that Washington could "know the causes of the 
decrease of the income" that had taken place during that time. 1 0 1  
Two weeks later, Washington wrote again, indicating that "there 
sti l l  remains one point on which I would wish to have further 
information": whether the annual profit of $39,985 "has been 
lodged in the Treasury of the United States ,  or appropriated to the 
use of the Post Office Department ." 1 02 Washington also reviewed 
contracts that the Postmaster General had negotiated regarding the 
carriage of the mai l ,  on one occasion "tak[ing] the matter into 
consideration" and promising to let the Postmaster General k..'low 
"his determination upon it" at a later time . 1 03 And any remaining 
that were clearly executive [such as] the short-range borrowing and disbursal o f  
funds . . .  Ham i l ton continued t o  report directly a s  a subordinate and t o  act only upon 
orders from [Washington ] . " ) .  
9 7 .  See Casper, Early Pracrices, supra note 8,  a t  2 4 1 ; Currie, First Congress and 
Structure, supra note 53 ,  at 1 90 n . l 96 .  
9 8 .  PHELPS, supra note 5 8 ,  a t  1 46. 
99.  See Currie ,  First Congress and Structure, supra note 53 , at 203 . 
I 00. Act Establ ishing the Post Office, sec. I ,  I Stat. at 70, cited in Currie, Firsr Con­
gress and Srrucrure, supra note 53, at 203. 
I 0 I .  Letter irom George Washington to the Acting Postmaster General (July 3 ,  1 789) ,  in 
30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59, at 352, 352-53, quoted in 
HART, supra note 53, at 1 36,  and Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3 ,  at 657. 
I 02. Letter from George Washington to the Acting Postmaster General (July 1 7 ,  1 7 89) ,  
in  30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59.  at 356,  356,  quoted in 
HART, supra note 5 3 ,  at 1 36.  
1 03 .  Letter from George Washington to the Postmaster General (Aug.  29,  1 79 1 ) , in 3 1  
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doubts about the extent o f  the control that Washington exerted over 
the Post Office were eliminated when he transferred the Post Of­
fice into the Treasury Department in 1 79 1 ,  and subsequently de­
clined in 1 792 to support removing the Post Office  into the State 
Department.104 Thus, Washington plainly asserted the power to 
direct the officers of all the executive departments, including the 
Treasury Department and the Post Office. 
Stil l  other scholars have pointed out that the First Congress did 
not centralize the authority to control the U.S. Attorneys under any 
single subordinate executive official, and that state officials were 
empowered by the early statutes to conduct federal prosecutions as 
well.  They go on to suggest that the absence of a s ingle, subordi­
nate executive officer with authority to control federal l itigation is 
inconsistent with the unitary theory of the executive. 1 05 
This position too fails to find any support in the practices of 
the Washington Administration, since 1Nashington clearly believed 
that he had plenary authority to control all federal prosecutions.  On 
several occasions, even though Congress had not yet at that time 
centralized control of federal prosecutions under any particular 
subordinate executive official, 106 Washington directed various fed­
eral d istrict attorneys in the exercise of their prosecutorial discre­
tion. Thus, ·washington wrote the United States Attorney for the 
Pennsylvania District saying that he thought two individuals recent­
ly indicted for riot were innocent and that he "therefore thought fit 
to instruct you forth with to enter a Nolle prose qui on the indict­
ment aforesaid: and for so doing let this be filed as your war­
rant." 107 Washington also "[d]irected the Att[orne]y Gen[era] l [] to 
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59. at 3 48, 348 (emphasis added) .  
1 04. See id. in 31  THE WRJTJNGS OF GEORGE WASH1NGTON, supra note 59, at 349, 
cited in WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS. supra note 60, at 30-3 i ;  see also Calabresi & Prakash, 
supra note 3, at 657 & n.535 .  
I 05.  See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over C.-imina I Law Enforcement: Some 
Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 275 ( 1 989) [hereinafter Krent, ExecU/ive Can­
cro!]; Krent, Fragmencing, supra note 1 3 ;  Lessig & Sunstein ,  supra note 6, at 1 5-20; 
Tiefer, supra note 2 1 ,  at 7tJ.-75. 
1 06. See WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 1 66-68; Bloch, supra note 1 6 ,  at 
567; Krent, Executive Control, supra note l 05, at 286-87;  Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 
6, at 1 6- 1 7 ;  Tiefer. supra note 2 1 ,  at 7 4-75 ;  james R.  Harvey III, Note, Loyalty in Gov­
ernment Licigation: Departmer.t of Justice Representation of Agency Ciients, 37 WM. & 
MARY. L. REv. 1 569, 1 578 ( 1 996). Washington did present Attorney General Edmund 
Randolph ' s  request for supervisory authority over t.he district atiomeys to Congress, but 
the Senate rejected this proposa! .  WHlTE, THE FEDERALiSTS, supra note 60, at 1 67;  Bloch, 
supra note 1 6, at 585-88; Calabresi & Pra..l;:ash, supra note 3 ,  at 658 n.542; Harvey, su­
pra, at 1 57 8  n.52.  
1 07 .  Letter from George Washington to Will iam Rawle (Mar. 1 3 , 1 793),  in 32 WRiT-
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instruct the District Attornies to req uire from the Col lectors of the 
several Ports, within them, information of all infractions of neutral­
ity that may come within their purview at the different ports, re­
quiring the interposition of Government, particularly as to bui lding 
and equipping Vessels for W ar . " 1 08 Asking that a subordinate of­
ficer be given control over all federal l itigation in no way suggest­
ed that the President lacked the authority to control all prosecutions 
even i f  no such subordinate officer were given such powers . 1 09 
Washington also sought help subject to presidential gui dance 
and direction from state as well as federal officials in thei r  en­
forcement of federal law during the Whiskey Rebell ion. 1 1 0 At first 
relying on his powers of suasion, Washington invoked his duties 
under the Take Care Clause in asking state courts and executives 
to use their weight and influence to bring the rebel s  to justice. 1 1 1  
More specifically:  
(Washington] charge[d] and require[d] all Courts, Magis­
trates and Officers whom it may concern, according to the 
duties of their several offices, to exert the powers in them 
respectively vested by l aw for the purposes aforesaid, here­
by also enjoining and requiring all persons whomsoever, as 
they tender the welfare of their c ountry, the just and due 
authority of government and the preservation of the public 
peace, to be aiding and assisting therein according to 
l aw . 1 1 2  
When these efforts failed, Washington assumed command of 
the state mil itias even though those troops nominally fell under the 
jurisdiction of the states. 1 1 3 As Glenn Phelps notes, " (O ] nce mobi-
INGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59,  at 3 86, 3 86 (emphasis added) .  
1 08 .  Journal of che Proceedings of che Presidenr (May 1 0, 1 793) ,  in 32 W R ITINGS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59,  at 455 n .3 5  (emphasis added).  Both the Attorney 
General and the Secretary of State entered numerous other requesl� for specific actions 
with re;;ards to prosecutions. See WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 407-08 & 
n . 1 0. 
1 09 .  See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 659 & n.547. 
1 1 0.  For a comprehensive discussion of the Framers ' v iews on the Preside n t ' s  abil ity to 
direct state official s '  execution of federal law, see Saikrishna B. Prakash, Field Of ice 
Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1 957, 1 990-2006 ( 1 99 3 ) .  
I l l . See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3 ,  a t  641  (citing PHELPS, supra note 5 8 ,  at 
1 3 1 -32).  
1 1 2.  Proclamation by George Wash ington , September 1 5 , 1 792, 32 WRlTINGS O F  
GEORGE WASHI NGTON ,  supra note 5 9, a t  1 50-5 1 (emphasis adde d ) .  
1 1 3 .  See MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESI DENCY, supra note 20,  at 240. 
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! ized, the state mil itias ceased to be under the jurisdiction of the 
governors. Organized as state units they were nonetheless the 
President ' s  men exclusively ." 1 1 4 Washington also dramatically 
intervened in the law enforcement process by making stunning and 
wise use of the Pardon Power to pardon many of those involved i n  
the Whiskey Rebellion . 1 1 5  This set a precedent for an important 
practice that has subsequently grown of post wartime pres idential 
pardons fol lowing such conflicts as the Civil War, the two World 
Wars, Vietnam, and the Cold War. Washington ' s  pardon in thi s  
instance was a direct and highly personal intervention in the law 
enforcement process that was des igned to heal and restore social 
peace .  It too suggests a direct personal role in law enforcement 
i ssues for the First President. 
Washington ' s  wil l ingness to seek help subject to presidential 
guidance and direction from state as well as federal officials was 
i l lustrated again when Citizen Genet approached various American 
citizens in an attempt to organize support for France ' s  war with 
Britain in direct violation of the Neutrality Proclamation. This time 
Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Mifflin, an old political rival of 
Washington ' s ,  followed Washington ' s  request and assisted the 
federal government in enforcing the Neutrality Proclamation with­
out questioning Washington ' s  authority to guide a s tate governor ' s  
execution of federal law . 1 1 6 Washington issued similar requests for 
help subject to his guidance from other governors as well . 1 1 7  
Phelps concludes that together these events underscore the 
President ' s  control over all  officers-both state and federal-who 
enforce federal laws:  "Where enforcement of the laws of the feder­
al government was concerned, Washington fimdy bel ieved that 
governors were constitutionally subordinate to the president ." 1 1 �  
Washington viewed his duty t o  "see that the laws be faithfully 
executed" as a personal responsibil ity that could not be delegated. 
1 1 4. PHELPS, supra note 58,  at 1 3 3 .  
1 1 5 .  See George Washington, ProclamQ/ion of 1 0  July 1 795, reprinted in  4 KURLAND & 
LERNER, supra note 55,  at 20. 
1 1 6 .  See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3,  at 64D-4 1  (citing PHELPS, supra note 58, at 
1 29).  
1 1 7 .  See id. at 641 n .442 (ci ting MCDONALD, PRESI DENCY OF WAS H INGTON,  supra note 
96, at 1 27 ) .  Thus, contrary to Lessig and S unste in  's assertions, enforcement  of federal 
laws by state officials during the early years of the Republic was not i nconsistent with  
the unitary executive. See Lessig & S unste i n ,  supra note 6.  at 1 8-20;  see a/so Krent, 
E:xecurive Control, supra note 1 05 ,  at 303-09.  
1 1 8 .  PHELPS, supra note 5 8 ,  at 1 32 .  
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A s  Phe lps s o  aptly  observes,  " [R]esponsibil ity under the Constitu­
t ion for actions of the chief executive was not col lective; it was his 
a lone. This also meant that the obligations of c itizens and state 
officials under the laws of the Constitution were also due to him 
alone ." 1 1 9  
The Neutrality Proclamation also gave rise to the first full 
publ ic defense of the theoretical and constitutional underpinnings of 
presidential power. Alexander Hamilton ' s  Pacificus letters, pub­
l ished to ral ly public support for the Neutrality Proclamation, pub­
licly set out a sophisticated textual argument for presidential power 
in the foreign policy context and over removals .  Hamilton ' s  princi­
pal thesis was that " [t]he general doctrine of our Constitution . . .  
i s ,  that the executive power of the nation is vested in the President; 
subject only to the exceptions and qualifications which are ex­
pressed in the instrument." 1 20 Hamilton observed that " [t ]he sec­
ond articl e  of the Constitution of the United States ,  section first, 
· establ ishes this general proposition, that ' the EXECUTIVE POWER 
shal l be vested in a President of the United States of America. ' 
[Article II, section 2] proceeds to delineate particular cases of 
executive power." 1 2 1  Hamilton reasoned: 
It would not consist with the rules of sound construction, 
to consider this enumeration of particular authorities as 
derogating from the more comprehensive grant in the gen­
eral clause, further than as it may be coupled with express 
restrictions or limitations; as in regard to the co-operation 
of the Senate in the appointment of officers and the mak­
ing of treaties; which are plainly qualifications of the gen­
eral executive powers of appointing officers and making 
treaties . 1 22 
Accordingly, subject only to "these exceptions,  the executive power 
of the United States is completely lodged in the President ." 1 23 
Hamilton bolstered this conclusion by comparing the Vesting 
C lauses of Articles I and II: 
1 1 ':1 .  !d. at 1 33 .  
1 20 .  Alexander Hami lton, Pacificus No. I (June 29, 1 793) ,  in 4 THE WORKS O F  ALEX­
. \ N DER HAMILTON 432, 439 ( He nry C.  Lodge ed., 1 97 1 )  (emp h as i s  i n  ori ginal) .  
1 2 1 .  /d. at 437 - 3 8 .  
1 22 .  /d. a t  438 .  Hamil ton a lso noted that t h e  Constitution establ ished an additional ex­
press restr iction on executive power when i t  provided for "the right of the Legislature ' to 
Jeclarc war, and grant letters of marque and reprisal . ' "  /d. at 439. 
1 23 .  !d. 
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The different mode of expression employed in the Constitu­
tion, in regard to the two powers, the leg islative and the 
executive, serves to confirm this inference. In the article 
which gives the legis lative powers of the government, the 
expressions are: "All legislative powers herein granted shall 
be vested in a Congress of the United S tates ."  In that 
which grants the executive power, the expressions are: "The 
executive power shal l be vested in a President of the Unit­
ed States." 1 24 
Given the Article I Vesting Clause ' s  specific limitation of congres­
sional powers to those "herein granted" and given the absence of a 
similar l imitation in the Executive Power Clause, Hamilton con­
c luded that " [t]he enumeration [of Article  II] ought therefore to be 
considered as intended merely to specify the principal articles im­
plied in the definition of executive power; leaving the rest to flow 
from the general grant of that power. "  This construction of the 
Executive Power Clause was made all the more authoritative since 
" [t]his mode of construing the Constitution has indeed been recog­
nized by Congress in formal acts upon ful l  consideration and de­
bate; of which the power of removal from office is an important 
instance." 1 25 
That Hamilton would write such a powerful defense of the 
constitutional construction that underlies the theory of the un itary 
executive and of presidential removal power is especially tel l ing. 
Although Hamilton had embraced the vision of a powerful ,  unitary 
executive in several of The Federalist Papers, 1 26 in The Federal-
1 24.  !d. at 43 8.  
1 25 .  !d. at  439 (emphasi s  added). See generally EDWARD S .  CORW I N ,  THE PRESIDENT 
209, 472 n . 3 1 (5th ed. , Randa l l  W .  B land et  a! .  eds. ,  1 984) [here i n a fter CORWI N ,  T i lE  
PRESIDENT ( 1 984 ed.) ;  LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS B ETWEEN CONGRESS 
AND THE PRESIDENT 1 6- 1 7, 5 8  (3d ed. rev . ,  1 99 1 )  (herei nafter FISHER,  CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONRICTS ] ;  LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDEI'<'T AND CONGRESS 3 2- 3 3  ( 1 97 2 )  [ hereinafter FIS H E R .  
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS] ;  I WILLIAM M .  GOLDSMITH, T H E  GROWTH 01' PRES I DENTI A L  
POWER 1 78-82. 397-404 ( 1 974); R I CHARD LOSS, T H E  MODERN THEORY 01' PRES I DENTIA l .  
POWER 1 7 - 1 8  ( 1 990) .  
1 26. In  The Federalisl No. 7 0 ,  A l exander Ham i l ton argued that u n i t y  was the first in ­
gredient of · ·Energy in the Execut ive," which H a m i l ton termed "a lead i ng character in the 
defi n i tion of good government" and "one of the best dist inguishing features of our consti­
tution." Pl ural i ty i n  the executive, on the other hand, "tend[ed]  to conceal faults and 
destroy responsibi l i ty." THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 47 1 ,  476 ( Alexander H am i lton) (Jacob 
E.  Cooke ed., 1 96 1  ); see also Calabres i ,  Some Normalive Argumenls, supra note I I , at 
37-47; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 6 1 4. Furthermore, in The Federalisl No. 72.  
Ham i l ton further indicated that al l  executive officers "ought to be s ubject to [presidential ] 
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ist No. 77,  he had also clearly suggested that " [ i ] t  has been men­
tioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the coopera­
tion of the Senate, in the business of appo intments, that it would 
contribute to the stabil ity of the administration. The consent of that 
body would be necessary to displace as wel l  as appoint. " 1 27 It ap­
pears that by the time Hamilton wrote his Pacificus l etters , he had 
completely disavowed the v iews expressed in The Federalist No. 
77 and had fully embraced both presidential removal power and 
implicitly a power to control all exercises of law execution as well . 1 28 
Madison responded to Hamilton in letters written under the 
pseudonym Helvidius, 1 29 and he decried Hamilton ' s  construction 
of the foreign policy powers conferred by the Executive Power 
Clause as being "no less vicious in theory than it would be dan­
gerous in practice. "  In Madison ' s  eyes, the only possible source of 
Hamilton ' s  broad definition of executive power in the foreign poli­
cy context was the "royal prerogatives in the British government, 
[which] are accordingly treated as executive prerogatives by British 
Commentators." 1 30 To draw on such an antidemocratic source to 
superintendence." THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 487 (Alexander H am i l ton) (Jacob E.  Cooke 
ed. , 1 96 1  ) ; see also Calabresi & Prakash ,  supra note 3 ,  at 643 n.454. 
1 27 .  THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 496-97 (Alexander H am il ton) (Edward M. Earle e d . ,  
1 976);  see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3 ,  a t  597 n . 2 1 5 ,  643 n . 4 5 4 ;  EDWARD S .  
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT ' S  REMOVAL POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION ( 1 927) ,  reprinted 
in I CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 3 1 7 ,  339-40 (Richard Loss ed. ,  1 98 1 )  [here inafter 
CORWIN,  PRESI DENT ' S  REMOVAL POWER); FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note. 
1 25 ,  at 5 3 ;  I GOLDSMITH, supra note 1 25 ,  at 1 8 1 .  
1 28 .  This concl usion is further supported by the fact that H am i l ton himself  regarded the 
Paciftcus letters as the better reasoned statement of h is  views on the Constitution. See 
Richard Loss, Cor>Vin on Alexander Hamilton and the President 's Removal Power. in 1 
CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 1 3 1 ,  at 373, 374-77 [ hereinafter Loss, Corwin 
on Hamilton]; Douglass Adair, The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers, 3 WM. 
& MARY Q.  97, 235 ( 1 944), in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 27, 73 (Trevor 
Colboum ed., 1 974).  
1 29 .  Apparently,  the Helvidius letters were prompted by Thomas Jefferson who,  while 
general ly  happy w i th the Neutrality Procl amation, was d isturbed by the i m p l ications of 
Ham i l ton ' s  rhetoric .  Jefferson entreated upon Madison,  " N obody answers h im,  h i s  doctrines 
w i l l  therefore be taken for confessed. For God ' s  sake, my dear Sir, take u p  your pen, 
se lect the most striking heres ies  and cut him to pieces in the face of the publ ic ."  Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 7. 1 79 3 ) ,  in 6 THE WRITINGS Of THOMAS 
JEffERSON 338,  338 (Pau l Leicester Ford ed . . I �95) .  Madison acceded with considerable 
reluctance: .. As I intimated in my last, l have forced myse l f  into the task of a reply.  I 
can truly say I find it the most grating one I ever e xperienced."  Letter from James M adi­
son to Thomas Jefferson (July 30,  1 79 3 ) ,  in I LETfERS AND OTHER WRITI NGS Of' JAMES 
MADISON 5 8 8 ,  5 8 8  (J .B.  Lippincot ed. ,  1 865) .  
1 30.  J ames Madison, Helvidius, in I LETfERS AND OTHER WRITINGS Of'  J A MES MADI­
SON, supra note 1 29,  at I 5 2  (emphasis deleted). 
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define the scope of executive power over foreign policy in a demo­
cratic society was to him unthinkable . 1 3 1  In making thi s  argument, 
Madison was hampered by his own statements offered during the 
Decision of 1 789, in which he had argued, as did the Pacificus 
letters, that the Executive Power Clause granted al l executive pow­
er to the President and that any derogation from that grant should 
be strictly construed. 1 32 Moreover, Madison was throughout his 
career a staunch defender of constitutional ly vested presidential 
removal power. 1 33 In any event, Madison ' s  protestations had l ittle 
impact, as most historians have generally agreed that Hamilton ' s  
v iews on the scope o f  executive power have prevailed . 1 34 
When viewed in their totality, Washington ' s  statements and 
administrative practice strongly support the view that the President 
is responsible for execution of all federal law and thus may super­
intend all those authorized to execute it, removing those who do 
not do so to his satisfaction. 1 35 That Washington emerged as such 
1 3 1 .  See generally CORWlN, THE PRESIDENT ( 1 98 4  ed.),  supra note 1 25 ,  at 2 1 0, 472 
n .33;  FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICfS, supra note 1 25 ,  at 1 7 ;  FISHER, PRESIDENT AND 
CONGRESS, supra note 1 25 ,  at 33; I GOLDSMITH, supra note 1 25 ,  at 404; RALPH 
KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON 345-46 ( 1 97 1 ) ;  Loss, Corwin on Hamilton, supra note 1 28 ,  at 
20-2 1 .  For a modem discussion, see Calabresi, Some Normative A rguments, supra note I I , 
at 30-3 1 ;  Calabresi, Power Grants, supra note 3 ,  at 1 392-93 ; Calabresi & Prakash, supra 
note 3 ,  at 583-84. 
1 32. I ANNALS OF CONG. 479-82, 499, 5 1 8  (Joseph Gales ed. ,  1 789);  see also Loss, 
Corwin on Hamilton, supra note 1 28,  at 2 1 .  Madison 's  attempt to distinguish these posi­
tions was less than successful ,  being, i n  the words of Edward Corwin,  "more adroit than 
convincing." CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT ( 1 98 4  ed.),  supra note 1 25 ,  at 2 1 0.  
1 33 .  The only exception i s  one brief statement made by Madison on one day about the 
Treasury Department bil l  which was l ater withdrawn. Otherwise, Madison staunchly de­
fended this view from 1 789 until the waning days of his l i fe .  
1 34. Richard Loss has noted that such eminent  scholars as Henry Cabot Lodge and 
Hans Morgenthau have agreed that Hamilto n ' s  arguments have prevailed. See Loss, supra 
note 1 25 ,  at 23 & nn. l 47-5 1 (citing Lodge ' s  statement in 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON, supra note 1 20, at 489 n . l ;  LOUIS HACKER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON IN THE 
AMERICAN TRADITION 1 98 ( 1 957);  HANS J. MORGENTHAU, lN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL 
INTEREST 14 ( 1 95 1 ) ; HENRY J. FORD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 288 ( 1 920);  FREDERJCK 
OLIVER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 335 ( 1 927) ;  and KETCHAM, supra note 1 3 1 ,  at 346-47));  
see also I GOLDSMITH, supra note 1 25 ,  at 404. For a pro-Madison eval uation, see 3 
IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 379 ( 1 950). 
1 35 .  See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3 ,  at 662. There was one development during 
the Washington Adm inistration that arguably suggested that Washington did not i nvariably 
adhere to the unitary theory of the executive. A l though Congress finnly rebuffed James 
Madison 's  proposal that the Comptrol ler of the Treasury be given a fixed tenure of office, 
Congress did approve statutes requiring that the Comptroller countersign warrants drawn 
by the Secretary, see Act of Sept. 2,  1 789,  ch. 1 2, sec. 3, 1 Stat. 66, 66, and providing 
that the Comptroller ' s  decisions would be "final and conclusive," Act of M arch 3 ,  1 795, 
ch. 48,  sec. 4, 1 Stat. 44 1 ,  442. Certain scholars have reasoned that these provisions 
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a strong advocate of executive unitariness i s  quite tel l ing.  I t  is 
often observed that the American presidency was created in George 
Washington ' s  image since all of the Founders knew that he was 
almost certain to be the first occupant of the new chief executive 
office. 1 36 Nor were the potential constitutional implications of the 
precedents set lost on Washington. He explic itly cautioned his 
advisers that " [m]any things which appear of l ittle importance in 
themselves and at the begirining, may have great and durable con­
sequences from their having been established at the commencement 
of a new general government ." 1 37 Washington similarly wrote to 
Madison, "As the first of every thing, in our s ituation will serve to 
establish a Precedent, i t  is devoutly wished on my part, that these 
precedents may be fixed on true principles ." 1 38 Thus Washington 
was well  aware of his unique position in this regard and his adop­
tion of a unitary executive structure was the result of his  best 
constitutional judgment. 
B. John Adams 
President John Adams was strongiy committed to the theory of 
the unitary executive, and, as President, he continued Washington ' s  
practice of asserting complete control over the execution o f  federal 
law. Leonard White describes Adams as being "an uncompromising 
friend of the executive, on theoretical as well as practical 
deprived the President of the authority to direct the Comptroller's execution of  the law 
and thus are inconsi stent with the unitai)' theor; of the executive branch. See Tiefer, 
supra note 2 1 ,  at 73-74; B loch, supra note 1 6 ,  at 578 n . 5 5 ;  Lessig & S unste in ,  supra 
note 6, at 27; Rosenberg, Congress 's  Prerogative, supra note 6, at 654-55 & n. l 5 5 .  
Professor Calabresi and Sai Prakash have already addressed t.'le flaws in this  argu­
ment. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 3, at 653-54 & n . 52 1 .  And in any event, the 
mere fact u1at Washington may have failed to objee1 to two isolated deviations from the 
unitary executive theory does not constitute the degree of acquiescence needed to resolve 
the issue under the methodology of coordinate construction advanced by this Article.  
1 36.  This may generally be a phenomenon of presidential regimes. The pres idency of 
the French Fifth Republic was, of course, created for Charles DeGaul le ,  the first occupant 
or that office. S i m i larly, the presidency of the Russian Federation was created by and for 
Boris Yeltsin, the curTent  and only c,ccupant of that office. 
I 3 7 .  Queries on a l ine of conduct to be pursued by the President (May I 0, 1 789), in 
30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 59 ,  at 3 1 9, 3 2 1 ,  quoted in 
PHELPS, supra note 58,  at 1 22.  
1 3 8 Casper, Eariy Practices, supra note 8,  at 225 (quoting Letter from George W ash­
ington to James Madison (i\.!ay 5, 1 78SI), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON ! 3 1 ,  
I 3 2  (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A .  Ru tland eds . ,  1 979)); see also PETER M .  SHANE & 
l-iAROLD H .  B R U FF, S EPARATION OF POWERS LAW: CASES A N D  MATERIALS 1 4- 1 5  ( 1 996).  
1 997] THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 1 49 1  
grounds ." 1 39 Thus, White notes that Adams wrote to Jefferson in 
the summer of 1 789:  
[I would] have given more power to the President, and less 
to the senate. The nomination and appointment to al l offic­
es, I would have given to the President, assisted only by a 
privy council of his own creation; but not a vote or voice 
would I have given to the senate or any senator unless he 
were of the privy council . 1 40 
Adams expanded on these views in a lengthy letter to Roger Sher­
man in which he adamantly expressed the view that for seven 
reasons it had been a mistake even to give the Senate a role in 
advising on and consenting to presidential appointments . 1 4 1  Adams 
gravely predicted that a role for the Senate in confirmations would 
"destroy the present form of government" and could even raise the 
"danger of dividing the continent into two or three nations, a case 
that presents no prospect but of perpetual war ." 1 42 There is  little 
question, then, that by 1 789  Adams was a stalwart defender of 
greatly enhanced executive power who believed the Constitution 
gave the President too little power, not too much. 
During his tenure as George Washington ' s  Vice President, and 
as the very first Vice President of the United States ,  John Adams 
had an early opportunity to play a critical role in the unitary exec­
utive debate. The key moment came when Adams cast a vital tie­
break ing  vote in the Senate thus participating directly in affecting 
the outcome of the famous Decision of 1 789. 1 43 As James Hart 
recounts: 
" [A] number" of senators who had favored presidential 
removal of the other Secretaries were at first against his 
removal of the Secretary of the Treasury. When the House 
adhered to its position, however, the vote of the S enate to 
recede was a tie of 1 0  to 1 0, which the Vice President 
broke in favor of presidential power. 1 44 
1 39 .  WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 92.  
1 40 .  !d. at 93 (quoting Letter from J o hn Adams to Thomas Jefferson (July 1 8, ! 789) ,  
in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS,  SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE U N ITED STATES 430-3 1 
(Charles Franci s  Adams ed., 1 969). 
1 41 .  See Letter from John Adams to Roger Sheman (July 20, 1 789),  in 6 THE WORKS 
OF JOHN ADAMS 432-36, reprinted in 4 KURLAND & LERNER, supra note 140, at 1 06-08. 
i 42 .  !d. at 1 07 .  
1 43 .  See HART, supra note 53,  a t  217  & n .279. 
1 44. HART, supra note 53, at 2 1 7- 1 8 ;  see also MCDONALD, A M ERICAN PRESI DENCY, 
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John Adams ' s  tie-breaking vote helped resolve a critical disagree­
ment between the Senate and the House, and it made clear the 
recognition of the First Congress that the Constitution places the 
Treasury Department, like the Departments of Foreign Affairs and 
of War, under direct presidential control with a full  presidential 
power of removal . 1 45 
As President, Adams continued to adhere to and act upon these 
views.  In a letter to Secretary of S tate Timothy Pickering , written 
during the first year of his administration, Adams criticized the 
plural executive directory then in place in France, which he 
thought could easily lead to a civil war. Adams observed: 
The worst evil that can happen in any government is  a 
divided executive; and, as a plural executive must, from the 
nature of men, be forever divided, this is a demonstration 
that a plural executive is  a great evil,  and incompatible 
with liberty . That emulation in the human heart, which 
produces rivalries of men, c ities ,  and nations, which pro­
duces almost all the good in human l ife, produces, also, 
almost all the evil.  Thi s  is  my philosophy of govern­
ment. 146 
Thus, it comes as l ittle surprise that, as Leonard White reports, 
"John Adams held the same general v iew of the position of depart­
ment heads as Washington" 1 47 and, as President, continued Wash­
ington ' s  practice of asserting complete control over the execution 
of federal law. When Adams and the Cabinet disagreed over major 
issues of federal policy, it was Adams who generally prevailed. 1 48 
Adams also sharply criticized a provision of the Stamp Tax that 
arguably could have been construed to render the Treasury S ecre­
tary somewhat independent of presidential control . Although the 
supra note 20, at 221 (citing The Diary of Wil liam Maclay and Other Notes on Senate 
Debates in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE U NITED 
STATES OF A MERJCA (Kenneth R .  Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds. 1 98 8)) .  
1 45 .  This was later confirmed again in the Salary Act,  which established salaries for the 
executive officers of the government including the Secretary of the Treasury .  See Act of 
Sept. 1 1 , 1 789,  ch. 1 3 ,  sec. 1 ,  I Stat.  67 
1 46. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 29 (quoting Letter from John Adams 
to Timothy Pickering (Oct. 3 1 ,  1 797), in 8 TH E WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 
1 40, at 559, 5 60).  
1 47 .  WHITE, TH E  FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 29. 
1 48.  See Cross, Executive Orders 12 ,291  and 12,498, supra note 3, at 486 n . l l .  
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federal government ' s  acute need for revenue m the end led Adams 
to approve the bi l l ,  Adams complained: 
[T]he office of the secretary of the treasury I S ,  in that bi l l ,  
premeditatedly set up as  a rival to that of the President; 
and that pol icy wi l l  be pursued, if we are not on our 
guard, til l we have a quintuple or a centuple executive 
directory, with all the Babylonish dialect which modem 
pedants most affect . 1 49 
Adams also fol lowed Washington ' s  precedent of using mil itary 
force for law enforcement purposes to subdue the so-called Fries 
Rebell ion in eastern Pennsylvania. After Fries was sentenced to 
death, Adams intervened again in the law enforcement process,  
using his pardon power to pardon both Fries and his accom­
plices. 1 50 Clearly, in practice as well as in theory, John Adams 
deserves to be counted as being squarely within the pro-unitary 
executive camp. 
Furthermore, although Adams used the removal power sparing­
ly, he did not hesitate to use i t  to maintain his control of the exec­
utive branch. Leonard White observes that Adams removed twenty­
one civil officers (counting two who were not reappointed) and six 
army officers: among these were the Secretary of State, Timothy 
Pickering, one minister and four consular officers, one marshall ,  
seven collectors, five surveyors, one supervisor, and one commis­
sioner of court. 1 5 1 Although removals were rare and were usual ly 
for poor performance in office, Adams did depart from Washing­
ton ' s  practice by making "a few changes [in personnel ]  in which 
party differences played a part." 1 52 White persuasively describes 
Adams ' s  removals of Joseph Whipple, collector at Portsmouth, and 
Wil l iam Gardner, commissioner of loans for New Hampshire, as 
being in this category , along with his removal of Tench Coxe, who 
1 49.  WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 30 (quoting Letter from John Adams 
to Ol i ver  Wolcott, Jr. (Oct. 20, 1 797) ,  in 8 THE WORKS 01' JOHN ADAMS. supra note 
1 4D, at 554,  555)  
1 50.  WH ITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60,  at  422-23 .  
I 5 I .  See id. at 285;  see also VAN R I PER, supra note 7 7 ,  at 2 i .  Adams also removed 
James McHenry as Secretary of War. David F. Fane, Marbury ' s  Travail: Federalist Poli­
lics and William Marbury 's  Appointment as Justice of the Peace, 45 CATH. U. L.  REV. 
349, 393 ( 1 996); Cross, E.xecwive Orders 1 2,291 and 1 2 ,498, supra note 3, at 485. 
1 52 .  WHITE, TH E FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 287.  
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was discharged as Commissioner of Revenue for shifting his politi­
cal allegiance from Hamilton to Jefferson. 153 
Perhaps the best example of Adams ' s  domination of his admin­
istration is his struggle with Secretary of State Pickering. A mem­
ber of Alexander Hamilton ' s  rival faction of the Federal ist party, 
Pickering disagreed with Adams over one of the most important 
matters of public policy fac ing the new republic: the nation ' s  rela­
tions with France. Pickering also provoked Adams ' s  personal ire by 
supporting Hamilton ' s  bid to become second-in-command of the 
army (after George Washington) and by galvanizing the opposition 
to the nomination of Adams ' s  son-in-law as adjutant general . 1 54 
After Pickering refused Adams ' s  invitation to resign, Adams sum­
marily removed him, flatly stating that " [d] ivers [sic] causes and 
considerations, essential to the administration of the government, 
[sic] in my judgment, requir[e] a change in the department of 
S tate ." 1 55 In sum, Adams used his removal powers more often 
than Washington did, and he was the first President to remove an 
official for political reasons.  In so doing , as one hi storian has 
noted, Adams "completed the demonstration of his supremacy m 
Executive affairs ." 156 
By the end of the Adams Administration the first twelve criti­
cally important years of unbroken presidential practice had firmly 
established a strongly unitary vision of presidential power over law 
execution. As Leonard White concludes: 
When the Federalists turned over the government to Jeffer­
son in 1 80 1  they left behind them a clear and consistent 
pattern of executive relationships .  They fully accepted the 
statement of the Constitution that the executive power was 
vested in the President. Their representatives in the legisla­
tive branch wrote this theory into the statutes conferring 
administrative authority . Their members in the Executive 
branch put into practice what the Constitution and law 
1 53 .  See id. at 287-89. 
1 54. See id. at 243-52. 
1 55 .  See id. at 252; see also ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, TilE I NDEPENDENT R EG U LATORY 
COMMISSIONS 466 ( 1 94 1 ) ; 2 GEORGE H .  HAYNES ,  THE S ENATE O F  THE U NITED STATES 
802 n.3 ( 1 938). Pickering later acknowledged that he expected that his opposit ion to the 
nomination of Adams ' s  son- in-law would lead to h is  own rem oval .  See WHITE,  THE FED­
ERALISTS, supra note 60, at 25 1 .  
1 56 .  MARY BURKE HINSDALE, A H I STORY OF THE PRESIDENT' S  CABINET 35 ( 1 9 1 1 ) , 
quoted in Cross, Execwive Orders 1 2 .291  and 1 2 ,4 98, supra note 3, at 485-86. 
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enjoined. Washington made the decisions of executive 
policy, but on the basis of regular conference with depart­
ment heads. The rise of the Cabinet as an organ of consul­
tation and advice did not obscure the single responsibil ity 
of the President or the subordinate position of Cabinet 
members. Even after the Federalists had split into factions 
during Adams ' administration, the leading figures on both 
sides agreed in maintaining the unity of executive power 
and the dominating position of the President. The power to 
govern was quietly but certainly taken over by the Presi­
dent. The heads of departments became his assistants. In 
the executive branch, according to Federalist orthodoxy, the 
President was undisputed master . 1 57 
C. Thomas 1 efferson 
Thomas 1 efferson ' s first reaction to the office of the presidency 
as described in the text of the proposed Constitution of 1 787 was 
the exact opposite of Theodore Lowi '  s. Where Lowi believes that 
we originally had a weak parliamentary executive, Jefferson wrote: 
[The newly proposed] President seems a bad edition of a 
Polish King. He may be reelected from 4. years to 4. years 
for l ife . . . . When one or two generations shall have 
proved that this is an office for l ife, it becomes on every 
succession worthy of intrigue, of bribery, of force, and 
even of foreign interference. 15 8  
Thus,  in 1 787, Jefferson shared much of the widespread v iew of 
the Anti-Federalists that the Framers had given the president a 
dangerous amount of power. He adhered to this view in the 1 790s 
when he consistently rejected Hamiltonian and Federalist views of 
Executive Power that "smelled of monarchy ." 1 59 
Jefferson hated executive tyranny, but he was not opposed to 
the very different idea that a unitary and independent executive 
structure should be created. Leonard White notes that while the 
more extreme Republicans favored making heads of departments 
independent of the President, Jefferson, Madison, Albert Gallatin, 
and other, more thoughtful members of the Republican party fully 
1 57 .  WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60,  at 36-37. 
1 58.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Nov. 1 3 , 1 787) ,  in 1 2  THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3 49 ,  35 1 (Jul ian P. Boyd ed., 1 955) .  
1 59. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, s upra note 60,  at 94,  95-96. 
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recognized the need for a strong, unitary executive . 1 60 Jefferson 
thus supported the idea of a strong executive branch directly re­
sponsible to the President and independent of legislative control . 
He opposed what he perceived as an attempt by Alexander Hamil­
ton to insinuate himself into the legislative activities of the House 
of Representatives. It was this legislative role of Hamilton ' s  that 
triggered Jefferson ' s  ire and cause him to complain in the 1 790s 
that the executive was exceeding its constitutional l imits and in­
truding upon the prerogatives of the legislature. As Jefferson wrote: 
Here then was the real ground of the opposition which was 
made to the course of administration. I t ' s  object was to 
preserve the legislature pure and independant [sic] of the 
Executive, [and] to restrain the administration to republican 
forms and principles. 1 6 1 
Thus, Jefferson ' s  concerns about executive power did not involve 
the issue of executive unitariness and autonomy. As he told Wash­
ington, " [l]f the equil ibrium of the three great bodies Legislative, 
Executive, and judiciary could be preserved, if the Legislature 
could be kept independant [sic ] ,  I should never fear the result  of 
such a govemment." 1 62 Given the history in England of monarchs 
bribing members of parl iament to get legislation passed, 1 63 and 
given the special need for George Washington as the Nation ' s  first 
President to be a unifying figure, Jefferson ' s  concern about the 
impropriety and impoliticness of Hamilton ' s  hyper-aggressive legis­
lative program was understandable. Jefferson ' s  concern is all the 
more understandable when we remember that he disagreed vehe­
mently with many of Hamilton ' s  policy views. 
Jefferson ' s  support for a strong, independent, unitary executive 
was evident when he served as Secretary of State during the Wash­
ington Administration. In a written opinion to President Washing-
1 60. See id. at 95 . 
1 6 1 .  The Anas (February 4, i 8 1 8) ,  in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 66 1 ,  670 (Merri l l  
D. Peterson ed . ,  1 984), quoted i n  WHITE, T H E  FEDERALISTS, supra note 60 ,  a t  95 .  
1 62 .  WHITE, T H E  FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, a t  95-96 (quoting 1 THE WORKS OF 
THOMAS JEF ERSON 236 (Paul Leicester Ford ed. ,  1 904)) .  
1 63 .  Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 57 ,  a t  1 053 .  The Incompatib i l ity Clause was added 
to the Constitution to prevent the President from inducing Members of Congress to vote 
for his legislative program by offering to appoint them to high executive and judicial  
offices. English monarchs had done precisely this ,  and their misconduct had left Ameri­
cans with very bad memories of the corruption they associated with executive monarchs 
with a legislative program. 
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ton, Secretary of S tate Jefferson specifically endorsed the notion 
that the opening Executive Power Vesting Clause of Article II of 
the Constitution conferred a general "grant" of the executive power 
on the President of the United S tates . 1 64 Many years later, Jeffer­
son ' s  arch-foe, Alexander Hamilton, observed: 
[I]t is not true . . . that [Jefferson] is an enemy to the 
power of the Executive, or that he is for confounding all 
the powers in the House of Representatives. It is a fact 
which I have frequently mentioned, that, while we were in 
the administration together, he was generally for a large 
construction of the Executive authority and not backward to 
act upon it in cases which coincided with his views. 1 65 
Jefferson ' s  conduct as Secretary of State further suggests his 
recognition of the need for presidential control of all executive 
matters. Even though he disagreed w ith Washington on a wide 
variety of policy matters, Jefferson unfailingly carried all of Wash­
ington ' s  policies into effect "as sincerely as if they had been my 
own, tho '  I ever considered them as inconsistent w ith the honor 
and interest of our country." 1 66 In a letter to William Short, Jef­
ferson observed bluntly that "the nature of our government . . .  
renders it' s [sic] heads [i .e . ,  the President and Senate] too responsi­
ble to permit them to resign the direction of affairs to those under 
them. The public would not be satisfied with that kind of resigna­
tion, and be assured it does not exist ." 1 67 Finally, when Jefferson 
concluded that he could no longer serve Washington in good con­
science, he resigned. He never considered holding onto office and 
acting contrary to Washington ' s  wishes when doing so would frag­
ment the unity of the executive branch . 1 68 
1 64. Opinion on the question whether the Senate has the right to negative the grade of 
persons appointed by the Executive to fill Foreign Missions, in 7 The Complete Jefferson 
1 38, 1 38-39 (Saul K. Padover ed.,  1 943) cited in HART, supra note 53,  at 1 78 n . I OS .  
1 65 .  Letter from Alexander Hamilton t o  James A .  Bayard (January 1 6, 1 80 1 ) , in  1 0  
THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 1 20,  a t  4 1 2, 4 1 3 ,  quoted in  LEONARD 
0. WHITE, THE JEFFERSONlANS: A STUDY IN ADMINlSTRATIVE HlSTORY 1 80 1 - 1 829 3 1  
( 1 95 1 )  [hereinafter WHITE, THE JEFFERSONlANS] . 
1 66. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Sept. 9, 1 792), in 24 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 1 58, at 35 1 ,  354 quoted in WHITE , THE FED­
ERALISTS, supra note 60, at 29. 
1 67 .  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Will iam Short (Sept. 30, 1 790), in 1 7  THE PA­
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 1 58 ,  at 5 43-44, quoted in WHITE, THE FEDERAL­
ISTS, supra note 60, at 27. 
1 68. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS, supra note 60, at 29.  
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Jefferson assumed the presidency on March 4, 1 80 1 , and he 
soon surprised many supporters and opponents alike with his robust 
v iews about the powers of the office.  In fact ,  however, Jefferson 
had never been as opposed to presidential power as many imag­
ined, and he did not join the most extreme members of his party 
in their overly timorous view of the executive power. As President, 
Jefferson continued to support strong, independent, unitary execu­
tive authority. Unlike Washington and Adams, Jefferson insisted on 
complete harmony and unanimity in his Cabinet, since " the power 
of decision in the President left no object for internal dissen­
sion ." 1 69 And, with respect to supervision of law execution deci­
sions by subordinates, Jefferson endorsed and adopted Washing­
ton ' s  practice of rev iewing the correspondence of his cabinet offi­
cials as a means of maintaining unity of action and the President ' s  
responsibility for the affairs of the executive branch . 1 70 A t  times, 
Jefferson concerned himself with even the most minute and incon­
sequential matters being addressed by his subordinates .  Leonard 
White notes: 
Thus we find Jefferson instructing Gideon Granger on the 
problem of post-road river crossings in the western wilder­
ness.  "! would propose that all streams under 40.f w idth 
not fordable  at their common winter tide shall be bridged; 
& over all streams not bridged, a tree should be laid 
across, if their breadth does not exceed the extent of a 
single tree." On another occasion he approved an increase 
of pay of $ 1 50 to an Indian agent. Early in his administra­
tion Gallatin authorized an expenditure of $600 to repair a 
leaky hospital roof in Norfolk as an emergency matter that 
would normally have gone to the President. 1 7 1  
Jefferson also took control of federal prosecutions,  directing the 
district attorneys to cease all prosecutions under the Al ien and 
Sedition Acts 1 72 and pardoning those already convicted under 
1 69 .  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to A.L.C. Destutt de Tracy (January 26, 1 8 1 1  ) ,  in 
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1 6 1 ,  at 1 24 1 ,  1 245, quoted in MCDONALD, 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 258.  
1 70. Cross, Executive Orders 1 2 ,291  and 1 2 ,498, supra note 3 at  486; DeMuth & Gins­
burg, supra note 74, at 1 075 (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON, 
supra note 1 64, at 306-07). 
1 7 1 .  WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 1 65 ,  at 7 1  (citations omitted) . 
1 72 .  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary N icholas (June 1 3 , 1 809), in 9 
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS J EFFERSON, supra note 1 29,  at 253;  Letter from Edwin Liv-
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them. 1 73 He also took an active role in the prosecution for treason 
of his first Vice President, Aaron Burr. 1 74 It is no wonder in light 
of Jefferson ' s  concern with matters of this kind that White con­
cludes that Jefferson was maintaining a tight and centralized con­
trol over "the whole business of the executive branch, domestic 
and foreign ." 1 75 
Perhaps even more indicative of Jefferson ' s  determination to 
assert his control over the executive branch were his v igorous and 
partisan removal policies . After twelve years of Federal ist rule,  
capped by Adams ' s  "midnight appointments," Pres ident Jefferson 
was faced with an executive branch fil led entirely with Federalist 
appointees. Although initially inclined not to remove any officers 
for differences of political opinion, Jefferson quickly real ized that 
the removal power was the only way to consolidate his control 
over the Administration. 1 76 However, Jefferson ' s  previous opposi­
tion to politically motivated removals during the Washington and 
Adams Administrations left him with little political room to maneu­
ver. Particularly after stating in his inaugural address that "We are 
all Republicans, we are all Federa1ists ," 1 77 Jefferson faced substan­
tial difficulties in defending purely partisa.11 removal s .  
Jefferson responded with characteristic shrewdness b y  arguing 
that his removals were in fact consistent with nonpartisanship, since 
true nonpartisanship required that each party had a right to fair 
representation in the government. The only way to implement his 
" [d]eclarations . . .  in favor of political tolerance, exhortations to 
harmony and affection in social intercourse, and to respect the 
equal rights of the minority" was to permit the Republicans "to 
ingston (Nov. I ,  1 80 1 ), in 8 Th'E WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 1 29.  at 
57-58; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gideon Granger (Mar. 9, 1 8 1 4) ,  in 9 THE WRJT­
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 1 29,  at 454; see also Easterbrook, supra note 
28, at 907. 
1 73 .  See MCDONALD , AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 268. 
1 74. See lEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 353 -74 ( 1 996). 
1 75 .  WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS,  supra note 1 65 ,  at 70.  
1 76. See MCDONALD , AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at  254.  As Jefferson 
noted privately, "If a due part ic ipation of office is a matter of right, how are vacancies to 
be obtained� Those by death are few;  by resignation, none. Can any other mode than that 
of removal be proposed�" Message from Thomas Jefferson to Elias S hipman and Others, 
a Committee of the Merchants of New Haven (July 1 2, 1 80 1  ) , in THOMAS JEFFERSON: 
WRITINGS, supra note 1 6 1 ,  at 497 ,  499 [herei nafter Message from Jefferson to Shipman] ;  
see also I GOLDSMITH, supra note 1 25 ,  a t  1 65 ;  VAN RIPER, supra note 77, a t  22. 
1 77 .  Thomas Jefferson, First I naugural Address (March 4, 1 80 1  ) , in 1 A COMPILATION 
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 309, 3 1 0  (James D.  Richardson ed., 
1 897) [hereinafter MESSAGES & PAPERS ] . 
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assert some rights . . .  also."  S ince "the wil l  of the nation, mani­
fested by their elections," had called for a new administration, it 
would be "political intolerance" to deny the Republicans the right 
"to claim a proportionate share in the direction of public af­
fairs ." 1 78 However, Jefferson cannily claimed that these removals 
gave him no joy and pledged that he would revert back to making 
merit removals: 
This is a painful office; but it is  made my duty , and I 
meet it as such. . . . It would have been to me a c ircum­
stance of great relief, had I found a moderate participation 
of office in the hands of the majority. I would gladly have 
left to time and accident to raise them to their just share. 
B ut their total exclusion calls for prompter corrections. I 
shall correct the procedure; but that done, return with joy 
to that state of things when the only questions concerning a 
candidate shall be, is he honest? Is  he capable? Is he faith­
ful to the Constitution? 1 79 
The general public accepted Jefferson ' s  justification for his 
partisan removals .  After exercising the power g ingerly during the 
first year, Jefferson expanded his program, initiating changes in 
between one third and one half of all presidentially appointed 
offices. 1 80 Thus,  in  his  removals as  well  as  his control over the 
entire executive branch, Jefferson adhered to the expansive v iew of 
presidential power established by Washington and Adams.  
Another striking development during Jefferson ' s  presidency was 
his formulation of and strident advocacy for the position that the 
President has a co-equal power with the Courts to engage in con­
stitutional review. Jefferson clearly believed in the legitimacy of 
co-ordinate or departmental judicial review, and he expressed that 
view as eloquently and forcefully as anyone who has ever occupied 
1 78 .  Message from Jefferson to S hipman ,  supra note 1 76 ,  at 498; see also I GOLD­
SMITH, supra note 1 25 ,  at 1 65 ;  MCDONALD, AMERJCAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 
254-55 ;  VAN RIPER, supra note 77, at 22. 
1 79 .  Message from Jefferson to Shipman, supra note 1 76 ,  at 499-500; see also I GOLD­
SMITH, supra note 1 25 ,  at 1 65 ;  MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 
254-55 .  Jefferson even went so far as to contend that the large number of unrem ovable 
Federalist judges justified removing the vast m ajority of the marshals and district attor­
neys. NORMAN J. SMALL, SOME PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY 1 27 
( 1 932).  
1 80.  See I GOLDSMITH, supra note 1 25 ,  at 1 65 ;  MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, 
supra note 20, at 255; VAN RIPER, supra note 77, at 22. 
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the presidential office. In his  celebrated letter to Abigail Adams in 
response to her letter complaining of his disregard of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts, he wrote : 
You seem to think it devolved on the judges to dec ide on 
the val idity of the sedition l aw .  But  nothing in the Consti­
tution has given them a right to decide for the Executive, 
more than to the Executive to decide for them . B oth mag­
istrates are equal l y  independent in the sphere of action 
assigned to them . The judges, believing the l aw constitu­
tional,  had a right to pass a sentence of fine and imprison­
ment; because that power was p l aced in their hands by the 
Constitution. But the Executive, believing the law to be 
unconstitutional, was bound to remit the execution of it; 
because that power has been confided to him by the Con­
stitution. That instrument meant that its co-ordinate branch­
es should be checks on each other. But the opinion which 
gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are con­
stitutional,  and what not, not only for themselves in their 
own sphere of action, but for the Legislature & Executive 
also, in their spheres, woul d  m ake the judic iary a despotic 
branch. 1 8 1  
Jefferson reiterated this v iew many years later m a letter to a 
friend: 
You seem . . .  to consider the judges as the ultimate arbi­
ters of all constitutional questions; a very dangerous doc­
trine indeed, and one which would place us under the 
despotism of an ol igarchy .  . . . The constitution has erected 
no such single tribunal , knowing that to whatever hands 
confided, with the corruption of time and party, its mem­
bers would become despots . It  has more wisely made all  
the departments co-equal and co-sovereign within them­
selves . . . .  Betrayed by English example, and unaware, as 
it should seem, of the control of our constitution in thi s  
particul ar, they have a t  times overstepped their l imit  by 
underta.l(ing to command executive officers in the discharge 
of their executive duties ; but the constitution , in keeping 
1 8 1 .  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail  Adams (Sept.  1 1 , 1 804) , in 1 1  THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 1 29 ,  at 3 1 0, 3 1 1 (emphasis added); see also 
McDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 267-68 .  
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three departments distinct and independent, restrains the 
authority of the judges to judiciary organs, as it does the 
executive and legislative to executive and legislative or­
gans . 1 82 
Jefferson believed that each of the three branches of govern­
ment possessed the independent authority to interpret its own obl i ­
gations under the Constitution and to exerci se the authority vested 
by that document free from any interference by the other branches. 
Consistent with thi s  v iew, Jefferson resisted an attempt by Chief 
Justice Marshall ,  while presiding over Aaron B urr' s  trial for trea­
son, to require the President to appear in court and present certain 
documents. Jefferson refused to appear or present any documentary 
material in court at all ,  instead submitting a port ion of the subpoe­
naed documents to the d istrict attorney. 1 83 Moreover, Jefferson 
was not concerned by the portion of Marbury v. Madison holding 
the Judiciary Act of 1 80 1  unconstitutional , as Jefferson recognized 
that each of the three branches had the authority and the obl igation 
to construe the Constitution. Jefferson ' s  primary objection was to 
the opinion ' s  dicta suggesting that the executive branch was subject 
to orders from the judiciary. Courts in his  v iew did not have any 
right to interfere with the President ' s  authority over the entire 
executive branch and courts could not even issue writs of manda­
mus against executive officials .  For Jefferson, unconstitut ional 
executive actions were properly addressed only in  the democratic 
1 82 .  Letter from Thomas Jefferson t o  Wil l iam Charles Jarvis  (Sept. 28 ,  1 820), in  ! 0  
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 1 29,  a t  1 60 ,  1 60-6 1 .  Jefferson had 
originally wanted to lay out his theory of coordinate constitutional construction i n  h i s  
First Annual Message t o  Congress, but as Forrest McDonald notes, Madison and Gall at in  
dissuaded him from doing so to  avoid arousing the i re of the Federalists , who s t i l l  con­
trolled the bulk of the judiciary and would l ikely continue to support judicial supremacy 
on political  grounds. MCDONALD , AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 267 n .4 l .  
1 83 .  See MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 270. Simi larly,  Attor­
ney General Caesar Rodney indicated to President Jefferson that courts could not issue a 
writ of mandamus against an executive officer exercising discretionary functions and that 
the proper remedy against officials improperly exercis ing their discretion was an action at 
law or a criminal indictment. The contrary rule would v i tiate "the controlling power i n  
the chief magistrate o f  the United S tates," "would necessari ly have the effect o f  transfer­
ring the powers vested in one department to another department," would permit the courts 
to exercise control over an executive function in v iolation of the Take Care C lause, and 
would destroy "that unity of administration w hich the constitution meant to secure by 
placing the executive power for them al l ,  in  the same head ."  Letter from C.A. Rodney to 
Thomas Jefferson (July I 5 ,  1 808), reprinted in Gilchrist v .  Col lector of Charleston, I 0 F. 
Cas. 355,  358-59 (C.C.D.S.C.  l 808) (No. 5420). 
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process by the people themselves and not in litigation before judg­
e s !  
This was a n  extraordinary claim o f  executive power, so ex­
traordinary in fact that thankfully it has not been foll owed. Jeffer­
son ' s  claim in his letter to Abigail Adams that the President is 
without power to execute a law that he deems to be unconstitution­
al in his own independent judgment, paired with Jefferson ' s  own 
views, provide a striking vision of presidential power. 
Indeed, in the l ater years of his administration, Jefferson began 
to move beyond the bounds of his initial vision of a President who 
was autonomous only w ithin his own l imited sphere of law execu­
tion powers. It was at this point that Jefferson reall y  began to 
press up against the outermost constitutional limits of presidential 
power. In sharp contrast to Washington, who was extremely c ir­
cumspect about making any specific legislative proposals,  and in 
direct contradiction of his own previous criticism of Hamilton ' s  
efforts to influence Congress,  Jefferson as President began to as­
sume the role of national political leader and in this capac ity he 
began to take control of Congress ' s  legislative agenda to a greater 
extent than had either of his  two predecessors. As Forrest McDon­
ald has noted: 
[T]he President alone, as Jefferson put it, could "command 
a view of the whole ground" as representative of the nation 
and not merely of a state or a congressional district; the 
concentration of authority in one disinterested servant of 
the whole gave him a decisiveness as well as a vision that 
the other branches lacked . 1 84 
So much for Jefferson ' s  earlier concerns about the threat to legisl a­
tive independence posed by vigorous executive action. 
Jefferson ' s  expanding v iew of presidential power is also reflect­
ed in what is perhaps the most famous and consequential legacy of 
his Presidency: the Louisiana Purchase. As Gerhard Casper sug­
gests , this action raised serious separation of powers concerns as 
well as federalism concems. 1 85 Although Jefferson had initiall y  
1 84. MCDONALD, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, a t  259 (quoting Thomas Jef­
ferson, First Inaugural Address, in I MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 1 77 ,  at 324). 
1 85 .  The Louisiana Purchase raised serious questions of federal ism because the Constitu­
tion did not d irectly grant to the federal government the power to acquire addi tional terri­
tory. Under a strict construction of the Constitution, such an acquis i tion lay outside the 
scope of any constitutional grant and was properly was subject to the power of the states. 
To the extent that the Purchase did l ie  within the proper scope of federal authority, it 
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opined that the Constitution would have to be amended before the 
federal government would have the authority to undertake the Loui­
siana Purchase, ' 86 in  a remarkable letter written in  1 803,  Jefferson 
sought to justify the Louisiana Purchase in the absence of such an 
amendment by advancing an extraordinarily broad, almost Lin­
colnian, view of presidential power "to act as a 'guardian ' or 
' steward' for the people" 1 87 even when the Constitution strictly 
construed did not allow for this: 
The Executive in seizing the fugitive occurrence, which so 
much advances the good of their country , have [sic] done 
an act beyond the Constitution . The Legislature in casting 
behind them metaphysical subtleties , and risking themselves 
l ike faithful servants , must ratify & pay for it, and throw 
themselves on their country for doing for them unautho­
rized what we know they would have done for themselves 
had they been in a situation to do it .  I t  is the case of a 
guardian, investing the money of his ward in purchasing an 
important adjacent territory; & saying to him when of age, 
I did this for your good; I pretend to no right to bind you; 
you may disavow me, and I must get out of the scrape as 
I can: I thought it my duty to risk myself for you . B ut we 
shal l not be disavowed by the nation, and their act of 
indemnity will  confinn & not weaken the Constitution, by 
more strongly marking out its l ines . 1 88 
As Casper goes on to note, Jefferson was defiant upon l eaving 
office that " [t]o lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to 
written law ,  would be to lose the law itself, with l ife , l iberty, 
property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurd­
ly sacrificing the end to the means ." 1 89 This defense of the Loui­
siana Purchase suggests that Jefferson certainly cannot be ranked as 
impl icated the separation of powers as w e l l ,  s ince it was unclear which branch of the 
federal government was properly invested w i th such authority. Gerhard Casper, Thomas 
Jefferson, supra note 1 6, at 490-96. 
1 86 .  See id. at 495; McGinnis, Opinion Function, supra note 37, at 4 1 2- 1 9 . 
1 87 .  SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 1 38,  at 1 6. 
1 88 .  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B reckenridge (Aug. 1 2, 1 803),  in THOMAS 
J EF1-10RSON: WRITINGS, supra note 1 6 1 ,  at 1 1 36, 1 1 38-39, quoted in Casper, Thomas Jef­
ferson, supra note 1 6 , at 496, and in SHANE & BRUI-t', supra note 1 38, at 1 6 . 
1 89 .  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B .  Colvin (Sept. 20, 1 8 1 0), in 9 THOMAS 
J EFFERSON: WRITI NGS, supra note 1 6 1 ,  at 1 23 1 ,  1 23 1 ,  quoted in Casper, Thomas Jeffer­
son, supra note 1 6 ,  at 496. 
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a weak President or as one who was unwill ing to use the full 
powers of the office when the occasion demanded it. This of 
course makes sense intuitively . Jefferson was a popular and charis­
matic political leader, the author of the Declaration of Indepen­
dence, and one of the foremost statesmen of his day. It would be 
astonishing if such an individual were to act timidly in office, and 
Jefferson certainly did not do so. Rather, he used the ful l  panoply 
of powers left to him by his Federalist predecessors and,  as Profes­
sors Peter Shane and Harold Bruff have indicated, he "set a prece­
dent for a strong Presidency, one which would be taken to heart 
by several later executives." 190 
By the time Jefferson had completed his two terms in office, 
he was as enthusiastic and committed an advocate of the unitary 
executive as has ever walked the earth. On January 26, 1 8 1 1 ,  as 
Jefferson was preparing to hand over the reigns of power to his 
best friend and neighbor, James Madison, he wrote a striking letter 
to a French friend of his, A.L.C. Destutt de Tracy.  Comparing the 
American Presidency with the plural executive created by the 
French Revolutionaries, Jefferson observed that: 
One of [Montesquieu ' s] doctrines,  indeed, the preference of 
a plural over a singular executive, will probably not be 
assented to here. When our present government was first 
established, we had many doubts on this question, and 
many leanings towards a supreme executive council .  It 
happened that at that time the experiment of such an one 
was commenced in France, while the single executive was 
under trial here. We watched the motions and effects of 
these two rival plans,  with an interest and anxiety propor­
tioned to the importance of a choice between them.  The 
experiment in France failed after a short course, and not 
from any circumstances peculiar to the times or nation, but 
from those internal jealousies and dissensions in the D irec­
tory, which will ever arise among men equal in power, 
without a principal to decide and control their differences. 
We had tried a similar experiment in 1 784, by establishing 
a committee of the States. . . . They fel l  immediately into 
schisms and dissensions . . . .  This was then imputed to the 
temper of two or three individuals ;  but the wise ascribed it 
to the nature of man. 1 9 1  
1 90. SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 1 38 ,  a t  1 6. 
1 9 1 .  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to A.L.C. Destutt de Tracy (Jan. 26, 1 8 1 1 ), in 
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There can be little doubt then that Jefferson ' s  views of presidential 
power inclined strongly in an executive unitarian direction. By the 
end of his Administration, Jefferson was unquestionably a strong 
and effective advocate of presidential power. 
D. James Madison 
James Madison was, along with James Wilson, one of the key 
architects of the presidency at the Constitutional convention , and he 
was a vigorous advocate both of a strong presidency and of the 
v iew that the Constitution gave the president the removal power. 
As James Hart noted: 
The student of our constitutional history cannot fail to be  
impressed by the fact that the theory that the opening sen­
tence of Article II of the Constitution is a grant of "the" 
executive power was expressed by Madison, Jefferson and 
Hamilton. Of their historic pronouncements the first in time 
was that of Madison in the removal debate of 1 789. 1 92 
According to Madison: 
[Where the Constitution] has left any particular department 
in the entire possession of the powers incident to that de­
partment, I conceive we ought not to qualify them further  
than they are qualified by the constitution. . . . 
The constitution affirms, that the executive power shall 
be vested in the President. Are there exceptions to this 
proposition? Yes, there are. The constitution says, that in 
appointing to office, the Senate shall be associated with the 
President. . . .  Have we a right to extend this  exception? I 
believe not. If the constitution has invested all executive 
power in the President, I venture to assert that the Legisla­
ture has no right to diminish or modify his executive au­
thority. 
The question now resolves itself into this,  Is the power 
of displacing, an executive power? I conceive that if any 
power whatsoever is in its nature executive, it is the power 
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS , supra note 1 6 1 ,  at 1 243 . 
1 92 .  HART, supra note 53 ,  at 1 78 (footnotes omitted). Jefferson ' s  opinion on this ap­
pears in a written opinion to President Washington i ssued while he was Secretary of 
State. See supra note 1 64. 
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of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who exe­
cute the laws. 1 93 
Thus, as a member of the first Congress, Madison placed himself 
squarely on the record as an advocate of both the constitutional 
grant theory of the Article II Vesting Clause and of the view that 
the executive power conferred by that Clause included a power of 
removal. As is well known, Madison briefly wavered in this view 
in his comments one day on the House floor during the debate 
over the Office of the Comptroller of the Treasury, but he swiftly 
returned to the executive unitarian fold after other Members of 
Congress objected to his Treasury proposal on unitarian grounds. 
Between the Decision of 1 789 and the Revolution of 1 800, 
Madison ' s  enthusiasm for Executive Power waned as he fell into 
Jefferson ' s  opposition political camp. It was during this period that 
Madison wrote his Helvidius letters, discussed above, wherein he 
challenges Hamilton ' s  argument for broad foreign policy making 
powers derivable from the Article II Executive Power Vesting 
Clause. Madison ' s  argument in the H elvidius letters is in tension 
with, but is not necessarily inconsistent w ith, his argument for a 
presidential removal power derivable from the Vesting Clause. One 
could perfectly well bel ieve that the "Executive Power" conferred 
by Article II included a removal power but not the unilateral presi­
dential powers over foreign policy that Hamilton was arguing for. 
Other parts of the Constitution would support this construction-the 
Take Care Clause supports construing the Vesting Clause as grant­
ing removal power, while the Declaration of War and Treaty-Mak­
ing Clauses support the Madisonian view of a more limited power 
in the foreign policy arena. Thus, Madison ' s  statements in the 
H elvidius letters do not detract a bit from our argument that he 
falls  squarely in the unitary executive camp. It is perfectly consis­
tent with the theory of the unitary executive to reject broad, unenu­
merated presidential powers over foreign policy. 
After the Revolution of 1 800, Thomas Jefferson assumed the 
presidency for eight years and, as we have discussed, he became a 
strong advocate of presidential power. James M adison did not 
undergo a similar transformation during his eight years in office, 
although more for reasons of his personality than because of his 
constitutional beliefs . "James Madison . . .  did not exert the degree 
of broad control over the executive branch as had his predeces-
1 93 .  I ANNALS OF CONG. 48 1 -8 2  (emphasis added). 
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sors ." 1 94 Despite his dynamic role in framing the Constitution and 
in supporting the Decision of 1 789,  he proved to be a weak Presi­
dent and often found his policies frustrated by Congress.  That 
being said, nothing in the conduct of the Madison Administration 
in any way suggested that Madison acquiesced to any dissipation 
in the unitariness of the executive branch. Quite the contrary, M ad­
ison continued to exert his direct influence over the departments, 
even going so far as to redraft ordinary correspondence issued by 
the State Department. 1 95 
Madison did not hesitate to exert his control over the executive 
branch by using his power of removal . He called for the resigna­
tion of his Secretary of State, Robert Smith, and he also compelled 
the resignation of his Secretary of War, John Arrnstrong. 1 96 Con­
gress did begin to resist presidential control of the department 
heads in 1 8 1 4  after Madison removed Gideon Granger as Postmas­
ter General. In response to this removal , the Senate debated a 
resolution calling upon the President "to inform the Senate whether 
his office of Postmaster General be now vacant, and, if vacant, in 
what manner the same became vacant."  In the end, however, the 
Senate rejected this resolution, concluding that it did not have the 
right to make such an inquiry. 1 97 
Leonard White describes the general practice with respect to 
removals during Madiso n ' s  Administration as follows: 
Madison removed twenty-seven presidential officers during 
his eight years in the White House. Almost without excep­
tion they were officers collecting the revenue. Madison was 
under some pressure after the War of 1 8 1 2 to find civil  
employment for supernumerary military officers, but de­
clined to disturb the civi l  service. He was prepared to favor 
meritorious and indigent officers, but only where a removal 
could be justified "by legitimate causes."  Crawford once 
remarked that Madison could not bear to tum men out of 
office for "simple incapacity. " 1 98 
1 94. See Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 1 2,498, supra note 3, at 486-87 (citing 
HINSDALE, supra note 1 56, at 5 1 ) . 
1 95 .  See id. at 487 (citing H INSDALE, supra note 1 56, at 52) .  
1 96. See id. (citing H I NSDALE, supra note 1 56, at  52-53,  56-57). 
1 97.  See 2 HAYNES, supra note 1 55 ,  at 793 n.4 (citing LUCY M. SALMON, HISTORY OF 
THE APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 44 ( 1 886)); Warren, supra note 2 1 ,  at 5. 
1 98 .  WHITE, THE J EFFERSONIANS, supra note 1 65 ,  at 379. 
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Clearly,  then, the removal power did not lapse during Madi son ' s  
years, although it was not used very vigorously . O f  course, after 
eight years of Jefferson in the White House, Madison would not 
have felt the need experienced by his two immediate predecessors 
to make more removals. 
Finally, Madison concurred, although with caution, in Jeffer­
son ' s  ambitiously expressed views concerning the power of the 
President to engage in coordinate constitutional construction or 
departmental review. Writing many years after he left office, Madi­
son observed: 
As the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments of 
the United States are co-ordinate, and each equally bound 
to support the Constitution, it follows that each must be 
guided by the text of the Constitution according to its own 
interpretation of it; and, consequently, that in the event of 
irreconcilable interpretations, the prevalence of the one or 
the other department must depend on the nature of the 
case, as receiving its final decision from the one or the 
other, and passing from that decision into effect, without 
involving the functions of any other. 1 99 
Madison , however, qualified the harshness of his endorsement of 
the Jeffersonian view of coordinate construction, with its sweeping 
implication of a presidential power to decline to enforce a law the 
President alone thought was unconstitutional. He said that ordinari­
ly the judiciary would construe the Constitution, and he pointed 
out some reasons why so long as the judicial bench was "happily 
filled" the public would have the most confidence in its construc­
tions of the Constitution.200 
Thus, in the end, Madison was something of a moderate on the 
question of coordinate construction. In theory , he agreed that Jef­
ferson was right, and he endorsed full  fledged departmentalism as 
his bedrock constitutional analysis.  B ut, in practice, he wisely 
doubted whether in ordinary times the constitutional system should 
operate that way. We suspect Madison would have approved of the 
practice that has actually grown up under the Constitution of re­
serving executive and legislative construction for those rare periods 
1 99. Letter written in  1 83 4  by J ames Madison, in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS 01' 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 1 29, at 349, 349 (emphasis added). 
200. /d. 
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of crisis that have punctuated American constitutional h istory20 1 
and for laws that clearly encroach on core executive prerogatives. 
Thus ,  it might be fair to conclude that Madison was enough of a 
departmentalist that he would have embraced the core thesi s  of thi s  
Article were h e  alive t o  read it. 
In sum, Madison supported executive power throughout his 
long and distinguished career particularly with respect to law exe­
cution and removals. His practice as our nation ' s  fourth President 
is fully consistent with that view even if he was sometimes an 
ineffectual leader. 
After he left office, in 1 8 1 7 , Madison remained in the unitary 
executive camp for the rest of his long and productive life . Be­
tween 1 8 1 7 and his  death in 1 836, Madison staunchly defended the 
President ' s  removal power at every tum opposing as we shall 
discuss below the Tenure of Office Act of 1 820 (even though it 
did not l imit presidential removal power) , and v igorously defending 
Andrew Jackson ' s  use of the removal power (even though he did 
not especially like Jackson) . Thus Madison, in one letter written in 
1 83 4, observed: 
The claim, on constitutional ground, to a share in the re­
moval as well as appointment of officers, is in direct oppo­
sition to the uniform practice of the Government from its 
commencement. It is clear that the innovation would not 
only vary, essentially,  the existing balance of power, but 
expose the Executive, occasionally,  to a total inaction, and 
at all times to delays fatal to the due execution of the 
laws.  
Another innovation brought forward in the Senate 
claims for the Legislature a discretionary regulation of the 
tenure of offices. This, also, would vary the relation of the 
departments to each other, and leave a wide field for legi s­
lative abuses. The power of removal, like that of appoint­
ment, ought to be fixed by the constitution, and both, like 
the right of suffrage and apportionment of representatives, 
not be dependent on the legislative will. . . . B ut apart 
from the distracting and dilatory operation of a veto in the 
Senate on the removal from office, it is pretty certain that 
the large States would not invest with that additional pre-
20 I .  Like the debates over Dred Scott or in 1 93 7  over the constitutionality of the New 
Deal. 
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rogative a body constructed like the Senate, and endowed, 
as it already is, with a share in all the departments of 
power, Legislative, Executive, and Judici ary . It is well 
known that the large States,  in both the Federal and State 
Conventions, regarded the aggregate powers of the Senate 
as the most objectionable feature in the Constitution.202 
Madison repeated these v iews in other letters written during the 
same period203 and an interesting feature of them is that they con­
firm that his position on presidential removal power, taken as a 
member of the House of Representatives, may have been motivated 
in part by an early skepticism about the institution of the Senate . 
This fits with everything we know about Madison' s views, 
especially during the critical formative period in 1 7 89.  Madison 
had favored the Virginia Plan at the Phi ladelphia Convention, un­
der which both Houses of Congress were to be apportioned by 
population, and he was an ardent nationalist in the 1 7 80s. Accord­
ingly, it should come as no surprise that he would be loath to 
expand the prerogatives of the Senate over either removals or over 
appointments to fill the vacancies thus created, since the Senate 
was the most States-oriented institution in the national government. 
To the extent the Senate represented the S tates and the presidency 
was more nationalist, it should come as no surprise that the early 
Madison would favor a broad presidential removal power given the 
v iews he had expressed at the Philadelphia Convention .204 
In sum, James Madison was at all times during his long and 
remarkable career a defender of the unitary executive. This is c lear 
202. Letter from James Madison to Edward Coles (Oct. 1 5 , 1 83 4) ,  in 4 LEITERS AND 
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1 29 ,  at 366, 368-69 (emphasis added). 
203. See, e .g . ,  Letter from James Madison to Edward Coles (Aug. 29, 1 834) ("claims 
are made by the Senate in opposition to the principles and practice of every adm i nistra­
tion, my own included, and varying materia l ly ,  i n  some instances, the relations between 
the great departments of the government") (discussing the Andrew Jackson removal de­
bate); Letter from James Madison to John M. Patton ( M ar. 24, 1 834) ("Shou ld the contro­
versy on removals from office end in the establ ishment of a share in the power, as 
c l aimed for the Senate it would materia l ly  vary the relationship among the component 
parts of the government, and disturb the operation of the checks and balances as now 
understood to exist.") in id. at 354, 355 & 342, 342. 
204. Thus Madison wrote i n  a letter to Edmund Randolph: 
I th ink i t  best to give the Senate as l i ttle agency as possible  i n  Executive 
matters, and to make the President as responsible as possible in them.  . . I 
see and politically feel that that wi l l  be the weak branch of the Government. 
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph ( May 3 1 ,  1 7 89) in 1 LEITERS AND 
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1 29,  at 473 .  
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whether one considers his role in the Philadelphia Convention of 
1 787,  his rol e  in the Decision of 1 789,  his role as President of the 
United States,  between 1 8 1 1 and 1 8 1 7, or his role as a senior 
statesman writing letters in 1 83 4  a mere two years before his 
death . It is difficult to imagine how someone could outdo James 
Madison in consistently and vigorously defending the unitary exec­
utive. 
E. James Monroe 
James Monroe proved to be a stronger President than James 
Madison, although he lacked the charismatic personality and leader­
ship abilities of Thomas Jefferson.205 He too proved to be a com­
m itted believer in the vital importance of a unitary executive struc­
ture, although regrettably he did not always follow through to act 
upon his bel iefs. 
Monroe ' s  support for the unitary executive and for the impor­
tance of administrative hierarchy became evident long before he 
assumed the presidency. In a letter regarding the Patent Office 
written in 1 8 1 2  to Congressman Seybert while Monroe was serv ing 
as Secretary of State, the future President wrote: 
I have always thought that every institution, of whatsoever 
nature it might be, ought to be comprised within some one 
of the departments of Government, the Chief of which only 
should be respons ible to the Chief Executive Magistrate of 
the Nation. The establishment of inferior independent de­
partments, the heads of which are not, and ought not to be 
members of the Administration, appears to me to be liable 
to many serious objections.206 
Monroe had also championed presidential control in mil itary mat­
ters when in 1 8 1 5 ,  as head of the War Department, he prepared a 
report for a Senate committee championing unilateral presidential 
control over the state mil itias once they had been called into the 
service of the United States. Two state governors had challenged 
presidential authority unilateral ly to call forth the state mil itias,  a 
position Monroe described as being "fraught with mischief' and 
"absurd."207 
205. See WH ITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS,  supra note 1 65 ,  at 3 8 .  
206. /d. a t  74 (quoting Letter from Secretary o f  S tate James Monroe t o  Congressman 
Adam Seybert (June I 0, 1 8 1 2) ,  in 5 THE WRITI NGS O F  JAMES MONROE 203 ( S tanis laus 
M .  Ham i l ton ed., 1 898- 1 903) ) .  
207. !d. at 54 1 (quoting I AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: M ILITARY AFFAIRS 605-06); see 
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Monroe assumed the presidency in 1 8 1 7 , and his two terms in 
office were quite successful  with the result that the office regained 
some of the luster it had lost during Madison ' s  indecisive and 
timorous eight years in office. As President, James Monroe v igor­
ously defended and asserted executive power in a number of con­
texts, most famously in announcing the Monroe Doctrine which 
was embodied in his Seventh Annual Message to Congress.208 
The Monroe Doctrine was an important statement of American 
foreign policy, analogous to George Washington ' s  Neutrality Proc­
lamation discussed above, and its unilateral i ssuance by President 
Monroe thus suggests his willingness to exercise executive power 
vigorously in the foreign policy context. Chief Justice Vinson, 
d issenting in the Steel Seizure Case many years later, observed: 
A review of executive action demonstrates that our 
Presidents have on many occasions exhibited the leadership 
contemplated by the Framers when they made the President 
Commander in Chief, and imposed upon him the trust to 
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."  With or 
without explicit statutory authorization, Presidents have at 
such times dealt with national emergencies by acting 
promptly and resolutely to enforce legislative programs, at 
least to save those programs until Congress could act. 
Congress and the courts have responded to such executive 
initiative with consistent approval.  . . .  
Jefferson ' s  initiative in the Louisiana Purchase, the 
Monroe Doctrine, and Jackson ' s  removal of Government 
deposits from the Bank of the Uni ted States further serve 
to demonstrate by deed what the Framers described by 
word when they vested the whole of the executive power 
in the President. 209 
Chief Justice Vinson lists the Monroe Doctrine along with other 
hi storic unilateral exertions of the executive power because of the 
important role that Doctrine was to play in defining the future of 
American foreign policy. It is thus clear that James Monroe, as the 
also id. at 539-45 . 
208. See GEORGE MORGAN, THE LIFE OF JAMES MONROE 394, 3 95 -4 1 0  ( 1 92 1 ) .  See 
also J ames Monroe, Seventh Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1 823),  in 2 MESSAGES 
& PAPERS, supra note 1 77 ,  at 776. 
209. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.  v .  Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 3 43 U.S. 579, 
683,  685 ( 1 952) (Vinson, C .J . ,  dissenting) (emphasis added). 
1 5 1 4  CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W  REVIEW [Vol .  47: 1 45 1  
author of the Monroe Doctrine, was a powerful occupant of the 
Chief Executive Office who knew well how to exercise vigorously 
the executive power in the foreign policy sphere. 2 1 0  
While Monroe was more cautious with domestic pol icy matters, 
he did on occasion assert presidential prerogatives. Leonard White 
reports that Monroe on two occasions expressed the view that the 
President ought to be able to control executive branch communica­
tions to Congress .  First, in 1 8 1 9, the House of Representatives 
asked Secretary of War John Calhoun for his opinion on building 
some roads and canals for allegedly military purposes. Calhoun 
was known to favor such internal improvements, while Monroe 
was known by the House to believe that the federal government 
lacked constitutional power to undertake them. The issue thu s  arose 
"whether department heads in  making reports to Congress had a 
responsibil ity to reflect the opin ions of the President rather than 
their own."2 1 1  As reported by Secretary of State John Quincy Ad­
ams: 
[Monroe] expressed an oprn10n that the call of the H ouse 
directly upon the Secretary of War for this report w as itself 
irregular, and not conformable to the spirit of the Constitu­
tion of the United States ,  the principle of which was a 
single Executive . . . .  And as the heads of Departments 
were executive officers under the President, it  was to be 
considered whether the President himself was not responsi­
ble for the substance of their reports .2 1 2  
The matter arose again in 1 820 when Monroe and Adams 
complained about Secretary of the Treasury Crawford ' s  transmis­
sion of annual estimates directly to Congress without first sharing 
the financial program with Monroe. This practice, which had been 
followed by all the early Treasury Secretaries since Hamilton, was 
viewed by both Adams and Monroe as being unconstitu tional . 
Leonard White reports: 
2 1 0. This is consistent with Monroe ' s  behavior as Governor of V irginia. One biographer 
reports that Monroe and the Republican governor of Pennsylvania were ready in 1 80 I to 
use military force on Thomas Jefferson ' s  behalf if the Federal ists had used the deadlock 
in the Electoral College as an excuse not to let the House of Representatives elect a 
Republican President. MORGAN, supra note 208, at 2 1 9-220. 
2! 1 .  WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 1 65 ,  at 67.  
2 1 2 . !d. at  68 (quoting Entry for January 1 2 , 1 8 1 9, 4 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY AD­
A M S  2 1 7  (Charles Francis  Adams ed. ,  1 87 4-77) (emphasis added)). 
1 997] THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 1 5 1 5  
[Adams] thought the practice "altogether inconsi stent with 
the spirit of the Constitution," and one that "ought immedi­
ately to be changed." Monroe asked Adams to look into 
the law and expressed his own opinion that the practice 
was wrong.2 1 3  
For whatever reason, nothing was done to correct this practice, but 
there can be l ittle doubt that Presidents Monroe and John Quincy 
Adams objected to it. Leonard ·white is  plainly right that Monroe 
was concerned that there be "left no loose ends of administration 
unconnected with the departments aild independent of presi dential 
direction. "21 4 
Monroe also asserted his belief i n  the hierarchy of command in 
an exchange of v iews with then-General Andrew Jackson, who for 
a time attempted to object to orders being issued directly to his  
subordinates by the War Department. Monroe pointedly reminded 
Jackson that the "orders of the [war] dept are . . .  the orders of 
the President" and according "to my v iew of the subject, no officer 
of the army, can rightfully disobey, an order from the President." 
Monroe went on to agree with Jackson that the V/ar Department 
should not ordinarily communicate with Jackson ' s  army while 
bypassing him as the commanding general of it .2 15  
Finally, Monroe maintained supremacy over the admin istration 
by exercising the presidential removal power, albeit in a gingerly 
and tepid fashion. Leonard White notes that "f':�1onroe . . . removed 
twenty-seven civil officers in his eight years in the \Vhite House. 
One-third were in the foreign service, all consuls with a s ingle 
exception; one-third were collectors of revenue."2 1 6 Although, 
according to John Quincy Adams,  Monroe was too hesitant to use 
his power to remove,217 and although he plainly did not exerci se 
the removal power often or in major cases, he did in fact exercise 
the power, and an opinion issued by Attorney General Will iam 
Wirt acknowledged that "the power of the President to dis-
2 1 3 .  /d. at 69 (quoting Entry for January 8 ,  1 820, 4 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, 
supra note 2 1 2, at 50 1 ) ; see also id. at 68-69. 
2 1 4. ld. at 74. 
2 1 5 .  /d. at 241 -45 (quoting Letter from James Monroe to Andrew Jackson, 2 CORRE­
SPONDENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON 329- 3 1  (John Spencer B assett ed . ,  1 926-35)). 
2 1 6. !d. at 379-80; see also MCDONALD, AMERiCAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 255. 
2 1 7 .  See WHITE, THE JEFFERSON!ANS, supra note 1 65 ,  at 380 (quoting 5 THE MEMOIRS 
OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 2 1 2, at 1 58) .  
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miss . . .  , at pleasure, is not disputed."2 1 8  When we remember 
that Monroe reached the White House at a time when the Republi­
cans had been in office for sixteen years, it  is perhaps not so sur­
prising that there were few removals. By 1 8 1 7, most federal offi­
cials in office had been appointed by Monroe ' s  good friends and 
neighbors Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. 
The Monroe Administration did bear witness to the first event 
that even arguably could be said to support a historical practice of 
presidential tolerance of any deviation whatsoever from the theory 
of the unitary executive (more than three decades after the C onsti­
tution of 1 787 had been adopted), when Congress enacted the first 
substantial limitation on presidential control of federal patronage: 
the Tenure of Office Act of 1 820. Passed without any significant 
debate, the 1 820 Act provided that executive officers serving out­
side of Washington, D.C. ,  "shall be appointed for terms of four 
years, but shall be removable from office at pleasure ."2 1 9  The Act 
was vigorously and firmly denounced by former Presidents Jeffer­
son and Madison. Jefferson warned: 
It saps the constitutional and salutary functions of the Pres­
ident, and introduces a principle of intrigue and corruption, 
which will soon leaven the mass, not only of Senators, but 
of citizens .  It  is more baneful than the attempt which failed 
in the beginning of the government to make all officers 
irremovable, but with the consent of the Senate. It w il l  
2 1 8 . 2 O p .  Att 'y Gen. 67 ( 1 828).  
2 1 9. Tenure of Office Act, ch. 1 02, sec. 1 ,  3 Stat. 5 82,  582 ( 1 820). Specifically, the 
Act applied to "all district attorneys, collectors of the customs, naval officers and survey­
ors of the customs, navy agents, receivers of public moneys for lands, registers of the 
land offices, paymasters in the army, the apothecary general, the assistant apothecaries 
general, and the commissary general of purchases." !d. 
Although the Act was supposed to bring the pro-democratic benefits of "rotation i n  
office" to the federal government, many historians have concluded that support for the 
Act was in reality driven by the presidential ambitions of Treasury Secretary Wil l iam H .  
Crawford . According t o  some historians, Crawford proposed the Tenure of Office Act 
because he believed that the Act would foster his planned presidential bid by giving him 
greater influence over federal patronage. The Senate went along with Crawford because, 
by requiring the more frequent exercise of the Senate 's  confirmation power, the Act in­
creased its power as well .  1 GOLDSMITH, supra note 1 25 ,  at 1 67 .  Historians are far from 
unanimous in supporting this conclusion. See JOSEPH P. HARRJS,  THE ADVICE AND CoN­
SENT OF THE SENATE 5 ! -52 ( 1 968) [hereinafter HARRIS, ADVICE AND CONSENT) (compar­
ing 7 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS at 424-25 with FISH, supra note 77,  at 65-70); 
VAN RIPER, supra note 77,  at 25; WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 1 65 ,  at 3 8 8-89 
(comparing Carl R .  Fish, The Crime of W.H. Crawford, 21 AM. HIST. REV.  5 45-56 
( 1 9 1 5- 1 6) with CHARLES M .  WILTSE, JOHN C. CALHOUN: NATIONALIST 2 1 1 n. l ( 1 944)) .  
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keep in constant excitement al l the hungry cormorants for 
office, render them, as well as those in place, sycophants to 
their Senators, engage these in eternal intrigue to turn one 
out and put in another, in cabals to swap work, and make 
of them what all executive directories become, mere sinks 
of corruption and faction.220 
Madison responded in kind: "The law . . . is pregnant with mis­
chiefs such as you describe. . . . If the error be not soon corrected, 
the task will  be very difficult; for it is of a nature to take a deep 
root."221 Furthermore, although the Act did not directly p lace any 
limits on the President ' s  removal power, Madison was concerned 
that, if carried to its logical conclusion, i t  would lead to such 
l imits. In his view, if a law could displace an officer every four 
years, "it can do so at the end of every year, or at every session 
of the Senate; and the tenure will then be the pleasure of the Sen­
ate as much as of the President, and not of the President 
alone."222 Moreover, Madison was concerned that in l ight of the 
Decision of 1 789, the inclusion of language providing that these 
officers "shall be removable from office at pleasure"223 implied 
that the removal power was conveyed by congressional, rather than 
constitutional , grant. 
Although Monroe signed the bil l  into law without objection, he 
later came to share Madison ' s  concerns. As then-Secretary of State 
220. WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 1 65 ,  at 388 (quoting 1 5  THE W R ITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 1 29, at 294-95) ;  see also 1 GOLDSMITH,  supra note 1 25 ,  
a t  1 67;  MCDONALD , A M ERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, a t  256. 
22 1 .  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 1 0, 1 820), in 3 LETIERS 
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON supra note 1 29, at 1 96, quoted in WHITE, 
THE J EFFERSONIANS, supra note 1 65 ,  at 389; see also 1 GOLDS M ITH,  supra note 1 29, at 
1 92-93; VAN RIPER, supra note 77, at 25. 
222. Letter from James Madison to President Monroe in 3 LETIERS AND OTHER WRIT­
INGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1 29, at 1 99, 200; see also Fisher, Removal Power, 
supra note 2 1 ,  at 65. Madison had voiced a similar view during the Decis ion of 1 789. 
See Ruth Weissbourd Grant & Stephen Grant, The Madisonian Presidency, in THE PRESI ­
DENCY IN T H E  CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 3 1 ,  53 ,  63 n .70 (Joseph M .  Bessette & Jeffrey 
Tulis eds., 1 980). 
223. Tenure of Office Act, sec. 1 ,  3 Stat. at 582; see also CORWIN,  PRESI DENT ' s  RE­
MOVAL POWER, supra note 1 27 ,  at 345-46; 1 GOLDSMITH. supra note 1 25 ,  at 1 67-68. 
However, the settled practice s ince the Decis ion of 1 789 essentia l ly  forecl osed any such 
an impl ication, and it  i s  just as l ikely that this statutory l anguage represents Congress's 
recogni tion that the removal power was constitutional ly vested in  the Pres ident. FISHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 1 25 ,  at 58 (referring to the removal prov i sion as 
a "stipu lation") .  See generally WHITE, THE J EFFERSONIANS, supra note 1 65 ,  at 388-89; 
Fisher, Remoml Power, supra note 2 1 ,  at 65. 
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John Quincy Adams wrote in his memoirs, "Mr. Monroe unwari ly 
signed the bill without adverting to its real character. He told me 
that Mr. Madison considered it as in principle unconstitutional .  . . . 
Mr. Monroe himself incl ined to the same opinion, but the question 
had not occurred to him when he signed the bill ."224 These con­
cerns led Monroe to make it his pol icy to renominate all honest 
executive officials when their commissions expired, ensuring that 
the Act would have little immediate impact.225 
The significance of Monroe ' s  initial acceptance of the first 
Tenure of Office Act should not be overstated. In fact, the Act ' s  
establishment o f  fixed terms for certain federal officials only impli­
cated the removal power tangentially and did not purport to limit 
the removal power in any way.226 The fact that Monroe voiced 
his objections to the bill  as soon as he became aware of the threat 
to the removal power posed by the Act also indicates that 
Monroe ' s  initial silence stemmed more from inadvertence than 
acquiescence. Finally,  any remaining questions about Monroe ' s  
willingness to protect the President' s  power to remove were erased 
in 1 824, when Monroe refused to comply with a House request to 
provide the documents connected with the suspension of a naval 
officer as an improper interference with executive functions.227 
Together, these considerations effectively vitiate any inference that, 
in initially fail ing to object to the Tenure of Office Act, Monroe 
acquiesced to any infringement on the President ' s  power to re­
move. 
Final ly, it must be noted that President Monroe ' s  Attorney 
General, William Wirt, compiled a somewhat equivocal record on 
some of the other aspects of the unitary executive. Before describ­
ing that record, it should be noted in Wirt ' s  (and Monroe ' s) de­
fense that Wirt was by far the most successful and powerful Attor-
224. WH ITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 1 65 ,  at 3 8 8  (quoting Entry for Feb. 7,  
1 828,  7 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 2 1 2, at 424-25) ;  see also I 
GOLDSMITH,  supra note 1 25 ,  at 1 92-93;  VAN RIPER, supra note 77, at 25 .  
225 . WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 1 65 ,  at 389; Goldsmith,  supra note 1 25 .  at 
1 92-93; HARRIS, ADVICE AND CONSENT, supra note 2 !  9, at 52 ;  Carl R. Fish.  Removal of 
Officials by 1he Presidents of 1he United Stales, 2 ANN. REP. AM.  HIST. Ass ' N  67, 72 
( 1 899). 
226. See Parsons v .  United States, 1 67 U.S. 324, 339 ( 1 897) .  
227. James Monroe, Message t o  the House of Representatives (Jan. 1 0, 1 825) ,  in  2 
MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 1 77,  at 847; see also I rv ing Younger, Congressional 
lnvesligalions and ExecUiive Secrecy: A SIUdy in 1he Separalion of Powers, 20 U. P ITT . 
L. REV . 755, 759 ( 1 959).  
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ney General the nation had had up until that point. Wirt created 
many of the most important traditions and institutions that surround 
the office of the Attorney General, and he helped to lay the 
groundwork for the eventual creation of the Department of Justice 
many, many decades later.228 A lack of resources and a cautious 
personality may have prevented Wirt from doing even more, and 
may have contributed to his tendency to decline power that he 
lacked the resources to exercise, but William Wirt nonetheless 
deserves enormous credit for putting the Attorney General on an 
equal footing with the other three principle Cabinet Secretaries .229 
James Monroe deserves some of this credit as well ,  for the eleva­
tion in stature of the Attorney General was an important develop­
ment with long term implications for the theory of the unitary 
executive. It could not have occurred without both Monroe ' s  sup­
port and his selection of so able and energetic a lawyer as Will iam 
Wirt to hold the office. 
Nonetheless, as indicated above, Wirt ' s  record w ith respect to 
the unitary executive was at times equivocal . Thus ,  in 1 823 ,  Gener­
al Wirt issued an opinion that challenged the President ' s  authority 
to direct the actions of accounting officers in advance and to re­
view their exercise of discretion after the fact.230 This opinion, 
some scholars have suggested, is inconsistent with a unitarian view 
of presidential power.23 1 
228. WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 1 65 ,  at 346. 
229. See id. 
230. Wirt argued "it  could never have been the intention of the constitution, in assign­
ing this general power to the President to take care that the l aws be executed, that he 
should in  person execute the laws himself." While the Take Care Clause did "place [ ]  the 
officers . . .  under [the President's]  general superintendence," it  only authorized the Presi­
dent to displace, prosecute, or impeach officials who fail to execute the law properly; it 
did not grant to the President with the "power to interfere" with those officials' actions. 
Wirt believed that requiring the President "to take upon himse l f  the responsibil ity of al l  
the subordinate executive officers of the government" represented "a construction too ab­
surd to be seriously contended for."  Wirt continued, 
If the laws, then, require a particular officer by name to perform a duty, not 
only is that officer bound to perform it, but no other officer can perform it 
without a violation of the law; and were the President to perform i t, he would 
not only be not taking care that the laws were faithfully executed, but he 
would be violating them himself. The constitution assigns to Congress the pow­
er of designating the duties of particular officers: the President is  only required 
to take care that they execute them faithful ly .  
Op.  Att ' y  Gen. 624, 625 ( 1 823) .  Wirt relied upon the authority of this  opinion to reject 
summaril y  subsequent requests for presidential intervention in matters before accounting 
officials. See I Op. Att ' y  Gen. 705-06 ( 1 825); 1 Op. Att ' y  Gen. 678 ( 1 824); I Op. Att ' y  
Gen. 636-37 ( 1 824). 
23 1 .  See Ledewitz, supra note 2 1 ,  at 799; Froomkin, Note, supra note 6, at 8 0 1  & 
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It is far from clear, however, that this opinion properly consti­
tutes a definitive disavowal of the unitary executive. First, the 
opinion ' s  reasoning is incomplete in that it only analyzed the presi­
dential review of subordinates '  actions under the Take Care Clause 
without considering the impact of the Executive Power Clause .232 
Furthermore, whether this record can be fairly attributed to Monroe 
is certainly subject to debate. A position taken in an Attorney 
General ' s  opinion does not necessarily represent the official posi­
tion of an Administration, and Presidents have often ignored posi­
tions taken by their Attorneys General and substituted their own 
judgment instead.233 
But by far the biggest problem with interpreting thi s  opinion as 
a firm rejection of the unitary executive is that so interpreting it 
conflicts with a number of Wirt' s other opinions on executive 
power. For example, just seven months before authorizing this 
opinion, Wirt had issued another opinion taking a contrary position 
with regard to the power of presidential review. Specifically,  Wirt 
opined that a law authorizing accounting officers to settle the ac­
counts of the Vice President were "subject to the revision and final 
decision of the President."  Under the specific statute, "the account­
ing officers must act on the subject in the first instance; the power 
of the President being merely in the nature of appellate power; and 
that, consequently, he cannot, in the regular execution of the law, 
put those officers aside, and take the whole subject at once into his 
own hands." Nonetheless ,  Wirt emphasized that once the account­
ing officers had acted, their decisions remained subject  to the 
President ' s  "revising power."234 It is even more difficult to recon­
cile the first opinion discussed with an opinion issued by Wirt in 
1 827 affirming the President ' s  right to direct federal district 
attorney ' s  prosecution of a particular suit. Wirt "entertain [ed] no 
doubt of the constitutional power of the President to order the 
discontinuance of a suit commenced in the name of the United 
S tates in a case proper for such order."  In fact, if the suit lacked a 
proper legal basis, the Take Care Clause "not only authorized, but 
n.75, 805 & n. 1 1 l . 
232. See Liberman, supra note 3, at 337 & n. l 56 .  
233.  See Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1 995 B.Y.U.  L. 
REV. 1 7 , 27 & n.24 [hereinafter Lund, Lawyers] (citing examples when Presidents over­
ruled their Attorneys General); Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Of ice of Legal 
Counsel, 1 5  CARDOZO L. REV. 437 ,  443-45 ( 1 993)  [hereinafter Lund, Rational Choice] .  
234. 1 Op. Att 'y  Gen. 596, 597-98 ( 1 823) .  
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required [the President] by his duty, to order a discontinuance of 
such vexation. 'ms This 1 827 opinion is particularly problematic 
for the critics of the unitary executive who have argued that the 
Comptroller of the Treasury was independent of the Presidene36 
and that giving the Comptroller the power to prosecute certain 
suits237 was an early example of the fragmentation of the unitary 
executive.238 Wirt ' s  opinion clearly suggests that the President had 
full power to direct the actions of the Comptroller and that giving 
the Comptroller authority over some types of cases did not vitiate 
the President ' s  control over federal prosecutions. 
Wirt did not make any attempt to reconcile his various opin­
ions,239 and subsequent Attorney General Opinions have vacillated 
on this point ever since.240 Fortunately,  the methodology of coor­
dinate construction relieves us of the need to do so. For our pur­
poses, it is sufficient to note that even if the views expressed in 
Wirt ' s  opinions are attributed to the President and are read for all 
they are worth, they stil l  fall far short of establishing an extended 
pattern of presidential acquiescence to a non-unitary executive 
branch. 
235.  2 Op. Att ' y  Gen.  53 ,  54 ( 1 827). Wirt concluded in  this particular case such a 
direction would have been inappropriate since a court had granted the prosecutor' s  request 
for an injunction in this case over two years before. /d. at 54-56. Had the matter not 
been already decided by a court of law, however, there is l i ttle doubt that Wirt woul d  
have endorsed dismissal o f  the suit. 
236. See B l och, supra note 16, at 578 n.55; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6,  at 27; 
Tie fer, supra note 2 1 ,  at 73-74. 
237. In 1 797, Congress gave the Comptroller the power "to institute suit for the recov­
ery of" a "sum or balance reported to be due to the United States." Act of Mar. 3, ! 797, 
ch. 20, sec. I ,  I Stat. 5 1 2, 5 1 2. I n  1 8 1 7 ,  Congress gave the Comptroller the power "to 
direct suits and legal proceedings, and to take a l l  such measures as may be authorized by 
the laws, to enforce prompt payments o f  all debts to the United States." Act of Mar. 3,  
1 8 1 7, ch. 45 sec. 1 0, 3 Stat. 366, 367.  
238.  See Krent, Executive Control, supra note 1 05 ,  at 288; Lessig & Sunstein, supra 
note 6, at 1 7 - 1 8 ; Tiefer, supra note 2 1 ,  at 75. 
239. Wirt ' s  two opinions concerning the direction of accounting officers may be distin­
guished in that the second opinion dealt with the general accounting laws while the first 
involved special legislation. Thus differences in the availability of presidential review 
arguably could have flowed from differences in congressional intent. See 2 Op. Att ' y  Gen. 
625 ( ! 834) (discussing this distinction without referring to either of Wirt ' s  opinions) . This 
resol ution, however, sti l l  fails to provide an adequate explanation of Wirt ' s  opinion on the 
President 's  power to direct district attorneys. 
240. See P. Strauss, supra note 3 at 605 & n. 24. 
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F .  John Quincy Adams 
John Quincy Adams was, l ike his father, a strong believer in 
the value of a hierarchical , unitary executive branch. Thus,  Adams 
was (according to Leonard White) "temperamentally a man to 
restore the presidency to its original h igh estate. "241 White elabo­
rates: 
[T] he last of the Jeffersonians in the "White House, John 
Quincy Adams, was in truth more nearly a Federalist than 
a Republican. His political doctrines resembled those of 
Alexander Hamilton, and his ideals of administration were 
those of George Washington and his  father, John Ad­
ams.242 
Adams ' s  support for executive unitariness surfaced long before 
he entered the White House. While serving as Secretary of S tate 
during the Monroe Administration, Adams reportedly wrote to his  
wife that: 
For myself I shall enter upon the functions of my office 
with a deep sense of the necessity of union with my col­
leagues,  and w ith a suitable impression that my place is 
subordinate. That my duty will be to support, and not to 
counteract or oppose, the President ' s  administration, and 
that if from any cause I should find my efforts to that end 
ineffectual, it will be my duty seasonably to w ithdraw fro m  
the public service.243 
As noted earlier, Adams had also sided in 1 8 1 9  with President 
Monroe in the dispute over w hether department heads could appro­
priately make reports to Congress w hich disagreed with the presi­
dent ' s  constitutional interpretations. Adams reports in his  memoirs 
that he thought "there would be an obvious incongruity and inde­
cency that a head of Department should make a report to either 
House of Congress which the President should disapprove. "244 
24 1 .  WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 1 65 ,  at 4 1 .  
242. !d. at v i i -v i i i .  
243 . /d. at 6 1 -62 (quoting Letter from Johil Quincy Adams to  Abigail Adams (May 1 6 , 
1 8 1 7), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF J OHN QUINCY ADAMS 1 79 ,  i 82 ('Northington Chauncey 
Ford ed.,  1 9 1 3- 1 7) ) .  
244. !d. at 68 (quoting 4 THE WRITINGS O F  JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, supra note 2 1 2, a t  
2 1 7  (quoting Entry for January 1 2 ,  i 8 1 9  in  T H E  MEMOIRS O F  JOHN QUI NCY ADAMS, 
supra note 2 1 2, at 2 1 7)) .  
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Adams continued to adhere to these positions after he ascended 
to the Presidency.  After giving an inaugural address that was "Fed­
eralist in its conception,"245 Adams insisted on the same degree of 
loyalty from his own Cabinet members that he had shown Monroe. 
And in 1 825 when he asked a former rival from Monroe ' s  Cabinet, 
William Crawford, to stay on as Secretary of the Treasury, 
Crawford declined due to irreconcilable policy disagreements.246 
Moreover, consistent with the advice Adams had given Monroe, 
Adams refused to disclose secret information to a friendly Con­
gressman, indicating that he was forbidden from doing so by the 
Constitution."247 John Quincy Adams was clearly deeply and per­
sonally committed to the core principles of a unitary and indepen­
dent executive branch. 
Adams effectuated those principles by continuing the moderate 
reappointment and removal practices of Monroe while echoing 
Jefferson ' s  criticisms of the Senate ' s  attempts to influence federal 
patronage. As Adams noted: 
Efforts have been made by some of the senators to obtain 
different nominations ,  and to introduce a principle of 
change or rotation in office at the expiration of these com­
missions,  which would mak:e the government a perpetual 
a11d unintennitting scramble for office . . . .  A more perni­
cious expedient could scarcely have been devised. . . . I 
determined to renominate every person against whom there 
was no complaint which would have warranted his remov­
al. 248 
The fact that Adams was reluctar1t to use his control of federal 
patronage for political purposes, however, did not suggest that he 
questioned the constitutional basis of the President ' s  power to 
remove. Indeed, Adams did remove twelve officials during his four 
years in office.249 Adams ' s  presidency, however, never recovered 
from the circumstances of his election/50 and his midterm con-
245. !d. at 4 1 . 
246. See WHJTE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 1 65, at 64. 
247. /d. at 41 (citing Entry for March 1 5 ,  1 828,  in 7 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY AD-
AMS, supra note 2 1 2, at 475). 
248 . HARRIS, ADVICE AND CONSENT, supra note 2 1 9,  at 52 (citing JOHN T.  MORSE, 
JOHN QUiNCY ADAMS, 1 7 8-79 ( 1 898) for the Adams quote); see also i GOLDSMJTH, su­
pra note 1 25,  at 1 92-93; WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 1 65 ,  at 3 89-90. 
249. See WHITE. THE JEF!-t:RSONIANS , supra note 1 65, at 380; MCDONALD, AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY, supra note 20, at 2 5 5 .  
250. in the election of 1 824, t.'Jen Senaror Andrew Jackson received 1 3  I electoral votes, 
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gressional elections left him without influence over Congress both 
Houses of which were won for the first time by the president 's  
opponents.25 1 Given his  lack of  political support, Adams was un­
derstandably cautious in exercising his presidential prerogatives not­
withstanding his finn belief in them. 
By the second half of the Administration of John Quincy Ad­
ams, however, Congress began showing renewed interest in placing 
limits on the President' s  removal power. In 1 826, a Senate select 
committee on executive patronage reported a bill proposing " [t]hat, 
in all nominations made by the President to the Senate, to fill 
vacancies occasioned by an exercise of the President ' s  power to 
remove from office, the fact of the removal shall be stated to the 
Senate . . . with a statement of the reasons for which such officer 
may have been removed."252 Motivated more by the next election 
than a desire to curtail presidential power/53 the Report attempted 
to evade the serious constitutional questions raised by these propos­
als by adopting a functionalist view of the Constitution, in which 
deviating from the specific proscriptions of the Constitution was 
justified so long as those deviations complied with "the spit-it of 
the constitution in laboring to multiply the guards and to strengthen 
the barriers, against the possible abuse of power."254 In the 
committee ' s  opinion, this more dynamic view of the Constitution 
was mandated by changed circumstances: 
[T]he Committee cannot imagine that the jealous foresight 
of the time, great as it was, or that any human sagacity, 
could have foreseen, and placed a competent guard upon, 
every possible avenue to abuse of power. The nature of a 
while Adams received 99, William Crawford 4 1 ,  and House Speaker Henry Clay 37.  
Since no candidate received a majority of the electoral vote, under the Twelfth Amend­
ment the President was to be selected by the House from among the top three candidates. 
Although no longer able to stand as a candidate, as Speaker Clay was able to exert sub­
stantial influence over the e lection. In the "Corrupt B argain," Clay was able to engineer 
Adams's election. In return, Adams named Clay Secretary of State, the post then consid­
ered to be the stepping stone to the Presidency. Thus, as a minority President, Adams 
always struggled against questions about the legitimacy of his election and general lack of 
political support. 
25 1 .  See WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 1 65 ,  at 42. 
252. S. Doc. No. 88 ,  1 9th Con g . ,  I st Sess. 1 4- 1 5  ( 1 826), reprinted in 2 CONG. DEB. 
app. 1 33 ( 1 826). The committee also proposed that mi l i tary officers' commissions "contin­
ue in force during . . .  good behaviour," and that such officers be only dismissed pursu­
ant to a court martial or by congressional action. _!!L 
253 . See WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note 1 65 ,  at 39 1 ,  393 . 
254. S. Doc. No.  88,  supra note 252, at 2. 
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constitutional act excludes the possibility of combining 
minute perfection with general excellence. After the exer­
tion of all possible v igilance, something of what ought to 
have been done, has been omitted, and much of what has 
been attempted, has been found insufficient and unavailing 
in practice.255 
The Senate adjourned without acting on this proposal . Nonetheless, 
the debate on the Benton Report foreshadowed the more senous 
challenges to the President ' s  removal power yet to come.256 
By  the end of John Quincy Adams ' s  Administration, it was 
clear that the strong, unitary presidency created by Washington, 
Hamilton, and John Adams had survived the Jeffersonian period 
largely intact. As Leonard White argues: 
The Jeffersonian era in the field of administration was in 
many respects a projection of Federalist ideals and practice. 
The political differences between Jefferson and Hamilton 
turned out to be much more profound and significant than 
their differences in the manner and spirit of conducting the 
public business . Jefferson and Gallatin, moreover, inherited 
a going concern, and it developed that a brief twelve years 
had been enough to set patterns that persisted throughout 
the next thirty . The Federalists disappeared as a political 
party, but their administrative system was adopted by their 
political rivals .257 
White concludes: 
[N]o doubt arose in the minds of the Jeffersonians concern­
ing the administrative supremacy of the President. The 
department heads were responsible to him. The executive 
power remained where the Constitution had placed it.258 
255. !d. Curiously, the Report 's  reliance on dynamic constitutional theory i s  inconsistent 
with its proposal of two constitutional amendments to create the proper balance between 
executive and legislative control of federal patronage, which recognizes that the proper 
way to adapt the Constitution to contemporary exigencies is by amending it. As the Re­
port emphasizes, "The people made the Constitution, and they can amend i t. They are the 
only constitutional triers of the amendment. They alone have the power to adopt it. . . .  " 
!d. at 1 2  (emphasis in original). 
256. See WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS, supra note I 65, at 393.  
257 . !d. at vi i .  
258 .  !d. at 76. 
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Thus,  by 1 829, exclusive presidential power over law execution 
had already been firmly established, even as one of the strongest 
presidencies in American history was getting ready to begin. 
G. Andrew Jackson 
Andrew Jackson was one of the most powerful presidents in 
American history, and he clearly in some respects transformed and 
enhanced the high office he held. In his development of the Presi­
dent' s  role as the leader of a political party and in the vigor with 
which he pressed the President ' s  claim to be a direct representative 
of the people, Jackson clearly trod new ground. He also trod new 
ground in the energy with which he used the veto power, especial­
ly in cases where he disapproved of bills on policy grounds rather 
than for constitutional reasons. Finally, he used the president ' s  
removal power and powers over law execution much more vigor­
ously than they had ever been used before, and he endorsed a new 
principal of the desirability of rotation in office that was c learly 
contrary to the policy views held by his predecessors who had 
favored stability in administration as a core value. From the point 
of view of many political scientists and historians, then, the Jack­
son administration marks not the end of the Founding period but 
rather a new beginning-the start of a period that culminates in the 
strong modem presidencies that have characterized much of the 
twentieth century . 
We do not disagree with the view that Jackson greatly en­
hanced the office of the presidency by providing people w ith an 
example of the leadership role that strong presidents can play. We 
adamantly disagree, however, with the entirely different claim, 
advanced most recently by Professors Lessig and Sunstein,259 that 
the Jackson Administration marked the advent of some new legal 
role for the president where for the first time presidents acquired 
power over law execution by the whole of the executive branch, 
including the Treasury Department and the Post Office. From the 
perspective of a constitutional lawyer, the Jackson Administration 
was not a new beginning: it was a reaffirmation of the victories 
won by James Wilson and James Madison at the Philadelphia 
Convention-victories that were acknowledged by the First Con­
gress in the Decision of 1 789 and by all of Jackson ' s  six predeces­
sors in the White House. 
259. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 7 8 .  
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It was for this reason that James Madison himself agreed with 
Andrew Jackson ' s  legal claims during the Bank War even though 
he disliked Jackson and disapproved of many of his policies. Madi­
son, of course, wrote in 1 83 4  that " [t]he claim, [of the Senate] on 
constitutional ground, to a share in the removal , as well as appoint­
ment of officers, [is] in direct opposition to the uniform practice of 
the government from its commencement."260 He also described the 
Senate ' s  position as being "in opposition to the principles and 
practice of every administration, my own included."26 1  Presum­
ably, former President James Madison was in a better position to 
judge the prior presidential practice in 1 834 then are Professors 
Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein writing today, especially in a 
situation where his political views were hostile to the administra­
tion in power. 
The key error, then, committed by those anti-unitarians who 
view the Jackson presidency as transformative is to confuse the 
separate issues of whether Jackson' s  presidency was transformative 
legally or politically .  With respect to the legal matters we have 
been discussing in this Article, Jackson ' s  presidency w as a reaffir­
mation of claims made and settled long before: Old Hickory broke 
no new legal ground in his assertions about presidential control 
over law execution. 
In discussing the relevance of the Jackson presidency for the 
unitary executive debate, we think it is useful to divide our analy­
sis into three sections: the first section focusses on J a.ckson ' s  
claims about the role of the president and his place i n  our constitu­
tional system; the second section describes Jackson ' s  views and 
practice on presidential powers of removal and supervision of l aw 
execution; and the third section illustrates the points discussed in 
the first two sections by describing briefly the history of Jackson ' s  
famous and successful war to kill the B ank  of the United States .  
1 .  Jackson ' s  Claims about the Role of the President 
in Our Constitutional System 
Andrew Jackson vigorously articulated and defended what 
Leonard White has called the Doctrine of D irect Represen­
tation.262 He argued that the President is  the direct representative 
260. See Letter from James Madison to Edward Coles (Oct. 1 5 , 1 83 4) in 4 LETIERS 
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1 29, at 368 (emphasis added).  
26 1 .  Letter from James M adison to Edward Coles (Aug. 29, 1 83 4) in 4 LETIERS AND 
OTHER WRITINGS OF J AMES MADISON, supra note 1 29,  at 355 (emphasis added). 
262. See LEO.'lARD B. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HlSTORY 
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of the whole people of the United States and that the Cabinet 
Secretaries are not.263 Presidential power over the Cabinet S ecre­
taries follows easily from this point as does some degree of presi­
dential authority relative to Congress.  Obviously, the president ordi­
n arily has something of an electoral mandate from the people ,  
while members of Congress in 1 829 had a mandate only from their 
districts and Senators from the legislature of their home state . 
Jackson ' s  theory built upon solid antecedents. James Wilson 
had argued during the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention that the 
method of electing the president made him '"the MAN OF THE 
PEOPLE, "' as McDonald describes ,  "the one governmental official 
who was elected to represent the entire country ."264 Similarly, 
Washington and Jefferson had emphasized the president ' s  indepen­
dent electoral connection w ith the people .  Nonetheless, Jackson 
stressed this aspect of presidential legitimacy more heavily and 
more publicly than had anyone before him, no doubt becau se of 
his loss to John Quincy Adams in the House of Representatives in  
1 825 ,  and he repeatedly called for a constitutional amendment 
providing for direct election of the President.265 
Jackson ' s  emphasis on the president ' s  role as direct representa­
tive of the people reinforced every other claim of presidential 
power he asserted. Vetoes for policy reasons,  removals of recalci­
trant Cabinet Secretaries, arguments for a presidential power of 
constitutional interpretation-all of these claims of presidential 
power were buttressed by the claim of democratic legitimacy that 
Andrew Jackson advanced once he gained the office that had been 
"stolen" from him in 1 825 . 
The net effect of Jackson ' s  claims of presidential power was to 
bring together his opponents into a new political party called the 
"Whig" party . The name was adopted to signify the party ' s  "oppo­
sition to concentrated power in the hands of the chief execu­
tive"266 (the similarly named Whig Party in England having 
helped to lead the Glorious Revolution of 1 688 and having op­
posed royal prerogatives) .  The newly formed Whigs adopted oppo-
1 829- 1 86 1  23-28 ( 1 954). 
263. See id. 
264. McDONALD, supra note 20, at 20 1 .  
265. See WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at 23.  
266.  ROBERT V. REM IN! ,  ANDREW JACKSON AND THE BANK WAR 1 29 ( 1 967) (hereinaf­
ter REMINI,  BANK WAR ] .  
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s1t10n to executive power as a core plank of their program,267 and 
it was the Whigs who for the first time in the 1 830s and 1 840s 
adopted the view (as do Lessig and Sunstein) that the power of the 
sword and the purse ought to be entirely separate268 and that the 
Treasury Department should be independent of presidential control.  
Indeed, William Henry Harrison, the first Whig president, said in 
his inaugural address that "the framers of the Constitution commit­
ted a great error in not making the head of the Treasury Depart­
ment 'entirely independent of the Executive ' [ , and he] accepted the 
Clay -Calhoun doctrine that a President should communicate the 
reasons for making removals, at least of the Secretary of the Trea­
sury."269 Leonard White describes the Whigs as being so opposed 
to Jackson and to executive power "that they outdid the most tim­
orous Republicans of earlier years. "270 
Andrew Jackson ' s  Democratic Party triumphed over the Whig 
opposition at almost every tum during the period between 1 829 
and 1 837.  Indeed, during the entire period between 1 829 and 1 86 1  
the Jacksonian Democrats won the presidency six times and the 
Whigs won only twice. B oth of the two Whigs who won the presi­
dency died in office and one was succeeded after only one month 
in office by a man, John Tyler, who was "an old-school Demo­
crat."27 1 The Whigs were completely ineffectual politically as a 
presidential party and, during the brief periods they held the presi­
dency, they tended to abandon their anti-executive power 
views.272 The main significance, then, of the Whig opposition to 
"King Andrew I" (Jackson ' s  nickname) was that it had no success 
with the public during Jackson ' s  administration or at any point 
thereafter. 
In defending presidential power, Andrew Jackson argued vehe­
mently for a presidential role in constitutional interpretation. Like 
267. See WHJTE, THE JACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at 46-49. 
268. Leonard White observes: "The specific Whig reaction to Jackson ' s  removal of the 
deposits from the United States Bank was to demand ' the separation of the purse from 
the sword . "' WH ITE , THE JACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at 43 . White goes on to quote 
John Tyler, Wil liam Henry Harrison's  Vice President and successor, as saying that "I 
deem it  of the most essential importance that a complete separation should take place 
between !he sword and !he purse." !d. 
269. !d. at 47. 
270. !d. at 46 (emphasis added). 
27 1 .  !d. at 6. 
272. We will discuss and defend this point in the second Article in  our four part series, 
which will discuss the unitary executive debate during the second half-century of Ameri­
can histOf'J.  
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Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and George Washington before 
him, Jackson believed that the President was a co-equal constitu­
tional interpreter to the Supreme Court with an obligation indepen­
dently to assess questions of constitutionality .  He expressed his 
v iews eloquently in his Veto Message of July 1 0, 1 832 wherein he 
vetoed the attempt to renew the Charter of the Bank of the United 
States:  
It is maintained by the advocates of the bank that its con­
stitutionality in all its features ought to be considered as 
settled by precedent and by the decision of the Supreme 
Court. To this conclusion I cannot assent. Mere precedent 
is a dangerous source of authority, and should not be re­
garded as deciding questions of constitutional power except 
where the acquiescence of the people and the States can be 
considered as well settled. 
The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for 
itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. 
Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Con­
stitution swears that he wil l  support it as he understands it, 
and not as it is understood by others. It is as much the 
duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of 
the President to decide upon the constitutional ity of any 
bill or resolution which may be presented to them for 
passage or approval as it is of the supreme judges when it 
may be brought before them for j udicial decision. The 
opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress 
tha.11 the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on 
that point the President is  independent of both .273 
Jackson ' s  defense of the presidential role in constitutional interpre­
tation is obviously sweeping. It is also of great importance because 
it was made in so important (and fateful)  a Veto Message. His  
position may have manifested itself again in his failure to  take any 
action to enforce Chief Justice Marshal l ' s  decision in Worcester v. 
Georgia,274 which sought to give the Cherokee Indians the benefit 
of the treaty rights they had negotiated with the federal govern-
273. Veto Message of July l 0,  1 832,  in 3 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 1 77 ,  at 
1 1 39, 1 1 44-45. 
27 4. 6 Peters 5 1 5  ( 1 832).  
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ment.275 It was with respect to this  case that Jackson was reputed 
to have said, "Well ,  John Marshall has made his decision now let 
him enforce it."276 
Jackson also defended presidential power in two other ways 
that bear on the unitary executive debate. First, his Protest, deliv­
ered during the B ank War and discussed below, specifically endors­
es the view that the Executive Power Vesting Clause of Article II 
was a grant of power and not a mere designation of office and 
title. This ,  of course, puts Jackson squarely in the same camp with 
Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison, all of whom as we have seen 
took that position. Second, Jackson ' s  v igorous use of the veto 
power on both constitutional and policy grounds left l ittle doubt 
that the President would forcefully defend the prerogatives of his 
office from congressional attempts to impair them by, for example,  
curtailing presidential removal power.277 Such proposal s  were ad­
vanced by the Whigs in 1 83 4  and actually passed in the Whig­
controlled Senate, only to be killed off in the House of Representa­
tives, which was then held by the Democrats.278 
2. Jackson, the Removal Power, and the President ' s  
Power to Execute the Laws 
Andrew Jackson vigorously defended presidential power in the 
direct context of removal authority and authority to control the 
execution of the laws by his subordinates. His legal position on 
these matters was uncompromising and was founded upon the 
generally shared understanding at the time of the powers that text 
and practice had recognized as presidential prerogatives. As Leon­
ard White reports: 
To the constitutional argument against . . .  free use of the 
removal power, Jackson ' s  friends said flatly that the issue 
was settled; [Daniel] Webster himself had said it for them, 
indeed, better than they, although he proposed to reopen 
what he bel ieved to be an erroneous interpretation of the 
275. See SMITH, supra note 1 74, at 5 1 6- 1 8 . 
276. !d. at 5 1 8 . Sm i th agrees with the received view that Jackson probably did not 
make the statement at least in this form , and he notes that at this point Jackson did not 
have a responsibi l i ty to enforce the Court's judgment. 
277. See WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at 28-33.  Jackson used the veto far 
more often than his predecessors, and he greatly expanded the use of the veto for pure 
policy reasons. Jackson also originated Li-te use of the pocket veto. !d. 
278. See id. at 40-42. 
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Constitution: an interpretation, h e  admitted "settled by 
construction; settled by precedent; settled by the practice of 
the Government; and settled by statute."279 
Jackson had no doubt about his legal power to remove subordinate 
officials,  and all of the individuals he removed (including Treasury 
Secretary Duane) complied readily w ith his orders dismissing them.  
The Whig opposition sought to  change matters, but Jackson pre­
vailed in his removal policy at every tum .  
Jackson vigorously exercised the full legal powers that text and 
practice conferred. Indeed, he exercised his legal powers of remov­
al in a genuinely new and aggressive way . 280 In doing this ,  Jack­
son was guided by a firm belief in what he called the benefits of 
"rotation in office"281-what we would call term l imits . Jackson 
believed that "rotation in office" would democratize the govern­
ment and improve the quality of the administration by l imiting 
opportunities for corruption and laziness in public life.282 He thus 
rejected the Federalist and Jeffersonian preference for a permanent 
and professional c ivil service.283 Unfortunately, the consequences 
279. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at 33 (emphasis added). 
280. See id. at 33-34. 
28 1 .  !d. at 300-324. 
282. As Jackson noted in his First Annual Message, "I can not but believe that more is 
lost by the long continuance of men in office than is generally to be gained by their 
experience." He e laborated: 
There, are, perhaps, few men who can for any great length of time 
enjoy office and power without being more or less under the influence of feel­
ings unfavorable to the faithful discharge of their public duties. Their integrity 
may be proof against improper considerations immediately addressed to them­
selves, but they are apt to acquire a habit of looking with indifference upon 
the public interests and of tolerating conduct from which an unpracticed man 
would revolt. . . . Corruption in some and in others a perversion of correct 
feelings and principles divert government from its legitimate ends and make it 
an engine for the support of the few at the expense of the many . . . .  
In a country where offices are created solely for the benefit of the 
people no one man has any more intrinsic right to official station than anoth­
er. No individual wrong is, therefore, done by removal, since neither ap­
pointment to nor continuance in office is matter of right. . . . It is the people, 
and they aione, who have a right to complain when a bad officer is substituted 
for a good one. He who is removed has the same means of obtaining a living 
that are enjoyed by the millions who never held office. 
Andrew Jackson, First Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1 829) , in 3 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra 
note 1 77 ,  at 1 005,  1 0 1 1 - 1 2; see also I GOLDSMITH, supra note 1 25 ,  at 1 75-77; VAN 
RIPER, supra note 77,  at  3 1 ,  36-37. 
283. See WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at 300-30 1 .  
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o f  the Jacksonian system were less than benign ,284 and the net 
result was to set in motion a train of events that would only end 
in the 1 880s with the adoption of the civil service laws,  which 
helped to restore some degree of quality control to the lower levels 
of the bureaucracy. (After a momentous fight, Presidential removal 
power was retained for policy-making positions when the second 
Tenure of Office Act was finally repealed in 1 887 .285) 
Although Jackson firmly  endorsed the principle of rotation in 
office, his actual exercise of the removal power was not quite as 
sweeping as his opponents sometimes seemed to think. Leonard 
White reports: 
The shock was undoubtedly great, but the statistics show 
that the number of removals ,  although unprecedented, was 
small in terms of percentage. . . . [During the first e ighteen 
months of Jackson ' s  term, the] figures showed a total of 
9 1 9  removals out of 1 0,093 officeholders or somewhat less 
than 1 0  per cent.286 
White reports that another study suggests that during the rest  of 
Jackson ' s  Administration "less than 20% of all officeholders were 
removed, and . . .  probably the figure was nearer 1 0  per cent,"287 
and, if one looks at presidential offices only, 252 officers out of 
6 1 2  were removed during Jackson ' s  two terms.288 Thus ,  although 
Jackson clearly used the removal power much more broadly and 
for different reasons than had his predecessors , his use of that 
power was not quite so extraordinary as his political opponents 
claimed. Jackson removed more officers than all of his predeces­
sors combined,289 but in percentage terms he made fewer remov­
als than Jefferson.290 
284. See id. at 325-46. 
285.  These developments are discussed in the second Article of our fou r  part series,  
forthcoming from this l aw review. 
286.  WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at 307-08. 
287.  !d. 
288.  See id. at n.24 (citing FISH, supra note 77,  at 1 25) .  
289.  See FiSH,  supra note 77,  at  74;  FISHER,  CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 
1 25 ,  at 58; 2 HAYNES, supra note 1 55 ,  at 793; GEORGE W. PEPPER, FAMILY QUARRELS: 
THE PRESIDENT, THE SENATE, THE HOUSE 1 1 0- 1 1 ( 1 93 1  ) ;  Fisher, Removal Power, supra 
note 2 1 ,  at 65 . 
290. See VAN RI PER, supra note 77, at 30,  34-36; see also Fisher, Removal Power, 
supra note 2 1 , at 65 (citing Erik M. Eriksson, The Federal Civil Service under President 
Jackson, 1 3  MISS.  VALLEY HIST. REV. 5 1 7 ( 1 927)); FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, 
supra note 1 25 ,  at 58 (same); 1 GOLDSMITH, supra note 1 25 ,  at 1 77 ;  WHITE, THE JACK-
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Jackson ' s  most important and extraordinary removal came in 
1 833  with his firing of Treasury Secretary Duane during the B ank 
War. Even before that momentous event his removal policy had the 
political opposition up in arms.291 In 1 830 and 1 833 ,  a series of 
unsuccessful resolutions were put forward all of which were aimed 
at limiting the President ' s  removal power.292 Although these ini­
tial resolutions w ere rejected,293 in 1 83 5  the Senate finally passed 
a resolution asking the President to communicate the charges that 
had led to the removal of Surveyor General Gideon Fitz, a com-
SONIANS, supra note 262,  a t  307-08. 
29 1 .  See WHITE, THE JACKSONlANS, supra note 262, at 40. 
292. In 1 830, Senator Barton introduced resolutions calling upon the President to "in­
form the Senate of the cause or causes that existed for the removal[s]" of Theodore H u nt 
and Will iam Clark. 6 CONG.  DEB. 367 ( 1 830) (Theodore Hunt); id. at 457-70 (Wil l iam 
Clark); 8 Cong. Deb. 1 65-66 ( 1 830); see also 2 HAYNES, supra note 1 55 ,  at 793 . B arton 
also introduced resolutions challenging the constitutionality of Jackson's removals. See S .  
DOC. N O .  1 03, 2 1 st Cong., 1 st Sess. ( 1 830); see also DARRELL H .  S M ITH, T HE  UNITED 
STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMM ISSION 3 ( 1 928) [hereinafter S M ITH, CIVIL SERVICE). In 
support of these resolutions, B arton charged that Jackson ' s  unfettered exercise of the re­
moval power constituted "an absolute despotism and right of dark and ex parte inquisi­
tion" that was inconsistent with democratic government: "It fel l  upon my ear l ike the 
anathema of the minority pronounced from the modern Vatican! It  sounded l ike the knell  
of our constitutional l i berties !"  6 CONG. DEB. 459 ( 1 830). 
Shortly thereafter, Senator Holmes offered another series of resolutions criticizing 
Jackson ' s  removal policies and requesting information on the reasons for all of his  remov­
als. See 6 CONG. DEB . 385 ( 1 830); see also 2 HAYNES, supra note 1 55 ,  at 794. H ol mes 
admonished, "A President, with unl i m i ted discretion in  removals and appointments, . . .  
has only to wi l l  it, and he is  the tyrant. I t  i s  done, i t  is finished, and the l iberties of the 
people are gone forever." 6 CONG. DEB. 396 ( 1 830). 
all :  
Two years later, S enator Thomas Ewing introduced the most sweeping resolution of 
That the practice of removing public officers by the President for any other 
purpose than that of securing a faithful execution of the laws, is hostile to the 
spirit of the Constitution, was never contemplated by its framers, is  an exten­
sion of executive influence, is prejudicial to the public service and dangerous to 
the l iberties of the people; 
That i t  is  inexpedient for the Senate to advise and consent to the 
appointment of any person to fill a supposed vacancy in any office, occasioned 
by the removal of a prior incumbent, unless such a prior incumbent shall ap­
pear to have been removed for a sufficient cause. 
S. Doc. No. 4 1 ,  22d Cong., 1 st Sess. ( 1 832); see also SMIT H ,  CIVIL SERVICE , supra, at 
3 .  
293. See 6 CONG. DEB. 3 7 4  ( 1 830) (tabling Barton 's resolution regarding Hunt); id. at 
396 (voting to postpone the Holmes ' s  resolutions by a vote of 24 to 2 1 ) ; 2 H A YNES, 
supra note 1 55,  at 794 & n.2 (noting that Barton's resolution regarding Clark fai led 22 to 
26); SMITH, CiVIL SERVICE, supra note 292, at 3 (noting fai lure of Ewing resol utions). 
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munication the Senate claimed was needed for i t  to act o n  the 
nomination of his successor.294 
Jackson bluntly refused to comply, charging that the resolution 
"either related to the subjects exclusively belonging to the execu­
tive department or otherwise encroached on the constitutional pow­
ers of the Executive." Jackson reasoned, "The President in cases of 
this nature possesses the exclusive power of removal from office."  
Senate interference in removals could not  be tolerated, because 
"[s ]uch a result, if acquiesced in, would ultimately subject the 
independent constitutional action of the Executive in a matter of 
great national concernment to the domination and control of the 
Senate."295 Therefore, Jackson concluded: 
[Although I have complied with previous requests] [ i ] t  is 
now . . . my solemn conviction that I ought no longer . . . 
to yield to these unconstitutional demands. Their continued 
repetition imposes on me, as the representative and trustee 
of the American people,  the painful but imperious duty of 
resisting to the utmost any further encroachment on the 
rights of the Executive.296 
The Senate retaliated by rejecting Jackson ' s  choice to succeed 
Fitz, which had been pending for three months. Jackson tried to 
force the issue the fol lowing year by renominating the same person 
to the same post.297 The Senate again refused to confirm him by 
a vote of nearly two to one, but thi s  did nothing to blunt the force 
with which Jackson defended his removal powers. 
294. See Warren, supra note 2 1 ,  at I I .  
295. Andrew Jackson, Message to the Senate (Feb. 1 0, 1 835),  in 3 MESSAGES & PA­
PERS, supra note 1 77 ,  at 1 35 1 ,  1 35 1 -53 .  
296. !d. a t  1 352;  see also 2 HAYNES, supra note 1 55 ,  a t  796-97; Warren, supra note 
2 1 ,  at I I ; Younger, supra note 227, at 759-60. The following year, Treasury Secretary 
Lev i  Woodbury expressed a similar view in refusing a request by Senate Commerce Com­
mittee Chairman John Davis for i nformation regarding the removal of David Melvi l l  as 
weigher and gauger in the custom-house at Newport, Rhode Island. Woodbury stated: 
Nor is it the practice of the Department, even under the injunction of secrecy 
in  transacting Executive business as to appointments, where the Senate is, by 
law, a co-ordinate power, to forward communications on those subjects, unless 
they relate to nominations by the President, then under advisement before the 
Senate. 
Letter from Levi Woodbury to John Davis (May 5, 1 836), in S. Doc . No. 430, 24th 
Cong. ,  l st Sess. 26, 30 ( 1 836). 
297 . See 2 HAYNES, supra note 1 55 ,  at 797. 
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The Jackson Administration also vigorously defended presiden­
tial powers to supervise exercise of law execution. While not com­
pletely consistent on the issue, Jackson ' s  Attorneys General began 
challenging Wirt ' s conclusion that the President could not interfere 
with the decisions of accounting officers . 298 1 ackson ' s conduct 
298. Jackson' s  first Attorney General, John MacPherson Berrien, concluded that a deci ­
s ion o f  the Second Comptroller o f  the Treasury "could only be set aside b y  the Secretary, 
acting by the direction of the President." Berrien even suggested that the Secretary of 
War could overturn a decision of the Second Comptroller even without explicit authoriza­
tion from the President, reasoning that "the Secretary must possess this power, or Con­
gress would have placed him at the head of the Department of War to be subjected to 
the control of a subordinate officer of the Treasury." 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 302, 303 -04 
( 1 829). 
Jackson ' s  second Attorney General , future Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, at first also 
strongly supported the President ' s  power to direct al l subordinate officers, including both 
district attorneys and accounting officers. As Taney concluded: 
Upon the whole, I consider the district attorney as under the control and direc­
tion of the President . . . and that it is  within the legitimate power of the 
President to direct him to institute or to discontinue a pending suit, and to 
point out to him, h is  duty, whenever the interest of the United States is direct­
ly or indirectly concerned. 
[Even if Congress were to delegate prosecutorial discretion to some other exec­
utive official ,]  it would not, and could not, deprive the President of the powers 
which belong to him under the constitution. The power conferred on the [sub­
ordinate executive official ] ,  by the law of Congress, would be merely in  aid of 
the President, and to l ighten the labors of his office. It could not restrain or 
l imit his constitutional powers. 
2 Op. Att ' y  Gen. 482, 489, 492 ( 1 83 1 ) .  And if a district attorney refused to follow the 
President ' s  directions, the President would be entitled to remove him. !d. at 489. Consis­
tent with Berrien 's  opinion, Taney also concluded that a Secretary of War ' s  confirmation 
of an accounting officer's decision was appealable to the President. Taney did conclude 
that once one Secretary had confirmed such a decision, that successor's Secretaries could 
not reopen that decision. That this bar to subsequent reconsideration by the Secretary in 
no way precluded subsequent presidential review is  implicit in Taney' s  statement that 
"[t]he party may carry h is  appeal from the Secretary of War before the President." 2 Op. 
Att 'y Gen. 463, 464 ( 1 83 1 ) .  
A subsequent Taney opinion i ssued the following year wavered from thi s  position 
somewhat. Taney still maintained that the President had "the legal power to order the 
dismissal of a suit instituted in the name of the United States" or to "compel the officer 
to prepare for trial and proceed to trial wi thout delay." 2 Op. Att 'y  Gen. 507, 508, 5 1 0  
( 1 832). However, the laws governing the settlement of accounts "seem to regard the deci ­
sion o f  the Comptroller a s  final" and "appear . . . not t o  contemplate any appeal to the 
President." Therefore, Taney thought "that the decision of the Comptroller i n  this case is  
conclusive upon the executive branch of the government" and was not subject to subse­
quent presidential review. !d. at 509; see also 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 544 ( 1 832) .  An opinion 
issued in  between the two principle opinions clearly advised the President against over­
turning a decision of the accounting officers, but it is  not clear whether Taney 's  advice 
was based on policy grounds or a belief that the President lacked the authority to inter-
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makes i t  clear that h e  personally harbored n o  doubts about his 
power to control all p arts of the executive branch. Jackson domi­
nated his cabinet secretaries, treating them, as one historian has 
noted, "more l ike a General ' s  orderlies than high civil offi­
cials."299 Like Jefferson, he took direct control over federal crimi­
nal prosecutions, ordering a district attorney to terminate condem­
nation proceedings then pending over jewels owned by the Princess 
of Orange.300 Moreover, when Attorney General B errien resisted 
Jackson ' s  early efforts to subdue the B ank of the United States, 
Jackson bluntly told B errien, " [Y]ou must find a law authorizing 
the act or I will appoint an Attorney General who will ," after 
which Berrien resigned and was replaced with Roger Taney.301 
But as we shall see, these initial assertions of presidential control 
of the executive branch ,  strong as they were, paled in comparison 
to Jackson ' s  subsequent actions during his war w ith the B ank of 
the United States. Jackson ' s  resounding v ictory in that struggle, a 
v ictory in which he was ful ly supported by a mobilized and en-
vene. 2 Op. Att 'y  Gen. 5 1 5  ( 1 83 1 ) .  
Taney ' s  successor (and one of  the future House managers of  Andrew Johnson's  
impeachment) , Benjamin F. Butler, returned to  the position espoused by Berrien, relying 
squarely on Berrien's  opinion for the proposition that a Cabinet Secretary could either 
direct the Comptroller's resolution of any account that had not yet been finalized or re­
vise the decision upon reviewing the Comptroller's  report. See 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 652 
( 1 834). And since the Secretaries were clearly subject to presidential direction, this logi­
cally implied that nothing prohibited the President from directing the actions of the ac­
counting officers. In fact, Butler went so far as to suggest that, despite the statutory lan­
guage indicating that the decisions of the accounting officers were to be conclusive, "the 
Comptroller, or the head of the department, may be authorized to interfere for the purpose 
of correcting errors of frauds which may have been discovered after the action of the 
Auditor." 2 Op. Att ' y  Gen. 625, 630 ( 1 834). Thus, although Jackson 's  Attorneys General 
did waver on the issue, on balance they tended to support the President 's  power to direct 
all subordinates. 
299. HINSDALE, supra note 1 56, at 3 1 3 - 1 4, quoted in Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 
and 12.498, supra note 3, at 488. 
300. See Cross, Executive Orders 1 2,291 and 12,498, supra note 3, at 488; Zamir, 
supra note 24, at 877; see also 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 482, 489 ( 1 83 1 ) . Like Washington, 
Jackson also asked Congress to concentrate all legal authority in a newly formed depart­
ment. See Andrew Jackson, First Annual Message to Congress, in 3 MEsSAGES & PAPERS, 
supra note 1 77 ,  at 1 005, 1 0 1 6- 1 7 .  Jackson only succeeded in effecting the creation of a 
Solicitor of the Treasury who was given the authority to control the United States Attor­
neys. See Act of May 29, 1 830, ch. 1 53,  sec. 5 ,  4 Stat. 4 1 4, 4 1 5; see also Bloch, supra 
note 1 6, at 6 1 8  n. 1 84; Harvey, supra note 1 06,  at 1 578 & n.52. Jackson's direction of 
this prosecution clearly indicates that Jackson believed that his authority to control federal 
prosecutions did not depend on the creation of such a department. 
301 . Harvey . supra note 1 06,  at 1 679 (quoting ARTHUR S. MiLLER ,  The A ttorney Gener­
al as the President 's Lawyer, in ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 4 1 ,  5 1  ( 1 968)) 
(quoting Senator George H .  William 's  account of events)).  
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gaged public opinion, constitutes one of the truly great moments m 
the 208 year history of the unitary executive. 
3. Jackson ' s  Battle with the B ank arJd the Removal 
of Treasury Secretary Duane 
The conflict between Andrew Jackson arJd Congress over the 
Second Bank of the United States began in 1 832 when Jackson 
vetoed the bill to recharter the B ank,302 arJd won reelection in a 
campaign in which the B ank: had been a major issue.303 Jackson 
hated the Bank with an almost irrational vehemence, and he de­
scribed it at times as a hydra-headed monster that impaired the 
morals of the American people, corrupted their leaders, and threat­
ened their l iberty .304 Jackson ' s  disdain for the B ank was further 
enhanced by the active role the B an..� played in opposing his re­
election in 1 832,305 and by the proud and difficult personality of 
the B ank ' s  stubborn and vain president, Nicholas B iddle . 306 After 
B iddle ' s  foolish and unsuccessful involvement in several poiitical 
disputes with Jackson,307 and particularly after his reckless opposi­
tion to Jackson in the 1 832  election, the outraged and hot-tempered 
President resolved to destroy the B ank as soon as possible rather 
than waiting for its charter from the federal government to expire 
302. In what is now widely perceived as a blunder, the Bank ' s  President, Nicholas 
Biddle, pressed for its recharter four years before its initial charter was to expire. Jackson 
took the recharter proposal both as a challenge to his independence and as an indication 
of the Bank 's intention to meddle in electoral politics. The Bank's  political machinations 
only hardened Jackson ' s  resolve to destroy it so as to end its involvement in politics. At  
the height of  the Bank War, Jackson is said to  have remarked to  h i s  Vice President, 
"The Bank, Mr. Van B uren, is trying to kill me, but I will kill it." WILLIAM H. REHN­
QUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND 
PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 252 ( 1 992) (citing ARTHUR M. SCffi.ESINGER, JR . ,  THE AGE 
OF JACKSON 89 ( 1 946)) .  See generaily RICHARD B. LATNER, THE PRESIDENCY O F  AN­
DREW JACKSON 1 65 ( 1 979); REMINI, BAI"'K V'IAR, supra note 266, at 75- 80; ROBERT V. 
REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON A N D  THE COURSE O F  AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 1 833- 1 845, at 
1 43 ( 1 984) [hereinafter REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY); WALTER B. SMITH, ECONOMIC 
ASPECTS OF THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 1 49- 1 54 ( 1 953)  [hereinafter 
SMITH, ECONOMJC ASPECTS] .  
3 0 3 .  See RALPH C . H .  CATIERALL, THE SECOND B A N K  O F  THE UNITED STATES 285 
( 1 902); THOMAS P. GOVAN, NICHOLAS BIDDLE 242 ( 1 959); LATNER, supra note 303,  at 
1 65 ;  REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 45- 46,  99- 1 00; S MITH, ECONOMIC ASPECTS , 
supra note 303 , at 1 49, 1 56 .  
304. See REMINI , BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 1 5 .  
305. See id. at 98-99. 
306. See id. at 32-35, ! 76.  
307 .  See id. at 74-75. 
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i n  1 836.308 The mechanism that Jackson settled upon to accom­
plish this feat was to remove the federal money deposited in the 
Ban1c After some investigation and study, Jackson and his close 
aide Amos Kendall resolved that the federal money would be 
placed instead in a consortium of politically friendly state banks ,  
later known as  "pet" banks, as  had been done previously m 
1 8 1 9 .309 
The B ank ' s  charter authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to 
remove the federal deposits so long as the Secretary transmitted his 
reasons for doing so to Congress.3 1 0  Because Jackson ' s  first Trea­
sury Secretary , Louis McLane, had previously opposed removing 
the deposits, Jackson reshuffled his Cabinet, promoting McLane to 
Secretary of State and naming William J. Duane,  who up to that 
point had been an ardent opponent of the Bank, as the new Trea­
sury Secretary in June of 1 833 .3 1 1 However, when Jackson 
pressed Duane to remove the deposits, Duane was surprisingly 
reluctant to do so.3 1 2  
308. See id. at 1 09. 
309. See LATNER, supra note 302, at 1 7 1 ;  REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 1 25; 
REMINI , COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 1 08- 1 1  I .  For a reprint of Treasury 
Secretary Will iam Crawford 's 1 820 report regarding the removal of the deposits, see 1 0  
CONG. DEB. app. 1 3 1 -46 ( 1 834) .  
The President's power t o  remove the deposits essentially vi tiates the suggestion of­
fered by Lessig and Sunstein that the Second Bar..k of the United S tates constituted "the 
first truly independent agency in the republic ' s  history." Lessig & S unstein, supra note 6, 
at 30; see also Froomkin, Note, supra note 6, at 808. Although only five of the B ank's  
twenty-five directors were presidential appointees, the President always retained the power 
eliminate the Bank ' s  role in federal fiscal policy by ordering the removal of federal mon­
eys from the Bank. Thus,  as subsequent events would soon demonstrate, nothing about the 
Bank' s  structure prevented the President from asserting complete control over the execu­
tion of federal policy. Once all federal funds were removed from the B ank, it became in 
essence a wholly private entity with no governmental role of any kind. At that point, it 
ceases to be relevant that only five of the twenty-five directors were presidential appoint­
ees. 
3 1 0. See Act of Apr. I 0, 1 8 1 6, ch. 44, sec. 1 6 ,  3 Stat. 266, 27 4; see also Lessig & 
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 79 & n.3 1 2. 
3 1 1 .  See REMINI,  BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 1 1 5 .  
3 1 2. Unfortunately, Jackson and his friends mishandled Duane almost from the begin­
ning. Shortly after Duane was appointed, lower-level Treasury officers and Kitchen Cabi­
net members Reuben M. Whitney and Amos Kendall both bluntly told Duane that he was 
expected to remove the deposits immediately. Being ordered around by his subordinates 
wounded Duane ' s  pride and, in Duane ' s  mind, reduced him "to a mere cypher [sic] in 
the administration." Wil l iam J. Duane, Address to the People of the United States (Dec. 
2, 1 833), reprinted in I 0 CONG. DEB . app. 305 ( 1 834). When Duane, confronted Jackson 
with their statements, Jackson assured Duane that he did not authorize Whitney and Ken­
dal l ' s  visit, but did admit that he wanted the deposits removed. Duane indicated his oppo­
sition to such action, but agreed to resign if unable to comply with Jackson ' s  wishes. 
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The conflict between Duane and Jackson came to a head dur­
ing a series of Cabinet meetings held in S eptember 1 83 3 .  Jackson 
polled his Cabinet on the issue and discovered that support for 
removing the deposits was tepid at best.3 1 3  Undeterred by his 
Cabinet ' s  lack of enthusiasm, the very next day Jackson directed 
his Attorney General Roger B .  Taney to read an "Expose" that he 
had prepared for the President. It began with a strong exposition of 
the President ' s  mandate to proceed against the B ank by virtue of 
his recent reelection, cal l ing it "a decision of the people against the 
bank. "  Since Jackson "was sustained by a just people,  . . . he 
desires to evince his gratitude by carrying into effect their decision 
so far as it depends upon him."314  It then detailed several actions 
by the B ank as evidence of the B ank ' s  corruption. First, the 
Expose cited the B ank ' s  failure to redeem the national debt in 
accordance with l aw.3 1 5  S econd, the Expose described the B ank ' s  
Duane ' s  pride suffered another blow on the following month when Jackson ordered Duane 
to appoint Amos Kendall as an agent for recruiting state banks to serve as depositories 
for federal funds in place of the Bank. When Duane temporized, Jackson overruled Duane 
and instructed Kendall to draw up any orders he saw fit. Anned with his own instruc­
tions, Kendall quickly enlisted a group of state banks wi l l ing to risk the Bank ' s  wrath 
and serve as depositories for the federal government. See CLAUDE G. BOWERS,  THE PAR­
TY B ATILES OF THE JACKSON PERJOD 295-96 ( 1 965); CATTERALL, supra note 303, at 
292-93; GOVAN, supra note 303, at 236-39; MARQUJS JAMES, THE LIFE OF ANDREW 
JACKSON 649 ( 1 938) ;  LATNER, supra note 302, at 1 74-75;  REMlNl, BANK WAR, supra 
note 266, at 1 1 4- 1 7; REM!Nl, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 65, 86, 94 
n.47, 1 1 6- 1 7 . 
3 1 3 .  See BOWERS, supra note 3 1 2, at 303; CATTERALL, supra note 303,  at 295-96; 
LATNER, supra note 302, at 1 80; REMlNl, B ANK WAR, supra note 266, at 1 1 8 ; REMINI,  
COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 95-96. 
3 1 4. Andrew Jackson, Removal of the Public Deposits (Sept. 1 8 , 1 833),  in 3 MESSAGES 
& PAPERS, supra note 1 77 ,  at 1 224, 1 226 [hereinafter Jackson, Expose] .  A s  Jackson fur­
ther noted: 
The object avowed by many of the advocates of the bank was [in 
asking for a recharter] to put the President to the test, that the country might 
know his final determination relative to the bank prior to the ensuing elec­
tion . . . .  
Can it  now be said that the question of a recharter of the bank was 
not decided at the election which ensued? . . . On that ground the case was 
argued to the people; and now that the people have sustained the Presi­
dent, . . .  it  is too late . . .  to say that the question has not been decided. 
!d. at 1 225-26 (emphasis in original) ;  see also REM!Nl, B ANK WAR, supra note 266, at 
1 1 8- 1 9; REM INI ,  COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 97. 
3 1 5 . See Jackson, Expose, supra note 3 1 4, at 1 229-30. In March of 1 832,  the govern­
ment notified the Bank that it  intended i n  July of that year to redeem half of the $ 1 3  
mi l l ion in three-percent bonds i t  had issued, and i t  later informed the Bank that i t  intend­
ed to redeem the other half on January 1 ,  1 83 3 .  However, when the scheduled redemption 
dates arrived, the Bank did not have the cash to redeem the bonds. Even the three-month 
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reprehensible conduct when the French government refused to 
honor a draft given to the United States under a treaty for repara­
tions for the spoliation of American-owned property destroyed 
during the Napoleonic Wars . 3 1 6  Third, the Expose pointed out that 
the Bank had refused to seat the government-appointed B ank direc­
tors on any committees and frequently had conducted business 
without them even though the board then lacked a working quo­
rum.3 1 7  Finally, the Expose pointed out that the B ank had become 
improperly involved in politics, openly campaigning against Jack­
son in the previous presidential election. 3 1 8  Jackson clearly be­
l ieved, and with some justification,3 1 9 that the B ank was a rene­
gade institution and that it absolutely had to be stopped.320 
The Cabinet reacted to the Expose with a stunned silence. 
Several Cabinet members who had previously opposed removing 
the deposits worried that their positions had been compromised and 
offered their resignations. Reluctant to initiate a Cabinet shakeup, 
Jackson worked hard to persuade them to remain in office. He 
assumed full  responsibility for removing the deposits, and he sue-
extension negotiated by B iddle for the first redemption was insufficient to allow the Bank 
to repay the debt. This enraged Jackson, whose conservative fiscal policy made him a 
strong advocate for repaying the debt. To make matters worse, the envoy B iddle sent to 
Europe to obtain rel ief from foreign holders of the bonds negotiated an agreement that 
violated the Bank charter ' s  prohibition against purchasing the public debt. 
B iddle cavalierly brushed off the resulting hubbub, stating that he did not see how 
the delay in  redeeming of the bonds for a few months or the violation of the charter was 
material so long as the interest had stopped accruing and the federal government retained 
the use of its funds.  The ensuing public outcry eventually force d  B i ddle to repudiate the 
agreement with the foreign debt holders, and the national debt was not retired until late 
1 83 3 .  See BOWERS, supra note 3 1 2, at 304; LATNER, supra note 302, at 1 65 ;  REMINI, 
BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 1 1 9-2 1 ;  REMINI ,  COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 
302, at 97-98; SMITH, ECONOMIC ASPECfS, supra note 302, at 1 50 ,  1 56-58.  
3 1 6. See Jackson, Expose, supra note 3 1 4, at  1 23 1 -32. The draft was returned unpaid 
because the French Chamber of Deputies had failed to appropriate the funds for those 
reparations. When payment of the draft was refused by the French government, B iddle 
charged the federal government fifteen percent of the principal in interest, costs, reex­
change, and damages. When the federal government refused to pay these charges, B iddle 
deducted it from the government ' s  B ank dividends. See CATTERALL, supra note 303, at 
299-300; GovAN, supra note 303, at 233-34; REM IN!, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 
1 1 9-20; REMINI,  COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 9 8 ;  S MJTH, ECONOMIC As­
PECTS, supra note 302, at 1 59-60. 
3 1 7 . See Jackson, Expose, supra note 3 1 4, at 1 232-33; see also LATNER, supra note 
302, at 1 65 .  
3 1 8 . See Jackson, Expose, supra note 3 1 4, a t  1 233-35,  1 237.  
3 1 9 . See REMINI ,  BANK WAR, supra note 266, at  1 76.  
320.  See GOVAN, supra note 303, at  248;  J A MES, supra note 3 1 2, at  649; LATNER, 
supra note 302, at 1 8 1 .  
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cessfully entreated his Cabinet Secretaries to stay i n  office. 32 1 
Treasury Secretary Duane asked Jackson if he was being directed 
by the President to remove the deposits, and Jackson answered 
affirmatively.322 The next day, Jackson sent a message asking 
Duane if he had made his decision. When Duane asked for a delay 
until September 2 1 ,  Jackson informed Duane that the removal of 
the deposits would be announced by the newspapers on September 
20 with or without Duane 's  consent.323 
When the announcement appeared in the Washington Globe as 
indicated,324 Duane obstinately dug in his heels, asking that the 
removal be delayed ten weeks until Congress was back in session. 
Jackson remained adamant, insisting, "Not a day, not an hour."325 
Duane persisted, sending Jackson a puerile series of letters attempt­
ing to justify his actions and rescinding his previous promise to 
resign.326 Not wanting to argue further with Duane,  Jackson re­
turned Duane ' s  letter describing it "as a communication which I 
cannot receive," and this time he requested that Duane adhere to 
his previous promise to resign.327 After Duane continued to refuse 
to remove the deposits, Jackson sent Duane a curt l etter on Sep­
tember 23 dismissing him as Secretary of the Treasury . 328 Shortly 
32 1 .  See LATNER, supra note 302, at 1 82; REMINl, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 1 24-
25; REMINJ, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 99, 1 03-04. 
322. See REM!Nl, B AN K  WAR, supra note 266, at 1 22; REMINI,  COURSE OF DEMOCRA­
CY, supra note 302, at 99. 
323. See BOWERS, supra note 3 1 2, at 306; GOVAN, supra note 303, at 243 ;  REMI N J ,  
BANK W A R ,  supra note 266, a t  1 22;  REM!Nl, COURSE O F  DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at  
99- 1 00 
324. See WASH. GLOBE, Sept. 20, 1 833 ,  reprinted in 1 0  CONG. DEB. app. 306 ( 1 834); 
see also BOWERS, supra note 3 1 2, at 306; REMINJ, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 1 22.  
325. REM!Nl, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 1 24; REM!Nl, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, 
supra note 302, at 1 0 I .  
326. See Letter from the Secretary of the Treasu ry to the President of the Uni ted S tates 
(No. 2, Sept. 2 1 ,  1 833) ,  in I 0 CONG. DEB. app. 306, 306-07 ( 1 834); Letter from the 
Secretary of the Treasury to the President of the United States (No. 4, Sept. 2 1 ,  1 83 3) ,  in 
10 CONG. DEB. app. 307, 308 ( 1 834); Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the 
President of the United States (No. 5, Sept. 2 1 ,  1 833), in 10 CONG. DEB. app. 308,  308 
( 1 834); Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the President of the United States 
(No. 6, Sept. 2 1 ,  1 833) ,  in 10 CONG. DEB. app. 308, 309 ( 1 834); see also BOWERS, 
supra note 3 1 2, at 307-08; CATTERALL, supra note 303, at 293-94; REMINJ,  COUR S E  OF 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at I 00-0 I .  
327. Letter from the President of the United States to the Secretary o f  the Treasury 
(No. 3, Sept. 2 1 ,  1 833) ,  in 1 0  CONG. DEB. app. 307, 307 ( 1 834) (returning Duane ' s  first 
letter). Jackson later returned Duane ' s  subsequent letters as "inadmissible" al ong w i th h i s  
Jetter removing Duane. See Letter from th e  President of the U n i ted States t o  t h e  Secretary 
of the Treasury (No. 7, Sept. 23, 1 833) ,  in JO CONG. DEB. app. 309, 309 ( 1 834) [herein­
after, Jackson, Duane Removal Letter]. 
328. Jackson ' s  Jetter read as follows: 
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after Jackson appointed Taney as Duane ' s  successor, Taney an­
nounced the removal of the deposits .329 
Taney ' s  actions triggered a battle between Congress and the 
President of a magnitude the country had never before witnessed. 
The conflict led to the creation of the Whig Party during the win­
ter of 1 83 3-34, and it was in the Whig-controlled Senate that the 
conflict was sharpest as some of the greatest orators in the history 
of Congress spoke out against the actions of "King Andrew ! ."330 
The opposition was led by the famous triumvirate of Daniel Web­
ster, John C. Calhoun, and Henry Clay. It fel l  to Clay,  a long-time 
Bank supporter, defeated by Jackson in the election of 1 832, to 
call for an immediate investigation into the removal of the deposits 
that would be conducted by the entire Senate rather than by a 
committee. As a part of this investigation, on December 1 0, 1 833 ,  
Clay introduced a resolution requesting that Jackson lay a copy of 
the Expose before the Senate in order to ensure that the newspa-
[F]rom al l  your recent communications, as well as your recent conduct, your 
feelings and sentiments appear to be of such a character that, after your letter 
of July last, in which you say, should your views not accord with mine "I wil l  
from respect to you and for myself, afford you an opportunity to select a suc­
cessor whose views may accord with your own on the i mportant matter in 
contemplation," and your determination now to disregard the pledge you then 
gave, I feel myself constrained to notify you that your further services as Sec­
retary of the Treasury are no longer required. 
Jackson, Duane Removal Letter, supra note 327, at 309; see also LATNER, supra note 
302, at 1 8 1 ;  REMINI ,  BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 1 24; REMINl, COURSE OF DEMOCRA­
CY, supra note 302, at I 02. 
329. See Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury Transmitting a Report upon the 
Subject of the Removal of the Public Deposits from the Bank of the United States (Dec. 
3 ,  1 833) ,  in 10 CONG. DEB. app. 59 ( 1 834). Interestingly, Taney accepted the Treasury 
portfolio even though he owned stock in one of the state banks recruited to hold the 
federal funds in place of the Bank of the United S tates. This, of course, placed Taney in 
a direct conflict of interest. Taney ' s  position worsened further when that state bank ' s  
financial troubles l e d  it t o  balance i t s  own accounts by improperly drawing o n  funds that 
the federal government had given to it to protect against any future retal iation by the 
Bank of the United States. See CATTERALL, supra note 303, at 303; GOVAN, supra note 
303, at 245; JAMES, supra note 3 1 2, at 65 1 ;  REMINI ,  COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 
302, at I 05-06. 
3 30. Claude Bowers aptly entitles his chapter discussing this debate as "The Battle of 
the Gods ."  BOWERS, supra note 3 1 2, at 322. Thomas A . R .  Nelson similarly observed in 
his closing argument during the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson, "There were giants 
in those days." 2 THE TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
BEFORE THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF REP­
RESENTATIVES FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 1 6 1  (Washington, Gov ' t  Printing 
Off. 1 868) (hereinafter TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON ] ;  see also REMINI ,  BANK WAR, supra 
note 266, at 1 30; GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN, THE LIFE OF HENRY CLAY 278 ( 1 937) . 
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pers had reported it accurately .  This resolution carried by a vote of 
twenty-three to eighteen.33 1  Even though the Expose had been 
widely published and was eventually even reprinted in the Register 
of Debates,332 Jackson refused to comply, exclaiming: 
The executive is a coordinate and independent branch of 
the Government equally with the Senate, and I have yet to 
learn under what constitu tional authority that branch of the 
Legislature has a right to require of me an account of any 
communication . . . made to the heads of Departments 
acting as a Cabinet council . 333 
Clay retaliated on December 26 by introducing a series of four 
resolutions to censure Jackson. The first three resolutions addressed 
whether the circumstances justified the removal of the deposits. 
The fourth resolution condemned Duane ' s  removal : 
[B]y dismissing the late S ecretary of the Treasury because 
he would not, contrary to his sense of his own duty, re­
move the money of the United S tates in deposite [sic] w ith 
the Bank of the United S tates and its branches, in confor­
mity with the President' s  opinion; and by appointing his 
successor to effect such removal, which has been done, the 
President has assumed the exercise of a power over the 
treasury of the United S tates ,  not granted to him by the 
constitution and laws,  and dangerous to the l iberties of the 
people.334 
33 1 .  See 1 0  CONG . DEB. 23-37 ( 1 833) .  
332 .  See I 0 CONG. DEB. app. 284 ( 1 834) .  
333 .  Andrew Jackson, Message to  the  Senate ( Dec. 1 2 , 1 833),  in  3 MESSAGES & PA­
PERS, supra note 1 77 ,  at 1 25 5 ,  1 255 ;  see also BOWERS, supra note 3 1 2, at 323;  J AMES, 
supra note 3 1 2, at 655-56; REMINI,  BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 1 37;  REMINI,  COURSE 
OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 1 23 ;  Younger, supra note 227, at 759.  
334.  10 CONG. DEB. 58  ( 1 833) .  The resolution was subsequently amended so that the 
final version read: "That the President, in the late executive proceedings in relation to the 
public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority not conferred by the constitution and 
laws, but in derogation of boLf-J ."  !d. at 1 1 87 ( 1 834); see also REMINI ,  COURSE OF DE­
MOCRACY, supra note 302, at 1 24-25. For the various versions of the resolutions, see 
Senator Benton 's  statements at 1 0  CONG . DEB. 637-38, 1 699 ( 1 834). 
In debating these resolutions, Clay charged, "We are . . .  in the midst of a revolu­
tion, hitherto bloodless, but rapidly tending towards a total change of the pure republican 
character of the Government, and to the concentration of all power in the hands of one 
man."  10 CONG . DEB. 59 ( 1 833) .  
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Despite the best efforts of Jackson ' s  supporters, these resolutions 
passed the Senate on March 29, 1 834, by a vote of twenty-six to 
twenty.335 
Passage of this censure resolution enraged Jackson. In response, 
he submitted a "Protest" in which he condemned the Senate ' s  
actions.336 S ince Jackson had been compelled to swear an oath to 
"preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution," it was his " impera­
tive duty to maintain the supremacy of that sacred instrument and 
the immunities of the department intrusted to my care by all means 
consistent with my own lawful powers, with the rights of others, 
and with the genius of our civil  institutions." Therefore, because 
the censure resolution was "not only unauthorized by the Constitu­
tion, but in many respects repugnant to its provisions and subver­
sive of the rights secured by it  to other coordinate departments,"  
Jackson concluded that he had no choice but to offer his "solemn 
335.  See I 0 CONG . DEB. 1 1 87 ( 1 83 4);  see also BOWERS, supra note 3 1 2, at 330, 3 37; 
CATIERALL, supra note 303, at 346; GOVAN, supra note 303, at 266; JAMES , supra note 
3 1 2, at 674; REM!Nl, B ANK WAR, supra note 266, at 1 37-41 ; REM!Nl, COURSE OF DE­
MOCRACY, supra note 302, at 1 49-52; VAN DEUSEN, supra note 3 30, at 284. 
Clay also took other actions to oppose Jackson. He considered fomenting impeach­
ment proceedings against Jackson based on Jackson's removals and vetoes, but was dis­
suaded by his colleagues. VAN DEUSEN, supra note 330, at 297. Clay later submitted 
additional anti-Jackson resolutions providing: 
I .  Resolved, That the constitution of the United States does not vest 
i n  the President power to remove at h.is pleasure officers under the Government 
of the United States, whose offices have been established by law. 
2. Resolved, That, in all cases of offices created by law, the tenure 
of holding which is not prescribed by the constitution, Congress is autho­
rized by the constitution to prescribe the tenure, terms, and conditions on which 
they are to be holden. 
3 .  Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be i nstructed to 
inquire into the expediency of providing by law that in all instances of ap­
pointment to office by the President, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, other than diplomatic appointments, the power of removal shall be 
exercised only in concurrence with the Senate, and, when the Senate is not in 
session, that the President may suspend any such officer, communicating his 
reasons for the suspension to the Senate at its first succeeding session; and, if  
the Senate concur with him,  the officer shal l  be removed, but  i f  i t  do not 
concur with h.im,  the officer shall be restored to office. 
1 0  CONG . DEB. 834-36 ( 1 834). These resolutions were made the order of the day on 
April 7, 1 834, but were never debated in the Senate. See id. at 1 260; see also VAN 
DEUSEN, supra note 330, at 297-98. 
336. Andrew Jackson, Protest (Apr. 1 5 ,  1 834), 3 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 1 77, 
at 1 288 [hereinafter Jackson, Protest); see also BOWERS, supra note 3 1 2, at 3 30, 339; 
GovAN, supra note 303, at 266; JAMES, supra note 3 1 2, at 674; REM IN!, BANK WAR, 
supra note 266, at 1 42-43 ; REMINI, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 1 52-53. 
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protest" to the censure resolution as an unconstitutional action on 
the part of the Senate.337 
Jackson began his Protest by decrying the Senate ' s  u se of 
resolutions as a means of declaring presidential actions unconstitu­
tional . Aside from a few, explicit deviations clearly mandated by 
the Constitution, the Vesting Clauses had established a formal 
separation of powers. As Jackson noted: 
The legislative power is, subject to the qualified negative 
of the President, vested in the Congress of the United 
S tates . . .  ; the executive power is vested exclusively in 
the President, except that in the conclusion of treaties and 
in certain appointments to office he is to act with the ad­
v ice and consent of the Senate; the judicial power is  vested 
exclusively in the S upreme and other courts of the United 
S tates, except in cases of impeachment.338 
The tripartite structure created by these Vesting Clauses should be 
strictly followed unless contradicted by an express constitutional 
provision. Admittedly, for the enumerated " special purposes," such 
337. Jackson, Protest, supra note 336 at 1 289 (emphasis in original). Jackso n ' s  Protest 
also included a sweeping claim of executive power over the public treasury. According to 
the Protest, "The custody of the public property, under such regulations as may be pre­
scribed by legislative authority, has always been considered an appropriate function of the 
executive department." S ince " [p]ublic money is but a species of public property," the 
Protest concluded that "its custody always has been and always must be . . .  intrusted to 
the executive department." !d. at 1 30 1 .  Jackson later recanted this position i n  his so-called 
Codicil to his Protest, in which he averred that "it was not my intention to deny i n  the 
[previous] message the power and right of the legislative department to provide by law 
for the custody, safe-keeping, and disposition of the public money and property of the 
United States." Andrew Jackson, Message to the Senate (Apr. 2 1 , 1 83 4),  in 3 MESSAGES 
& PAPERS, supra note 1 77, at 1 3 1 2 , 1 3 1 2 . The Codicil further conceded: 
l admit without reserve, as I have before done, the constitutional power of the 
Legislature to prescribe by law the place or places in which the public money 
or other property is  to be deposited, and to make such regulations concerning 
its custody,  removal, or disposition as they may think proper to enact. Nor do 
I claim for the Executive any right to the possession or disposition of the 
public property or treasure or any authority to interfere with the same, except 
when such possession, disposition or authority is  given to him by Jaw. Nor do 
I claim the right in any manner to supervise or interfere with the person in­
trusted with such property or treasure, unless he be an officer whose appoint­
ment under the Consti tution and Jaws, is  devolved upon the President alone or 
in conjunction with the Senate, and for whose conduct he is constitutional l y  
responsible. 
!d. at 1 3 1 3 . 
338.  Jackson, Protest, supra note 336, at 1 290. 
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as the President' s  veto power over legislation, Congress ' s  impeach­
ment power, and the Senate ' s  participation in treaties and appoint­
ments, "there is an occasional intermixture of the powers of the 
different departments, yet w ith these exceptions each of the three 
great departments is independent of the others in its sphere of 
action."339 These l imited departures,  however, constituted the only 
ways in which the Constitution authorized a particular branch to 
interfere in the affairs of ru."ly other branch: 
In every other respect each of them is the coequal of the 
other two, and all are the servants of the America.i1 people,  
w ithout power or right to control or censure each other in 
the service of their common superior, save only in the 
manner and to the degree which that superior has pre­
scribed. 340 
"Tested by these principles, "  Jackson concluded, "the resolution 
of the Senate is wholly unauthorized by the Constitution, and in 
derogation of its entire spirit." Although " [t]he high functions as­
signed by the Constitution to the Senate are in their nature either 
legislative, executive, or judicial," the censure resolution did not 
represent a proper exercise of any of those functions. In passing 
the censure resolution, the Senate could not have been acting in its 
legislative capacity, since the resolution "asserts no legislative 
power, proposes no legislative action, and neither possesses the 
form nor any of the attributes of a legislative measure."  Moreover, 
Jackson noted that the Senate ' s  executive powers "relate exclusive­
ly to the consideration of treaties and nominations to office, and 
they are exerc ised in secret session and with closed doors."  S ince 
" [t]his resolution does not apply to any treaty or nomination, and 
was passed in a public session ," Jackson thought it "manifest that 
the resolution was not justified by any of the executive powers 
conferred on the Senate." And although "the whole phraseology 
and sense of the resolution seem to be judicial," the only judicial 
power possessed by the Senate was the power to try i mpeach­
ments.341 The Senate, however, could not have passed the resolu­
tion pursuili"lt to its judicial power to try impeachments, s ince " [t]he 
Constitution makes the House of Representatives the exclusive 
judges,  in the first instance, of the question whether the President 
339. !d. 
340. !d. 
341 .  !d. at 1 29 1 -92. 
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has committed an impeachable offense," and the House had insti­
tuted no such proceedings.342 Therefore, Jackson concluded that 
the Constitution did not authorize the Senate to "take up, consider, 
and decide upon the official acts of the Executive" simply "for the 
purposes of a public censure, and without any vie to legislation or 
impeachment. "343 
Jackson did not simply denounce the form of the S enate ' s  
action. He attacked its substance as well .  In one of the most pow­
erful statements ever offered in favor of the theory of the unitary 
executive, Jackson declared that there was nothing improper in 
removing Duane for his failure to follow the President ' s  wishes. 
Because the Executive Power and the Take Care Clau ses made him 
"responsible for the entire action of the executive department, it 
was but reasonable that the power of appointing, overseeing, and 
controlling those who execute the laws-a power in its nature 
executive-should remain in his hands."344 Jackson elaborated: 
The whole executive power being vested in the President, 
who is responsible for its exercise, it  is a necessary conse­
quence that he should have a right to employ agents of his 
own choice to aid him in the performance of his duties,  
and to discharge them when he is no longer willing to be 
responsible for their acts.  In strict accordance with this 
principle, the power of removal , which, l ike that of ap­
pointment, is  an . . .  executive power, is  left unchecked by 
the Constitution in relation to all executive officers. 345 
342. !d. at 1 295; see also id. at 1 292 ("[U]nder the provisions of the Constitution i t  
would seem to b e  equally plain that neither the President nor any other officer can be 
rightfully subjected to the operation of the judicial power of the Senate except in the 
cases and under the forms prescribed by the Constitution."). Jackson also complained that 
the resolution could not represent a proper impeachment because it did not specify which 
laws or parts of the Constitution had been violated. /d. at 1 296-98. 
Interestingly, Jackson also challenged the censure resolution as an improper infringe­
ment upon the prerogatives of the House of Representatives as well as upon the 
President's:  
The Constitution makes the House of Representatives the exclusive judges, in 
the first instance, of the question whether the President has committed an im­
peachable offense. A majority of the Senate, whose interference with this pre­
liminary question has for the best of all reasons been studiously excluded, 
anticipate the action of the House of Representatives, assume . . . the function 
which belongs exclusively to that body. 
!d. at 1 295 . 
343. Jackson, Protest, supra note 3 36, at 1 29 1 .  
344. /d. at 1 298. 
345. !d. at 1 298-99. As Jackson further noted in his private memorandum book, only 
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And even " if there were any just ground for doubt on the face 
of the Constitution whether all executive officers are removable at 
the will of the President, it is obviated by the cotemporaneous [sic] 
construction of the instrument and the uniform practice under 
it. "346 As Jackson noted: 
The power of removal was a topic of solemn debate in the 
Congress of 1 789 while organizing the administrative de­
partments of the Government, and it was finally decided 
that the President derived from the Constitution the power 
of removal so far as it regard that department for whose 
acts he is responsible . 347 
through the exercise of the appointment and removal powers can the President ensure 
"that the laws are faithfully executed and those measures adopted which are best calculat­
ed to promote the public interest." REM!Nl, COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, s upra note 302, at 
1 02. 
Jackson also contrasted the treatment of the removal power under the Constitution 
with the regime established by the Articles of the Confederation. Jackson noted that "[ i ]n  
the Government from which many of the fundamental principles of our system are derived 
the head of the executive department originally had power to appoint and remove at wil l  
all  officers," including judges and that "[i]t  was to take the judges out of this general 
power of removal, and thus make them independent of the Executive, that the tenure of 
their offices was changed to good behavior." Jackson, Protest, supra note 336, at 1 299. 
The fact that no similar provision l imited the President's power to remove executive offi­
cers logically implied that the Constitution granted to the President the ful l  removal power 
over executive officers wielded by the executive under the Articles of the Confederation. 
See id. 
346. !d. at 1 299. 
347. ld. Although this debate at first focused on the State Department, its principles 
were subsequently extended to the Treasury Department as wel l ,  and "it appears never to 
have occurred to anyone in the Congress of 1 789, or since until very recently that [the 
Secretary of the Treasury] was other than an executive officer, the mere instrument of the 
Chief Magistrate in the execution of the laws, subject, like a l l  other heads of Depart­
ments, to his supervision and control." ld. at 1 299- 1 300. Furthermore, Jackson noted: 
[A]t the time of the organization of the Treasury Department an incident oc­
curred which distinctly evinces the unanimous concurrence of the First Congress 
in the principle that the Treasury Department is wholly executive in its charac­
ter and responsibilities. A motion was made to strike out the p rovision of the 
bill making it the duty of the Secretary "to digest and report p l ans for the 
improvement and management of the revenue and for the support of public 
credit," on the ground that it would give the executive department of the Gov­
ernment too much influence and power in Congress. The motion was not op­
posed on the ground that the Secretary was the officer of Congress and respon­
sible to that body, . . .  but on other ground, which conceded his executive 
character throughout. The whole discussion evinces an unanimous concurrence 
in the principle that the Secretary of the Treasury is wholly an executive offi­
cer. . . .  
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As Jackson concluded: 
Thus was it settled by the Constitution . . .  that the entire 
executive power is vested in the President of the United 
States; that as incident to that power the right of appointing 
and removing those officers who are to aid him in the 
execution of the laws,  w ith such restrictions only as the 
Constitution prescribes, is vested in the President; that the 
Secretary of the Treasury is one of those officers . . . ; that 
in the performance of these duties [the Secretary of the 
Treasury] is subject to the supervision and control of the 
President, and in all important measures having relation to 
them consults the Chief Magistrate and obtains his approval 
and sanction. 348 
Permitting the Senate "to interfere with this exercise of Execu­
tive power," Jackson warned, would inevitably lead to the complete 
destruction of executive independence: 
!d. at 1 300-0 I .  
348. Jackson, Protest, supra note 336, at 1 304 (emphasis added). Similar statements 
appear throughout the Protest: 
Here, then, we have the concurrent authority of President Washington, of the 
Senate, and the House of Representatives, numbers of whom had taken an 
active part in the convention which framed the Constitution and in the State 
conventions which adopted it, that the President derived an unqualified power 
of removal from that instrument itself, which i s  "beyond the reach of legislative 
authority." Upon this principle the Government has now been steadi ly  adminis­
tered for about forty-five years, during which there have been numerous remov­
als made by the President or by his direction, embracing every grade of execu­
tive officers from the heads of Departments to the messengers of bureaus. 
!d. at 1 299- 1 300. Jackson later stated: 
Nearly forty-five years had the President exercised, wi thout a question as to his  
rightful authority, those powers for the recent assumption of which he is now 
denounced. . . . [A]nd yet in  no one instance is i t  known that any man, 
whether patriot or partisan, had raised his voice against it as a v iolation of the 
Constitution. 
!d. at 1 305. Stil l  later, a sarcastic Jackson jibed: 
[O]n this occasion it is discovered for the first time that those who framed the 
Constitution misunderstood it; that the First Congress and all its successors 
have been under a delusion; that the practice of near forty-five years is but a 
continued usurpation; that the Secretary of the Treasury is not responsible to 
the President, and that to remove him is a violation of the Constitution and 
laws for which the President deserves to stand forever dishonored on the jour­
nals of the Senate. 
!d. at 1 306. 
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If the principle be once admitted, it is not difficult to per­
ceive where it may end. If by a mere denunciation like this 
resolution the President should ever be induced to act in a 
matter of official duty contrary to the honest convictions of 
his own mind in compliance with the wishes of the Senate, 
the constitutional independence of the executive department 
would be as effectually destroyed and its power as effectu­
ally transferred to the Senate as if that end had been ac­
complished by an amendment of the Constitution. . . . I t  
has already been maintained . . . that the Secretary of the 
Treasury is the officer of Congress and independent of the 
President. . . . Followed to its consequences,  this principle 
wil l  be found effectually to destroy one coordinate depart­
ment of the Government to concentrate in the hands of the 
Senate the whole executive power, and to leave the Presi­
dent as powerless as he would be useless-the shadow of 
authority after the substance had departed. 349 
In short, if " the practice by the Senate of the unconstitutional 
power of arraigning and censuring the official conduct of the Exec­
utive" were permitted to continue,  it would "break down the 
checks and balance by which the wisdom of its framers sought to 
insure its stability and usefulness"350 
And perhaps most importantly for the future contours of presi­
dential power, Jackson invoked the President ' s unique role as the 
only "direct representative of the American people" as supporting 
his authority to control of the entire affairs of the executive 
branch. 35 1 Jackson maintained that " (i ]f the S ecretary of the Trea­
sury be independent of the President in the execution of the laws,  
then is there no direct responsibility to the people in that important 
branch of this Government to which is committed the care of the 
national finances." Permitting the Secretary of the Treasury to 
decide for himself all issues pertaining to the Bank of the United 
States would effectively allow the B ank "to control . . .  the whole 
action of the Government . . .  in defiance of the Chief Magistrate 
349. !d. at 1 305.  
350. !d. at 1 309. 
35 1 .  !d.; see also id. at 1 290 (noting that the Pres ident was properly held accountable 
by "the bar of public opinion" as well as by the Constitution ·•for every act of his Ad­
ministration"); Jackson, Expose, supra note 3 1 4, at J 237 (mai ntaining that h i s  opposit ion 
to the Bank had been authorized by '·the suffrages of the American people'" ) .  
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elected by the people and responsible to them" so long as " a  Sec­
retary shall be found to accord with them in opinion or can be 
induced in practice to promote their views."352 Jackson also ad­
monished that permitting the Senate to sanction the President for 
purely executive acts threatened to undermine "the confidence of 
the people in [the President ' s] ability and v irtue . . .  , and the real 
power of the Government wil l  fall into the hands of a body hold­
ing their offices for long terms,  not elected by the people and not 
to them directly responsible ."353 Moreover, Jackson cautioned that 
congressional interference in executive affairs exacerbated the prob­
lems of faction and regionalism: 
[A] l l  the independent departments of the Government, and 
the States which compose our confederated Union, instead 
of attending to their appropriate duties and leaving those 
who may offend to be reclaimed or punished in the manner 
pointed out in the Constitution, would fal l  to mutual crimi­
nation and recrimination and give to the people confusion 
and anarchy instead of order and law, until at  length some 
form of aristocratic power would be established on the 
ruins of the Constitution or the S tates be broken into sepa­
rate communities .354 
Therefore, Jackson regarded it as his solemn duty to oppose any 
effort so "calculated . . .  to concentrate in the hands of a body not 
directly amenable to the people a degree of infl uence and power 
dangerous to their l iberties and fatal to the Constitution of the 
choice."355 Only by permitting the President to assume responsi­
bility for the entire executive branch, including the Treasury De­
partment, through the unrestricted exercise of the removal power 
could the normative benefits of energy, accountability, and faction 
control envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution be guaran­
teed. 
Upon the reading of the Protest in the Senate , George 
Poindexter immediately denounced it, declaring, as Remini de­
scribes, that "it could not be considered an executive message" in 
that it proposed no legislation and "did not pertain to any of the 
public occasions in which the President is . . . authorized to ad-
352 .  Jackson, Protest, supra note 336 ,  at 1 309. 
353. !d. at 1 3 1 0. 
354 .  !d. 
3 5 5 .  /d. at 1 3 1 1 .  
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dress himself to the Senate. "356 Poindexter charged that i t  was an 
"unofficial paper" s igned by one "Andrew Jackson" which should 
"not be received."357 Clay seconded Poindexter, objecting specifi­
cally to Jackson' s  claim as the representative of the people: 
The President speaks of a responsibil ity to h imself. . . . 
Thus ,  every thing concentrates in the President. He is the 
sole Executive; all other officers are his agents, and their 
duties are his duties.  This is altogether a mil itary idea, 
wholly incompatible w ith free government. I deny it abso­
lutely. There exists no such responsibil ity to the President. 
All are responsible to the law ,  and to the law only, or not 
responsible at all. 358 
Clay was backed up by the immense oratorical skills of John 
C. Calhoun, who was still embittered about being passed over as 
Jackson ' s  heir apparent,359 and who called the protest a "tyrant ' s  
plea."360 Calhoun thundered: 
Infatuated man !  blinded by ambition-intoxicated by flat­
tery and vanity ! Who, that is the least acquainted with the 
human heart-who, that i s  conversant w ith the page of 
history, does not see, under all this,  the workings of a 
dark, lawless, and insatiable ambition; which, if not arrest­
ed, will finally impel him to his own, or his country ' s  
ruin?36I 
Daniel Webster, after also flirting with the Democratic Party,362 
356. REMINI,  COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 1 55 .  
357.  /d. 
358. 1 0  CONG. DEB. 1 575  ( 1 834).  
359. Calhoun ' s  bitterness over h is  fall ing out wi th Jackson is  perhaps best i l lustrated by 
his role in blocking Marti n  Van B uren ' s  nomination as Minister to England. Not only did 
Calhoun orchestrate the defeat of Van B uren 's  confirmation; he even arranged that the 
vote would end in a tie, so that he himself, as Jackson's first Vice President, could cast 
the vote against Van Buren ' s  nomination. Calhoun' s  joy over the outcome was short- l ived, 
as Van Buren's defeat galvanized his support for the Vice Presidential nomination. Thus, 
soon after Van Buren was forced to return ignominiously from England, he was tapped as 
Calhoun's  replacement as the person whom Jackson would support to be his successor. 
See BOWERS, supra note 3 1 2 ,  at 1 78-82; HARR IS , ADVICE AND CONSENT, supra note 2 1 9, 
at 55; 2 HAYNES, supra note 1 55 ,  at 768; VAN R IPER, supra note 77, at 38;  WHITE, THE 
JACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at 1 08-09. 
360. 10 CONG. DEB. 1 645 ( 1 834).  
36 1 .  !d. 
362. See GOVAN, supra note 303, at 26 1 -62; REMINI,  COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra 
note 302, at I I 0, 1 28 .  
1 554  CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [ V o l .  47 1 45 1  
returned to the Whig fold and offered a scathing denunciation of 
the Protest: "Again and again we hear it said that the President is 
responsible to the American people ! that he is responsible to the 
bar of public opinion ! For whatever he does ,  he assumes account­
ability to the American people ! . . .  And this is thought enough for 
a limited, restrained, republican government !  "363 To Webster, the 
doctrines of Jackson ' s  protest were tantamount to dictatorial rule:  
" [I]f he may be allowed to consider h imself as the sole representa­
tive of all the American people . . .  then I say . . .  that the Gov­
ernment (I will not say the people) has already a master. "364 
The Senate voted twenty-seven to sixteen not to receive the 
Protest on May 8, 1 834,365 and Senator Benton ' s  motion to ex­
punge the Senate' s  refusal to receive the Protest from its Journal 
failed on the last day of the session.366 The Senate also refused to 
confirm four of Jackson ' s  five nominees for B ank directorships.367 
Jackson resolutely resubmitted their nominations along with a mes­
sage defending their candidacies .368 A Senate report acknowledged 
"that a right of renomination exists ," but opposed the practice 
except for " in very clear and strong cases."369 The Senate pro­
ceeded to reject the nominations by even wider margins than be­
fore.370 As a final gesture of defiance, the Senate summarily re-
363.  1 0  CONG. DEB. 1 687 ( 1 834).  
364.  !d. at 1 68 8 .  Webster may have been less than statesman-like in his advocacy for 
the Bank ,  since like Taney,  he was embroiled in a conflict  of interest. In the m idst of 
this conflict over the Bank, Webster wrote to B iddle complaining that his a.J11ma! "retain­
er" had not been "renewed or refreshed as usual." Webster warned ominously, "If  i t  be 
wished that my relations to the Bank should be continued, i t  may be well to send me the 
usual retainers." BOWERS, supra note 3 1 2, at 324; JAMES, supra note 3 1 2, at 657-58; 
REMINI,  COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 3 1 3, at 1 28;  VAN DEUSEN, supra note 3 30, 
at 278. 
365.  See 10 CONG. DEB. 1 7 1 1 - 1 2  ( 1 834);  see also VAN DEUS EN, supra note 330, at 
284. 
366. The Senate tabled Benton ' s  motion by a vote of 29 to 27. See I I  CONG. DEB . 
727-28 ( 1 835) ;  see aiso REMINI ,  COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 1 77 ;  VAN 
DEUSEN, supra note 3 30, at 284. 
3 67. See I 0 CONG . DEB . app. 3 1 0- 1 1  ( 1 834) (rejecting the nominations of Peter Wager 
by a vote of 20 to 2 5 ,  Henry D. G ilpin by a vote of 20 to 24, John T.  S ull ivan by a 
vote of 1 8  to 27, and Hugh McElderry by a vote of 20 to 25) .  
368.  See Andrew Jackson, Message to the Senate (Mar. 1 1 , 1 83 4) ,  in 3 MESSAGES & 
PAPERS, supra note 1 77,  at 1 260; see also BO\VERS, supra note 3 1 2, at 3 24; CATTERALL, 
supra note 303, at 308-09; HARRIS, ADVICE AND CONSENT, supra note 2 1 9, at 57-59;  
REMIN I ,  COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 1 75;  SMITH, ECONOMIC ASPECTS, 
supra note 302, at ! 67-68.  
369.  S .  Doc. No. 3 3 3 ,  23d Cong. ,  1 st Sess.  1 1 - 1 4  ( 1 834),  reprimed in 10 CONG. DEB.  
app. 3 1 4, 3 1 5  ( 1 834).  
370. See I 0 CONC. DEB. app. 3 !  6 ( 1 834) (rejecting the renominations by a vote of 30 
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jected Taney ' s  nomination as  Secretary of  the Treasury .37 1  
The debate would have been less rancorous in the Democrati­
cally-controlled House of Representatives but for a procedural 
blunder by one of Jackson' s  closest friends and all ies, James K. 
Polk. Jackson had hoped that Taney ' s  report would be referred to 
the Committee on Ways and Means,  which Polk chaired. However, 
Polk failed to object when another Member of Congress, at Clay ' s  
behest, moved that Taney ' s  report be considered b y  the Committee 
of the Whole, which opened the issue to unlimited debate on the 
House floor. When Polk tried to undo the damage by passing the 
previous question and reconsidering its decision, the motion failed 
by three votes.372 Consequently, Jackson ' s  removal of Duane was 
subjected to a lengthy debate in the House of Representatives as 
well.373 
Throughout this tumult, Jackson only became more resolute .374 
He was aided greatly by Nicholas Biddle ' s  foolish decision to 
trigger a financial panic during the winter of 1 833-34.375 Biddle 
believed that the panic would scare the public into supporting 
recharter of the Bank, but its effect was in the opposite direction. 
Ultimately, it angered the public and gave Jackson and the Demo­
crats a new complaint that could be used against the B ank. Jackson 
responded with great skil l  and made several deft political moves to 
deflect pressure from himself onto the Bank. First, he infused the 
debate with moral overtones, portraying the conflict as pitting 
honest working people against the moneyed aristocracy. Second, he 
deflected all criticism away from himself and towards the Bank, 
to I I ) ; see also HARRIS, ADVICE AND CONSENT, supra note 2 1 9, at 259; 2 HAYNES, 
supra note 1 55 ,  at 77 1 ;  SMITH,  ECONOMIC ASPECTS, supra note 302, at 1 67 -68; WHITE, 
THE jACKSONIANS, supra note 262, at I 09. Jackson subsequently stood by his defeated 
nominees, designating them for other positions with mixed success. See id. J ames A .  
Bayard, the one nominee who was confirmed by the Senate , declined to serve. See 2 
HAYNES, supra note 1 55 ,  at 77 1 ;  S MITH, ECONOMIC ASPECTS , supra note 302, at 1 67-68. 
37 1 .  See 2 GOLDSM ITH, supra note 1 25 ,  at 978; REHNQU!ST, supra note 302, at 255 
REM!NI,  BANK WAB., supra note 266, at 1 42; REMIN I ,  COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra 
note 302, at 1 70-72; VAN DEUSEN, supra note 330, at 279; W HITE, THE JACKSONIAN S ,  
supra note 262, a t  I 08- 1 0. 
372. See REMINI ,  COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 1 23-24. 
373 . One House member even considered in i tiating impeachment proceedings. See id. at 
I SO. 
374. Benton observed of Jackson, " I  . . . never saw him appear more truly heroic and 
grand than at this t ime. He was perfectly mild in his l anguage, cheerful in his temper, 
firm in his conviction." See id. (quoting I THOMAS H. BENTON ,  THIRTY YEARS ViEW 
424 ( 1 865)) . 
375. See REMINI ,  BANK WAR, supra not<:: 266, at 1 27-28. 
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responding to all those asking for relief from the monetary contrac­
tion, "What do you come to me for? . . .  Go to Nicholas B iddle.  
We have no money here, gentlemen. Biddle has al l  the mon­
ey ."376 Lastly, in a political coup de grace, in January 1 83 4  he 
revoked the Bank's  authority to serve as the federal government ' s  
agent in paying pensions to Revolutionary War veterans and direct­
ed Secretary of War Lewis Cass to recover the funds and accounts 
relating to those pensions.  When Biddle refused, Jackson suspended 
the pension payments altogether and referred the matter to Con­
gress, complaining that the Bank "not only defied the government 
but inflicted needless misery on the nation ' s  patriotic heroes. "377 
The public, unable to believe that "Jackson, the Hero of the War 
of 1 8 1 2, would withhold funds from veterans," proceeded to blame 
the entire matter on Biddle.378 
By mid-February of 1 834, public opinion had turned on the 
Bank.379 The Governor of Pennsylvania, previously a strong bank 
supporter, condemned B iddle in his annual message to the state 
legislature.380 With the chief executive of the B ank ' s  home state 
openly opposed to the Bank, Pennsylvania' s congressional delega­
tion and officials in other states quickly followed suit.38 1  B uoyed 
by the turn in public opinion, the House Democrats finally c losed 
off debate on the removal of deposits by a scant four votes .  382 
Taney ' s  report was referred to the Ways and Means Committee, 
which subsequently returned a report blaming B iddle for precipitat­
ing the Panic .383 The House then promptly passed resolutions de­
c laring ( 1 )  that the Bank ought not to be rechartered, (2) that the 
deposits ought not to be restored, (3)  that state banks ought to be 
376. REMINI ,  COURSE OF DEMOCRACY. supra note 302, at 1 1 4. 
377. Andrew Jackson, Message to the Senate and House of Representatives (Feb. 4, 
1 834), in 3 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 1 77 ,  at 1 258 .  
378 .  See REMINI , B ANK WAR, supra note 266, a t  1 60; see also CATTERALL, supra note 
303, at 305-07; ; REMINI,  COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 1 30-3 1 ;  S MITH, 
ECONOMIC ASPECTS, supra note 302, at 1 68 .  
379 .  See CAT ERALL, supra note 303 ,  a t  348 ;  REMINI , B A N K  WAR, supra note 266, at 
1 63 ;  REMINI ,  COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 1 64; VAN DEUSEN, supra note 
330, at 283. 
380. See BOWERS, supra note 3 1 2,  at 3 1 8 , 329; CATTERALL, supra note 303,  at 339-40; 
Gov A."l, supra note 303 , at 257; JAMES ,  supra note 3 1 2, at 672; REM IN I, COURSE OF 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 1 64. 
38 1 .  See CATTERALL, supra note 303, at 339-40; JAMES, supra note 3 1 2, at 672; 
REMINI , BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 1 63-64. 
382. See REMINI, BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 1 65 .  
383 .  See 1 0  CONG. DEB. app. 1 56-76 ( 1 834); see also REMINI ,  COURSE O F  DEMOCRACY, 
supra note 302, at 1 66. 
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continued as  federal depositories, and ( 4) that a spec ial committee 
should examine the Bank ' s  role in the Panic .384 The House later 
summarily tabled two Senate resolutions which disapproved of 
Taney ' s  action and called for the restoration of the deposits to the 
Bank.385 
With the House ' s  actions effectively overriding the previous 
action in the Senate, the B ank was doomed. B iddle quickened the 
end by refusing to allow the House investigators to examine the 
Bank ' s  books or correspondence and refusing to testify before 
Congress.386 Although B iddle attempted to save face by request­
ing an alternate investigation by the more Bank-friendly Senate, the 
Senate Finance Committee ' s  report approving of the B ank ' s  actions 
in refusing to cooperate with the House ' s  investigation was filed 
after the congressional elections and thus was too late to have any 
effect politically.387 
The following year, Senator Calhoun reported a bill to limit the 
President' s  removal power, the third section of which provided: 
[I]n all nominations made by the President to the Senate, 
to fill vacancies occasioned by the exercise of the 
President ' s  power to remove . . .  the fact of the removal 
shall be stated to the Senate, at the same time that the 
nomination is made, with a statement of the reasons for 
which such officer may have been removed.388 
The ensuing debate was a more measured and reasoned discussion 
of the removal power than was possible the previous session, when 
all positions taken on the ·removal power were offered in the politi­
cal shadow of the great B ank War.389 Calhoun ' s  bill passed the 
384. See CATTERALL, supra note 303 , at 3 4 1 -42; GovAN, supra note 303, at 266; 
LATNER, supra note 302, at 1 84; REMINI, BANK WAR , supra note 266, at 1 65-66; 
REMINI ,  COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 1 66-67; VAN DEUSEN, supra note 
330, at 283. 
385. See REMINI ,  COURSE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 1 67 ;  VAN DEUSEN, supra 
note 330, at 284. 
3 86.  See JAMES, supra note 3 1 2 ,  at 675; REMINI ,  B AN K  WAR, supra note 266, at 1 67 ;  
REMIN I ,  COURSE O F  DEMOCRACY, supra note 302, at 1 67 .  
387.  See CATTERALL, supra note 303,  a t  306, 356-58; REMI N! ,  BANK WAR, supra note 
266, at 1 68 .  
388 .  S .  Doc. N o .  I 0 9 ,  2 3 d  Cong., 2 d  Sess. ( 1 835),  reprinted in  I I CONG. D E B .  app. 
2 1 9-3 1 ( 1 835) ;  see also id. at 468 (statement of Sen. Webster) (quoting the b i l l ) ;  S MITH, 
CIVIL SERVICE, supra note 292, at 4. 
389. As Clay pointed out, it  was "extremely fortunate that this subject of executive 
patronage came up, at this  session, unencumbered by any col lateral question," unl ike in 
the prev ious session when " [t ]he bank m ingled itself in al l  our d iscussions." I I  CONG. 
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Senate on February 2 1 ,  1 835 ,  by a vote of thirty-one to s ix­
teen.390 House Speaker John Quincy Adams had prepared a long 
speech opposing Calhoun ' s  bil l .  However, he never got the chance 
to deliver it, as the bil l  was never cons idered by the House and 
died. The Senate exacted some measure of revenge by indefinitely 
postponing action on his nomination to the Supreme Court, but 
confirmed Taney as Chief Justice the following year.391 Final ly ,  
on January 1 6, 1 837,  the Senate erased the last vestige of its oppo­
sition to the President' s  power to remove, expunging the resolution 
censuring Jackson for his actions from its Senate Joumal .392 In 
discussing this vote, Leonard White writes: 
Jackson earned a personal triumph, and thus symbolically 
his reading of executive powers gained political confirma­
tion. "Never before and never since," wrote Corwin, "has 
the Senate so abased itself before a President."393 
Thus, Jackson ' s  victory over the Senate was made complete. 
The Senate triumvirate of Clay, Calhoun, and Webster, each 
driven by presidential ambition, proved far more unified in criticiz­
ing Jackson than in supporting the Bank. In considering Webster' s  
bill  to recharter the bank, the three splintered over the length of 
the recharter term, and in the end, the recharter failed.394 The 
B ank obtained a charter from Pennsylvania to keep its Philadelphia 
branch alive when its federal charter expired in 1 836,  but this 
extension was to be short l ived. The B ank ignominiously collapsed 
in 1 84 1 , the victim of wild speculation and fiscal mismanage­
ment.395 In the final analysis, even critics of unitary executive 
theory have been forced to concede that Jackson ' s  removal of 
Duane represents a monument to the development of the unitary 
DEB . 5 1 3  ( 1 835).  
390. See id. at 576. 
39 1 .  See REHNQUIST, supra note 302, at 255 .  
392. See 1 3  CONG. DEB . 504-05 ( 1 837)  (passing expungement resolution b y  a vote of 
24 to 1 9);  see also REM I N I ,  BANK WAR, supra note 266, at 1 74; LOUIS FISHER, PRESI­
DENTIAL SPENDING POWER 1 6  ( 1 975) ;  VAN DEUSEN, supra note 330, at 285.  
393.  WHITE, THE )ACKSONIANS, supra note 262.  at 44 (citing CORWI N .  THE PRESIDENT 
( 1 940 ed.), supra note 20, at 267).  
394. Webster offered a compromise recharter term of s ix years. but Clay, obstinatel y  
refusing t o  concede anything to Jackson, decl ined t o  support anything but a fu l l  twenty­
year term, while Calhoun favored 1 2 . See BOWERS, supra note 3 1 2, at 3 32-3 5 ;  
CAT ERALL, supra note 303, a t  336-38;  GOVAN, supra note 303,  a t  265-66; REMIN I ,  
BANK WAR, supra note 266, a t  1 65 .  
395.  See REMINI,  BANK WAR, supra note 266, a t  1 74. 
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executive. 396 Jackson ' s  unflagging advocacy o f  the President ' s  
power to supervise federal administration and to remove executive 
officials invalidates any suggestion that the executive branch acqui­
esced to any congressional interference with executive functions. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
When the first half-century of presidential practice under the 
Constitution is v iewed as a whole, it is crystal clear that the first 
seven Presidents did not by their words or their deeds undermine 
the unitary executive structure created in Philadelphia in 1 787 .  No 
reasonable Burkean common law constitutionalist could describe the 
whole of the presidential practice between 1 789 and 1 837 as con­
stituting a long-standing, consistent presidential acquiescence to 
congressional efforts to limit the unitariness of the executive. Even 
the Virginia dynasty of Presidents, whose constitutional views 
favored a weak chief executive,397 consistently opposed such con­
gressional incursions.  And as Jackson ' s  successful removal of Trea­
sury Secretary Duane demonstrated, no one could doubt the Presi­
dent ' s  constitutional power to control the entire executive branch 
(including the Treasury Department) and the actions of all of his 
subordinates. 
Perhaps the clearest proof of this  point comes from the writ­
ings of the most eminent constitutional commentators of that era, 
James Kent and Joseph Story, who clearly did not believe that the 
President had so acquiesced; in fact, if any established practice 
existed, they thought it indicated Congress ' s  inability to fragment 
the unitary executive. Kent claimed that the Decision of 1 789 
"amounted to a legislative construction of the constitution, and it  
has ever since been acquiesced in and acted upon, as of decisive 
authority in the case.  "398 Kent further noted: 
It is supported by the weighty reason, that the subordinate 
officers in the executive department ought to hold at the 
pleasure of the head of that department, because he is 
invested generally w ith the executive authority, and every 
participation in that authority by the Senate was an excep­
tion to a general principle, and ought to be taken strictl y .  
The President is the great responsible officer for the faith-
396. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 78-83 . 
397. See REHNQUIST, supra note 302, at 252. 
398. I KENT, supra note I ,  at 3 1 0. 
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ful execution of the law, and the power of removal was 
incidental to that duty , and might often be requisite to 
fulfill it. 
This question has never been made the subject of judi­
cial discussion; and the construction given to the Constitu­
tion in 1 789 has continued to rest on this loose, incidental 
declaratory opinion of Congress, and the sense and practice 
of government since that time. It may now be considered 
as firmly and definitely settled, and there is good sense 
and practical utility in the Construction.399 
Kent offered a similar observation in a letter to Daniel Webster: "I  
heard the question debated in the summer of 1 789, and Madison, 
Benson, Ames, Lawrence, etc . ,  were in favor of the right of re­
moval by the President, and such has been the opinion ever since, 
and the practice." Although Kent generally agreed with the views 
Hamilton expressed in The Federalist No. 77, he nonetheless con­
cluded: 
[I]t is  too late to call the President' s  power in question 
after a declaratory act of Congress and an acquiescence of 
half a century. We should hurt the reputation of our gov­
ernment with the world, and we are accused already of the 
Republican tendency of reducing all executive power into 
the legislative, and making Congress a national convention. 
That the President grossly abuses the power of removal is 
manifest, but it is the evil genius of Democracy to be the 
sport of factions. 400 
Likewise, Joseph Story, although critical of the Decision of 
1 789 ' s  outcome, conceded the fact that Congress had acquiesced 
and indicated that constitutionally  unlimited presidential removal 
power should be regarded as a settled constitutional point: 
The public . . .  acquiesced in this decision, and it consti­
tutes, perhaps the most extraordinary case in the history of 
the government of a power, conferred by implication on the 
executive by the assent of a bare majority of Congress, 
which has not been questioned on many other occasions .  
399. !d. (emphasis added) .  
400. Letter from James Kent t o  Daniel Webster (Jan. 2 1 ,  1 830) (emphasis  added),  in 1 
THE PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE OF DANIEL WEBSTER 486, 487 (Fletcher Webster ed. ,  
1 857) ,  quoted in Myers v .  United States, 272 U . S .  52  ( 1 926). 
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Even the most jealous advocates of state rights seem to 
have slumbered over this vast reach of authority, and h ave 
left it untouched. . . . 
. . . .  If there has been any aberration from the true consti­
tutional exposition of the power of removal [during the 
Andrew Jackson Administration] (which the reader must 
decide for himself,) it will be difficult, and perhaps imprac­
ticable, after forty years experience, to recall the practice 
to the correct theory.4D1 
Story ' s  and Kent' s  views in this respect were also held, as we 
have seen, by James Madison and D aniel Webster, both of whom 
thought that settled practice had conferred the removal power on 
the President. All four of these early and justly famous constitu­
tional commentators reject the Lessig and Sunstein argument about 
our early constitutional practices. 
Although Kent' s  and Story ' s  observations were l imited to the 
removal power, it is just as clear that the early Presidents of the 
Republic vigorously exercised their right to direct a11d review the 
actions of their subordinates. Although some (but not all) opinions 
of Attorney General Wirt suggest otherwise, Presidents throughout 
this period often exerted their control over the execution of the 
laws and did not hesitate to direct lower-level executive officials. 
And in the end, 'Wirt 's  v iews were subsequently disavowed during 
the Jackson Administration. Thus,  the first half-century of presiden­
tial practice under the Constitution provides l ittle support for the 
claim that any President accepted any l imitations whatsoever on 
the law execution power, including with respect to the Treasury 
Department. On the contrary, the vigor with which the first seven 
Presidents defended that power suggests , if anything, a fifty year 
founding tradition of constitutionally mandated presidential control 
over the executive branch .  
4() ] _  2 STORY, supra note 2, Section 1 543-44; see also 2 HAYNES, supra note 1 55 ,  at 
79 1 n.2. 
